2026 OPC POH Pre-Hearing Responses
Council of the District of Columbia · District of Columbia County · meeting of Mar 13, 2026 · Other
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Office of the People’s Counsel (OPC)
FY 25- 26 Performance Oversight
Hearing Responses Before the
Committee on Business and Economic Development
Submitted to the Office of the Chairman of the
Council of the District of Columbia
January 14th, 2026
Office of the People’s Counsel (OPC)
FY 25- 26 Performance Oversight
Hearing Responses Before the
Committee on Business and Economic Development
Submitted to the Office of the Chairman of the
Council of the District of Columbia
January 14th, 2026
The Table of Contents
TAB 1: Attachment 1: 2026 PERFORMANCE OVERSIGHT
TAB 2: Attachment 1: PJM TASK FORCE REPORT, PART 1
TAB 3: Attachment 1: PJM REPORT DONE BY SYNAPSE
TAB 4: Attachment 2: OPC ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
TAB 5: Attachment 3: OPC POSITION FUNDING REPORT
TAB 6: Attachment 4: OPC DATABASE
TAB 7: Attachment 5: CONTRACTS & PROCUREMENTS FY25
TAB 8: Attachment 5: CONTRACTS & PROCUREMENTS FY26
The Table of Contents
TAB 1: Attachment 1: 2026 PERFORMANCE OVERSIGHT
TAB 2: Attachment 1: PJM TASK FORCE REPORT, PART 1
TAB 3: Attachment 1: PJM REPORT DONE BY SYNAPSE
TAB 4: Attachment 2: OPC ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
TAB 5: Attachment 3: OPC POSITION FUNDING REPORT
TAB 6: Attachment 4: OPC DATABASE
TAB 7: Attachment 5: CONTRACTS & PROCUREMENTS FY25
TAB 8: Attachment 5: CONTRACTS & PROCUREMENTS FY26
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ATTACHMENT 5
(ORGANIZATIONAL CHART)
G
ENERAL QUESTIONS
ATTACHMENT 5
OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE’S COUNSEL
2026 PERFORMANCE
OVERSIGHT
ATTACHMENT 1
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OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE’S COUNSEL
2026 PERFORMANCE OVERSIGHT
Supplemental Performance Oversight Questions – Office of the People’s Counsel
Racial Equity
1. Describe any programs or policies where the Office has had success in building racial
equity during Fiscal Year 2025 and Fiscal Year 2026 to date.
Programs or Policies Where OPC Had Success in Building Racial Equity (FY25 & FY26 to
Date)
In Fiscal Year 2025, the Office of the People’s Counsel (OPC), through its Water Services Division,
hosted the Water Summit on September 29, 2025. This event was designed to advance racial equity
by ensuring inclusive participation from residents across all eight wards and diverse racial and
ethnic backgrounds. The Water Summit provides a platform for education and engagement on
utility resources available in the district, including water, energy, and telecommunications services.
The event focused on:
• Equitable Access to Information: Delivering clear guidance on programs that assist
consumers in managing utility bills and navigating affordability challenges.
• Community Empowerment: Helping residents understand their rights and available
assistance programs, regardless of income or background.
• Cross-Cultural Engagement: Creating an inclusive environment where diverse
communities can share experiences and learn strategies to maintain reliable and affordable
utility services.
By bringing together stakeholders and residents from varied racial and socioeconomic
backgrounds, OPC demonstrated its commitment to reducing disparities in utility access and
affordability. The Water Summit served as a model for how targeted outreach and education can
promote racial equity and empower historically underserved communities.
2. In the context of the Office and its mission, describe three areas, programs, or initiatives
where the Office has the greatest opportunity to address racial inequity.
From a litigation perspective, OPC has the greatest opportunity to address racial inequity
through effective advocacy in rate cases to control the rising cost of energy and by collecting
data on the impacts of rate cases and legislative mandates. To collect the necessary data, the
Office has filed a petition to establish an affordability study. One component of the petition
requests that the DC Public Service Commission (PSC) adopt an affordability metric. The
1
OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE’S COUNSEL
2026 PERFORMANCE OVERSIGHT
Supplemental Performance Oversight Questions – Office of the People’s Counsel
Racial Equity
1. Describe any programs or policies where the Office has had success in building racial
equity during Fiscal Year 2025 and Fiscal Year 2026 to date.
Programs or Policies Where OPC Had Success in Building Racial Equity (FY25 & FY26 to
Date)
In Fiscal Year 2025, the Office of the People’s Counsel (OPC), through its Water Services Division,
hosted the Water Summit on September 29, 2025. This event was designed to advance racial equity
by ensuring inclusive participation from residents across all eight wards and diverse racial and
ethnic backgrounds. The Water Summit provides a platform for education and engagement on
utility resources available in the district, including water, energy, and telecommunications services.
The event focused on:
• Equitable Access to Information: Delivering clear guidance on programs that assist
consumers in managing utility bills and navigating affordability challenges.
• Community Empowerment: Helping residents understand their rights and available
assistance programs, regardless of income or background.
• Cross-Cultural Engagement: Creating an inclusive environment where diverse
communities can share experiences and learn strategies to maintain reliable and affordable
utility services.
By bringing together stakeholders and residents from varied racial and socioeconomic
backgrounds, OPC demonstrated its commitment to reducing disparities in utility access and
affordability. The Water Summit served as a model for how targeted outreach and education can
promote racial equity and empower historically underserved communities.
2. In the context of the Office and its mission, describe three areas, programs, or initiatives
where the Office has the greatest opportunity to address racial inequity.
From a litigation perspective, OPC has the greatest opportunity to address racial inequity
through effective advocacy in rate cases to control the rising cost of energy and by collecting
data on the impacts of rate cases and legislative mandates. To collect the necessary data, the
Office has filed a petition to establish an affordability study. One component of the petition
requests that the DC Public Service Commission (PSC) adopt an affordability metric. The
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2
affordability metric will be a real -time measure of the impact of utility proposals and
Commission decisions on energy affordability for residential consumers. This data can be used
to inform the Commission, utility companies, consumer advocates, and other interested parties
as to how to enhance existing low-income programs or create new ones where necessary.
Furthermore, the Office identifies the following strategic areas for addressing inequity:
1. Targeted Outreach and Education
• Ward-Focused Engagement: Host monthly community forums in Wards 5, 7, and 8 to
educate residents on utility rights, billing assistance programs, and complaint resolution.
• Multilingual Resources: Provide materials in multiple languages to ensure inclusivity for
non-English-speaking communities.
• Mobile Outreach Units: Deploy outreach teams to high -traffic areas (community centers,
libraries, schools) to meet residents where they are.
2. Adopt-a-School Program
• Early Education on Utility Advocacy: Develop age-appropriate curriculum for middle and
high school students on energy efficiency, water conservation, and consumer rights.
• Student Ambassadors: Train students as “Utility Advocates” who can share knowledge
with peers and families.
• Career Pathways: Partner with utility companies to introduce internships or mentorship
programs for students interested in careers in the utility industry.
3. Partnerships with External Stakeholders
• Utility Companies & Agencies: Collaborate on equitable access programs like discounted
rates, arrearage forgiveness, and energy efficiency upgrades for low-income households.
• Community-Based Organizations: Work with local nonprofits and faith -based groups to
amplify outreach and build trust in underserved communities.
• Advisory N eighborhood Commissions (ANC) : Attend local ANCs meetings to identify
issues at the neighborhood level.
• Data-Driven Approach: Use demographic and usage data to identify inequities and tailor
solutions.
4. Digital & Media Campaigns
• Social Media Engagement: Share short videos and infographics explaining consumer rights
and assistance programs.
2
affordability metric will be a real -time measure of the impact of utility proposals and
Commission decisions on energy affordability for residential consumers. This data can be used
to inform the Commission, utility companies, consumer advocates, and other interested parties
as to how to enhance existing low-income programs or create new ones where necessary.
Furthermore, the Office identifies the following strategic areas for addressing inequity:
1. Targeted Outreach and Education
• Ward-Focused Engagement: Host monthly community forums in Wards 5, 7, and 8 to
educate residents on utility rights, billing assistance programs, and complaint resolution.
• Multilingual Resources: Provide materials in multiple languages to ensure inclusivity for
non-English-speaking communities.
• Mobile Outreach Units: Deploy outreach teams to high -traffic areas (community centers,
libraries, schools) to meet residents where they are.
2. Adopt-a-School Program
• Early Education on Utility Advocacy: Develop age-appropriate curriculum for middle and
high school students on energy efficiency, water conservation, and consumer rights.
• Student Ambassadors: Train students as “Utility Advocates” who can share knowledge
with peers and families.
• Career Pathways: Partner with utility companies to introduce internships or mentorship
programs for students interested in careers in the utility industry.
3. Partnerships with External Stakeholders
• Utility Companies & Agencies: Collaborate on equitable access programs like discounted
rates, arrearage forgiveness, and energy efficiency upgrades for low-income households.
• Community-Based Organizations: Work with local nonprofits and faith -based groups to
amplify outreach and build trust in underserved communities.
• Advisory N eighborhood Commissions (ANC) : Attend local ANCs meetings to identify
issues at the neighborhood level.
• Data-Driven Approach: Use demographic and usage data to identify inequities and tailor
solutions.
4. Digital & Media Campaigns
• Social Media Engagement: Share short videos and infographics explaining consumer rights
and assistance programs.
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3
• Ward-Specific Messaging: Highlight success stories from Wards 5, 7, and 8 to encourage
participation and build confidence.
5. Equity Metrics and Accountability
• Track Outreach Impact: Measure participation rates by ward and demographic to ensure
equitable reach.
• Consumer Satisfaction Surveys: Collect feedback to continuously improve services and
address gaps.
3. What barriers does your Office face when trying to: (1) make progress toward racial
equity or (2) better understand racial inequity within the agency’s context and operations
(if any)? How does your Office’s spending address existing racial inequities (gra nt
disbursement, procurement/contracting, etc.)
There are no barriers to racial equity or understanding of racial inequity. The mission of the Office
of the People’s Counsel (“OPC” or “The Office”) is to: advocate for the provision of safe and
reliable quality utility service and equitable treatment at rates that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory; advocate for climate change policies that transition the District to a clean
energy economy and sustainable environment in support of the District’s climate goals and that
benefits District utility consumers; assist individual consumers in disputes with utility providers;
provide technical assistance, education, and outreach to consumers, ratepayers, community
groups, and associations; and provide legislative analysis and information to the Council of the
District of Columbia on matters relating to utilities. The Office’s miss ion further includes
consideration of the District’s economy and promotion of environmental sustainability of the
District. The chart below reflects the complaints the office receives from Wards. A majority of
those complaints originate from Wards 4,5, 7,8, and those Wards have the lowest income . (See
chart; These numbers reflect the first quarter of FY26)
3
• Ward-Specific Messaging: Highlight success stories from Wards 5, 7, and 8 to encourage
participation and build confidence.
5. Equity Metrics and Accountability
• Track Outreach Impact: Measure participation rates by ward and demographic to ensure
equitable reach.
• Consumer Satisfaction Surveys: Collect feedback to continuously improve services and
address gaps.
3. What barriers does your Office face when trying to: (1) make progress toward racial
equity or (2) better understand racial inequity within the agency’s context and operations
(if any)? How does your Office’s spending address existing racial inequities (gra nt
disbursement, procurement/contracting, etc.)
There are no barriers to racial equity or understanding of racial inequity. The mission of the Office
of the People’s Counsel (“OPC” or “The Office”) is to: advocate for the provision of safe and
reliable quality utility service and equitable treatment at rates that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory; advocate for climate change policies that transition the District to a clean
energy economy and sustainable environment in support of the District’s climate goals and that
benefits District utility consumers; assist individual consumers in disputes with utility providers;
provide technical assistance, education, and outreach to consumers, ratepayers, community
groups, and associations; and provide legislative analysis and information to the Council of the
District of Columbia on matters relating to utilities. The Office’s miss ion further includes
consideration of the District’s economy and promotion of environmental sustainability of the
District. The chart below reflects the complaints the office receives from Wards. A majority of
those complaints originate from Wards 4,5, 7,8, and those Wards have the lowest income . (See
chart; These numbers reflect the first quarter of FY26)
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Please provide data on the racial diversity among leadership and at all staff grade levels.
How does retention differ by race across levels? How does pay differ by race within levels?
Racial Diversity Among Leadership:
▪ African American representation: 76.8%)
▪ Their average years of service: 23.3 years
▪ Range: 3 years (Consumer Services Manager) to 41 years (People's Counsel)
▪ Their average years of service: 23.5 years
▪ Range: 11 years (External Affairs Officer) to 38 years (Account/Rate Case Manager)
Observation: Retention is equal across racial groups in leadership, with both African American
and Asian or Pacific Islander employees exhibiting long tenure, averaging over 23 years.
Pay Differentiation by Race Within Leadership Levels:
African American Employees:
▪ Highest Annual Rate: $209,220.16 (People's Counsel, 41 years of service)
▪ Lowest Annual Rate: $130,000.00 (Consumer Services Manager, 3 years of service)
▪ Highest Annual Rate: $184,306.11 (Account/Rate Case Manager, 37 years of service)
▪Lowest Annual Rate: $145,000.00 (External Affairs Officer, 11 years of service) Observation:
African American employees on average earn slightly more, though pay varies significantly
within levels and appears tied to role type and tenure rather than race.
Agency Specific Questions
4
Please provide data on the racial diversity among leadership and at all staff grade levels.
How does retention differ by race across levels? How does pay differ by race within levels?
Racial Diversity Among Leadership:
▪ African American representation: 76.8%)
▪ Their average years of service: 23.3 years
▪ Range: 3 years (Consumer Services Manager) to 41 years (People's Counsel)
▪ Their average years of service: 23.5 years
▪ Range: 11 years (External Affairs Officer) to 38 years (Account/Rate Case Manager)
Observation: Retention is equal across racial groups in leadership, with both African American
and Asian or Pacific Islander employees exhibiting long tenure, averaging over 23 years.
Pay Differentiation by Race Within Leadership Levels:
African American Employees:
▪ Highest Annual Rate: $209,220.16 (People's Counsel, 41 years of service)
▪ Lowest Annual Rate: $130,000.00 (Consumer Services Manager, 3 years of service)
▪ Highest Annual Rate: $184,306.11 (Account/Rate Case Manager, 37 years of service)
▪Lowest Annual Rate: $145,000.00 (External Affairs Officer, 11 years of service) Observation:
African American employees on average earn slightly more, though pay varies significantly
within levels and appears tied to role type and tenure rather than race.
Agency Specific Questions
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5
4. Please identify the five most significant formal cases currently pending before the Public
Service Commission and provide a summary of the Office’s position and the current
status of the matter. To the extent permissible, please provide an explanation and status
update regarding OPC’s participation in each formal case identified.
The five most significant formal cases pending before the Public Service Commission are:
1. Formal Case No. 1176 – Pepco rate case appeal
2. Formal Case No. 1180 – Washington Gas Light rate case
3. Formal Case No. 1179 - PROJECTpipes (District SAFE Plan)
4. GD2025-01 - OPC’s Petition to Establish an Affordability Proceeding
5. Formal Case No 1167 – Climate Business Plan
Formal Case No. 1176 – Pepco rate case and Appeal to the DC Court of Appeals
On April 13, 2023, Pepco filed a request for approval of a multi-year rate plan that would
raise rates by $186.5 million over three years (2024-2026). This case was not a typical
request to increase rates; it was a proceeding to examine whether, going forward, Pepco
could shift the means of determining rates from a traditional one -year application format
to a multi-year rate plan.
OPC opposed Pepco’s multiyear rate plan because it proposed excessive and front -loaded
rate increases that would require customers to pay more before benefits were proven,
restricted the Commission’s ability to fully review whether Pepco’s costs were reasonably
and prudently incurred, and relied on an unjustified return on equity that would
unnecessarily increase customer bills, and included weak performance metrics that failed
to ensure meaningful service improvements, reliability gains, or accountability for poor
performance. Overall, OPC concluded that the plan shifted financial risk from Pepco’s
shareholders or customers and was inconsistent with the requirement that rates be just,
reasonable, and supported by the record.
Another huge issue in this case is that despite the complex financial, operational, and policy
issues raised in this case, the Commission did not convene an evidentiary hearing. Such a
hearing would have allowed for a full examination of Pepco’s financial assumptions,
construction and investment plans, and the fundamental question of whether shifting to a
multiyear rate plan was reasonable and in the public interest.
On November 26, 2024, approved a Modified Extended Multiyear Rate Plan (MRP) Pilot.”
This resulted in the approval of a multiyear rate plan for two years as opposed to three
years from 2025 -2026, authorizing a $123 million -dollar cumulative rate increase.
Specifically, the rate increase authorizes a $99.7 million increase for CY 2025 and a $23.7
million increase for 2026.
OPC filed an Application for Reconsideration of the order, which was denied. OPC then
filed a Petition for Review with the DC Court of Appeals. On November 28, 2025, the DC
Court of Appeals heard the case, and a decision is expected soon.
5
4. Please identify the five most significant formal cases currently pending before the Public
Service Commission and provide a summary of the Office’s position and the current
status of the matter. To the extent permissible, please provide an explanation and status
update regarding OPC’s participation in each formal case identified.
The five most significant formal cases pending before the Public Service Commission are:
1. Formal Case No. 1176 – Pepco rate case appeal
2. Formal Case No. 1180 – Washington Gas Light rate case
3. Formal Case No. 1179 - PROJECTpipes (District SAFE Plan)
4. GD2025-01 - OPC’s Petition to Establish an Affordability Proceeding
5. Formal Case No 1167 – Climate Business Plan
Formal Case No. 1176 – Pepco rate case and Appeal to the DC Court of Appeals
On April 13, 2023, Pepco filed a request for approval of a multi-year rate plan that would
raise rates by $186.5 million over three years (2024-2026). This case was not a typical
request to increase rates; it was a proceeding to examine whether, going forward, Pepco
could shift the means of determining rates from a traditional one -year application format
to a multi-year rate plan.
OPC opposed Pepco’s multiyear rate plan because it proposed excessive and front -loaded
rate increases that would require customers to pay more before benefits were proven,
restricted the Commission’s ability to fully review whether Pepco’s costs were reasonably
and prudently incurred, and relied on an unjustified return on equity that would
unnecessarily increase customer bills, and included weak performance metrics that failed
to ensure meaningful service improvements, reliability gains, or accountability for poor
performance. Overall, OPC concluded that the plan shifted financial risk from Pepco’s
shareholders or customers and was inconsistent with the requirement that rates be just,
reasonable, and supported by the record.
Another huge issue in this case is that despite the complex financial, operational, and policy
issues raised in this case, the Commission did not convene an evidentiary hearing. Such a
hearing would have allowed for a full examination of Pepco’s financial assumptions,
construction and investment plans, and the fundamental question of whether shifting to a
multiyear rate plan was reasonable and in the public interest.
On November 26, 2024, approved a Modified Extended Multiyear Rate Plan (MRP) Pilot.”
This resulted in the approval of a multiyear rate plan for two years as opposed to three
years from 2025 -2026, authorizing a $123 million -dollar cumulative rate increase.
Specifically, the rate increase authorizes a $99.7 million increase for CY 2025 and a $23.7
million increase for 2026.
OPC filed an Application for Reconsideration of the order, which was denied. OPC then
filed a Petition for Review with the DC Court of Appeals. On November 28, 2025, the DC
Court of Appeals heard the case, and a decision is expected soon.
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Formal Case No. 1180 – WGL Rate Case
On August 5, 2024, Washington Gas Light Company (WGL) filed an application seeking
authority to increase rates and charges for natural gas service in the District of Columbia
by a substantial $45.6 million. This request c ame just seven months after WGL received
$24.6 million in a previous rate case.
The three major issues in that case were 1) the transfer of costs from Project Pipes into
rates, 2) WGL’s proposal to recover accumulated tax losses, and 3) a request to increase
the company’s overall revenue requirement to fund the delivery of natural gas service.
OPC thoroughly examined the application and presented testimony to oppose the request
for such a large increase. Specifically, OPC found that the request to recover many of the
PROJECTpipes costs into base rates was premature because those costs have not been
examined through the required prudence review. As to the request to recover
accumulated tax losses, OPC found that WGL failed to provide documentation to verify
the source, amount, or accuracy of the tax losses and that the company relied on
assumptions rather than record evidence to support the claimed tax impacts. Last, as
regards WGL’s request to increase its overall revenue requirement, OPC found that the
company overstated its need for more review by relying on assumptions and projected
costs instead of actual costs.
Overall, OPC’s analysis shows that if the Commission approves any rate increase, it
should not exceed $9.42 million.
On November 25, 2025, the PSC granted WGL an increase of $33.4 million. This is the
largest increase granted to WGL. In December 2025, OPC filed an application for
reconsideration of the order, and we are awaiting the Commission's decision.
Formal Case No. 1179 - PROJECTpipes (District SAFE Plan)
PROJECTpipes is a long-term infrastructure replacement initiative led by Washington Gas
Light Company, created to modernize the District of Columbia’s aging natural gas pipeline
system. The program’s original goal was to proactively replace leak-prone pipe materials
to enhance public safety, reduce methane emissions, and improve the reliability of gas
service. It is funded through a special mechanism known as the Accelerated Pipe
Replacement Plan surcharge, which enable s WGL to recover project costs more quickly
than through traditional rate cases. The surcharge is recovered from WGL ratepayers,
The initial phase of PROJECTpipes was approved by the Commission in 2014. Since that
time, the Commission has approved a second version of PROJECTpipes in 2018. On
December 22, 2022, WGL submitted a five -year, $671.8 million proposal for
PROJECTpipes under the new name, District SAFE Plan.
OPC reviewed WGL’s proposal and raised multiple concerns in its testimony. OPC found
that, despite PROJECTpipes having begun in 2014, a substantial backlog of unrepaired
leaks remains; WGL failed to remain within budget during the first two phases of
6
Formal Case No. 1180 – WGL Rate Case
On August 5, 2024, Washington Gas Light Company (WGL) filed an application seeking
authority to increase rates and charges for natural gas service in the District of Columbia
by a substantial $45.6 million. This request c ame just seven months after WGL received
$24.6 million in a previous rate case.
The three major issues in that case were 1) the transfer of costs from Project Pipes into
rates, 2) WGL’s proposal to recover accumulated tax losses, and 3) a request to increase
the company’s overall revenue requirement to fund the delivery of natural gas service.
OPC thoroughly examined the application and presented testimony to oppose the request
for such a large increase. Specifically, OPC found that the request to recover many of the
PROJECTpipes costs into base rates was premature because those costs have not been
examined through the required prudence review. As to the request to recover
accumulated tax losses, OPC found that WGL failed to provide documentation to verify
the source, amount, or accuracy of the tax losses and that the company relied on
assumptions rather than record evidence to support the claimed tax impacts. Last, as
regards WGL’s request to increase its overall revenue requirement, OPC found that the
company overstated its need for more review by relying on assumptions and projected
costs instead of actual costs.
Overall, OPC’s analysis shows that if the Commission approves any rate increase, it
should not exceed $9.42 million.
On November 25, 2025, the PSC granted WGL an increase of $33.4 million. This is the
largest increase granted to WGL. In December 2025, OPC filed an application for
reconsideration of the order, and we are awaiting the Commission's decision.
Formal Case No. 1179 - PROJECTpipes (District SAFE Plan)
PROJECTpipes is a long-term infrastructure replacement initiative led by Washington Gas
Light Company, created to modernize the District of Columbia’s aging natural gas pipeline
system. The program’s original goal was to proactively replace leak-prone pipe materials
to enhance public safety, reduce methane emissions, and improve the reliability of gas
service. It is funded through a special mechanism known as the Accelerated Pipe
Replacement Plan surcharge, which enable s WGL to recover project costs more quickly
than through traditional rate cases. The surcharge is recovered from WGL ratepayers,
The initial phase of PROJECTpipes was approved by the Commission in 2014. Since that
time, the Commission has approved a second version of PROJECTpipes in 2018. On
December 22, 2022, WGL submitted a five -year, $671.8 million proposal for
PROJECTpipes under the new name, District SAFE Plan.
OPC reviewed WGL’s proposal and raised multiple concerns in its testimony. OPC found
that, despite PROJECTpipes having begun in 2014, a substantial backlog of unrepaired
leaks remains; WGL failed to remain within budget during the first two phases of
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7
PROJECTpipes the Company proposed to rely on a software platform for leak planning
and execution that is incompatible with the District’s topography; and the objectives of
District SAFE are misaligned with the District’s climate goals.
In addition, OPC determined that, even after being directed by the Commission to amend
District SAFE to address these and other deficiencies, WGL failed to provide a coherent
strategic plan for pipeline replacement and decommissioning, did not focus replac ement
efforts exclusively on the highest -risk pipe segments based on age, material, and leak
history, and did not demonstrate an appropriate balance between safety improvements,
emissions reductions, and the avoidance of stranded assets. OPC concluded that these
deficiencies alone warranted rejection of WGL’s District SAFE plan and recommended
that the Commission deny the proposal and require WGL to address pipeline replacement
through its routine construction operations, without accelerated cost recovery.
On December 9, 2025, the Commission held a limited evidentiary hearing on the issue of
the functionality and results of the risk modeling software used to identify which pipes will
be replaced. The other issues regarding accounting and other financial issu es will be
reviewed through written pleadings.
No decision has been issued in this case.
GD2025-01 - OPC’s Petition to Establish an Affordability Proceeding
On November 25, 2025, OPC filed a petition with the D.C. Public Service Commission to
open a comprehensive energy affordability proceeding to confront the growing crisis of
energy affordability.
One component of the petition requests that the PSC adopt an affordability metric. The
affordability metric will be a real -time measure of the impact of utility proposals and
Commission decisions on energy affordability for residential consumers. This data can be
used to inform the Commission, utility companies, consumer advocates, and other
interested parties as to how to develop solutions to reduce energy burdens.
This is one of the most significant matters currently before the Commission because it goes
beyond any single case and asks the PSC to fundamentally modernize how it evaluates the
real-world economic impact of its decisions on District residents. By establ ishing a clear,
data-driven affordability metric, the Commission would gain a consistent, transparent tool
to assess cumulative bill impacts, identify when utility proposals threaten household energy
affordability, and ensure that future decisions align wi th the district’s equity and
affordability goals.
The Commission has docketed the case but has not issued any further orders for parties
to respond to the petition.
7
PROJECTpipes the Company proposed to rely on a software platform for leak planning
and execution that is incompatible with the District’s topography; and the objectives of
District SAFE are misaligned with the District’s climate goals.
In addition, OPC determined that, even after being directed by the Commission to amend
District SAFE to address these and other deficiencies, WGL failed to provide a coherent
strategic plan for pipeline replacement and decommissioning, did not focus replac ement
efforts exclusively on the highest -risk pipe segments based on age, material, and leak
history, and did not demonstrate an appropriate balance between safety improvements,
emissions reductions, and the avoidance of stranded assets. OPC concluded that these
deficiencies alone warranted rejection of WGL’s District SAFE plan and recommended
that the Commission deny the proposal and require WGL to address pipeline replacement
through its routine construction operations, without accelerated cost recovery.
On December 9, 2025, the Commission held a limited evidentiary hearing on the issue of
the functionality and results of the risk modeling software used to identify which pipes will
be replaced. The other issues regarding accounting and other financial issu es will be
reviewed through written pleadings.
No decision has been issued in this case.
GD2025-01 - OPC’s Petition to Establish an Affordability Proceeding
On November 25, 2025, OPC filed a petition with the D.C. Public Service Commission to
open a comprehensive energy affordability proceeding to confront the growing crisis of
energy affordability.
One component of the petition requests that the PSC adopt an affordability metric. The
affordability metric will be a real -time measure of the impact of utility proposals and
Commission decisions on energy affordability for residential consumers. This data can be
used to inform the Commission, utility companies, consumer advocates, and other
interested parties as to how to develop solutions to reduce energy burdens.
This is one of the most significant matters currently before the Commission because it goes
beyond any single case and asks the PSC to fundamentally modernize how it evaluates the
real-world economic impact of its decisions on District residents. By establ ishing a clear,
data-driven affordability metric, the Commission would gain a consistent, transparent tool
to assess cumulative bill impacts, identify when utility proposals threaten household energy
affordability, and ensure that future decisions align wi th the district’s equity and
affordability goals.
The Commission has docketed the case but has not issued any further orders for parties
to respond to the petition.
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8
Formal Case No. 1167 -- Climate Business Plan
This proceeding has seen both utilities file their 15 -year plan to reduce emissions and
facilitate transportation and building electrification. WGL filed its plan on 6/9/ 25; Pepco
filed its plan, and the electrification study was filed on 10/31/25.
OPC's comments on WGL's proposal (filed 9/5/25) reiterated that the gas utility's plan is
non-responsive to the Commission's order to comply with District emissions reduction
laws as it largely maintains a business -as-usual approach to gas distribution and relies
primarily upon carbon offset credit purchases for emissions reduction compliance, with
increased cost passed along to ratepayers.
Comments on Pepco's plan and electrification study are due January 30th; OPC is currently
drafting comments focused on potential concerns with the proposal. OPC has been
involved in providing comments for this proceeding as well as for the Commission’s
Benefit-Cost Analysis Framework (GD2019 -04-M), which is set to inform the
implementation of the utilities’ plans.
Once all comments are submitted to the Commission, the PSC will then issue orders
accepting or rejecting the utilities 15-year plans and establishing implementation timelines
for proposed projects from each utility.
5. Please identify any legislative requirements that the Office lacks sufficient resources to
properly implement. Please identify any statutory or regulatory impediments to your
agency’s operations or mission.
There are no legislative requirements for which the Office lacks sufficient resources to properly
implement.
6. In FY26, the Office received an increase of $22,110 in the Consumer Services and
Advocacy program to support non -personnel services costs for the Advocate for
Consumers Fund.
a. Please describe how the Office will utilize this additional funding for the benefit of
consumers.
The Office of the People’s Counsel will utilize the additional funding to educate
consumers about energy-saving ideas and techniques, advertising, publications, and
brochures on how the Office can assist consumers with utility issues.
8
Formal Case No. 1167 -- Climate Business Plan
This proceeding has seen both utilities file their 15 -year plan to reduce emissions and
facilitate transportation and building electrification. WGL filed its plan on 6/9/ 25; Pepco
filed its plan, and the electrification study was filed on 10/31/25.
OPC's comments on WGL's proposal (filed 9/5/25) reiterated that the gas utility's plan is
non-responsive to the Commission's order to comply with District emissions reduction
laws as it largely maintains a business -as-usual approach to gas distribution and relies
primarily upon carbon offset credit purchases for emissions reduction compliance, with
increased cost passed along to ratepayers.
Comments on Pepco's plan and electrification study are due January 30th; OPC is currently
drafting comments focused on potential concerns with the proposal. OPC has been
involved in providing comments for this proceeding as well as for the Commission’s
Benefit-Cost Analysis Framework (GD2019 -04-M), which is set to inform the
implementation of the utilities’ plans.
Once all comments are submitted to the Commission, the PSC will then issue orders
accepting or rejecting the utilities 15-year plans and establishing implementation timelines
for proposed projects from each utility.
5. Please identify any legislative requirements that the Office lacks sufficient resources to
properly implement. Please identify any statutory or regulatory impediments to your
agency’s operations or mission.
There are no legislative requirements for which the Office lacks sufficient resources to properly
implement.
6. In FY26, the Office received an increase of $22,110 in the Consumer Services and
Advocacy program to support non -personnel services costs for the Advocate for
Consumers Fund.
a. Please describe how the Office will utilize this additional funding for the benefit of
consumers.
The Office of the People’s Counsel will utilize the additional funding to educate
consumers about energy-saving ideas and techniques, advertising, publications, and
brochures on how the Office can assist consumers with utility issues.
12_59151_FINAL.pdf
9
Consumer Issues
7. Please provide an update of the number of consumer complaints received by the Office
in Fiscal Year 2025 and Fiscal Year 2026, to date broken down by utility service.
Date range 10/1/2024 – 12/31/25
Electric (Pepco): 4096
Gas (WGL): 1156
Water (DC Water): 1211
a. Please provide analysis of any trends observed in the complaints received.
Observed Trends (Past Fiscal Year)
• High V olume of Complaints: Residents in Wards 5, 7, and 8 reported significant challenges
obtaining financial assistance for utilities.
• Decrease in Assistance Programs: Available programs have dwindled, leaving many
households without financial support.
• Misalignment Between Usage and Aid: Assistance amounts do not match actual utility
usage, which increases arrearages and service disconnections.
• Impact on Vulnerable Communities: Low-income and historically marginalized residents
are disproportionately affected.
Key Challenges
• Program Funding Gaps: Reduced funding or stricter eligibility criteria for assistance
programs.
• Lack of Awareness: Residents may not know about existing programs or how to apply.
• Administrative Barriers: Complex application processes discourage participation.
• Language barriers and an emerging fear of contacting or seeking relief from government
agencies.
9
Consumer Issues
7. Please provide an update of the number of consumer complaints received by the Office
in Fiscal Year 2025 and Fiscal Year 2026, to date broken down by utility service.
Date range 10/1/2024 – 12/31/25
Electric (Pepco): 4096
Gas (WGL): 1156
Water (DC Water): 1211
a. Please provide analysis of any trends observed in the complaints received.
Observed Trends (Past Fiscal Year)
• High V olume of Complaints: Residents in Wards 5, 7, and 8 reported significant challenges
obtaining financial assistance for utilities.
• Decrease in Assistance Programs: Available programs have dwindled, leaving many
households without financial support.
• Misalignment Between Usage and Aid: Assistance amounts do not match actual utility
usage, which increases arrearages and service disconnections.
• Impact on Vulnerable Communities: Low-income and historically marginalized residents
are disproportionately affected.
Key Challenges
• Program Funding Gaps: Reduced funding or stricter eligibility criteria for assistance
programs.
• Lack of Awareness: Residents may not know about existing programs or how to apply.
• Administrative Barriers: Complex application processes discourage participation.
• Language barriers and an emerging fear of contacting or seeking relief from government
agencies.
13_59151_FINAL.pdf
10
b. Please provide a Ward breakdown of the consumer complaints received by utility and
type of complaint.
c. Please provide an update on the Office’s Water Service s Division and its capacity to
address DC Water issues.
DC Water Forgiveness Program (with OPC Support)
Goal: Help residents reduce outstanding water bills and avoid disconnections while maintaining
service integrity.
How It Works:
• Residents enroll in a payment plan for their outstanding balance.
10
b. Please provide a Ward breakdown of the consumer complaints received by utility and
type of complaint.
c. Please provide an update on the Office’s Water Service s Division and its capacity to
address DC Water issues.
DC Water Forgiveness Program (with OPC Support)
Goal: Help residents reduce outstanding water bills and avoid disconnections while maintaining
service integrity.
How It Works:
• Residents enroll in a payment plan for their outstanding balance.
14_59151_FINAL.pdf
11
• If they make three consecutive on -time payments, they receive a credit equal to three
months of their bill.
• This cycle continues, allowing residents to lower their balance faster compared to standard
monthly payments that often include additional late fees.
• Encourages consistent payment behavior and provides a clear path to financial recovery.
Benefits to Residents
• Accelerated Debt Reduction: Credits significantly reduce arrears over time.
• Avoid Service Disconnection: Keeps water service active while resolving debt.
• Restores Trust: Demonstrates that utilities and OPC are working together to support
consumers.
Next Steps for Outreach
• Community Education: Create flyers, social media posts, and webinars explaining the
program.
• Ward-Focused Campaign: Target Wards 5, 7, and 8, where arrears and disconnections are
highest.
• Partner Amplification: Work with local nonprofits and schools to spread awareness.
8. District consumers saw increases in electricity costs starting in July 2025 due to higher
capacity prices across the region resulting from the recent Base Residual Auction
conducted by PJM Interconnection. How did the Office respond to these changes?
In response to the PJM Capacity Auction released on 7/30/24, OPC took three actions:
1. On October 15, 2024, OPC filed a petition with PSC to investigate 1) the financial
impact of the auction, 2) ways to educate consumers on the new charges, and 3) learn
what changes Pepco will make to its business strategy in light of the capacity auctions.
The Commission granted OPC’s petition and directed a task force of parties to develop
a report. The first report was filed on July 31, 2025. A second report will be filed later
this year.
2. OPC commissioned a study with Synapse to examine what happened at the auction to
cause the dramatic increase in costs and the impact on monthly impact on consumers’
bills in the District of Columbia: See attached Study.
3. OPC coordinated with other advocate offices in the PJM region to file comments to
address the structural issues in PJM that contributed to th e cause of the increase in
costs, specifically the lack of generation resources. OPC continues to work with these
offices as these issues evolve.
(See Attachments #1 (PJM Task Force Report, Part 1.PJM Report done by Synapse)
11
• If they make three consecutive on -time payments, they receive a credit equal to three
months of their bill.
• This cycle continues, allowing residents to lower their balance faster compared to standard
monthly payments that often include additional late fees.
• Encourages consistent payment behavior and provides a clear path to financial recovery.
Benefits to Residents
• Accelerated Debt Reduction: Credits significantly reduce arrears over time.
• Avoid Service Disconnection: Keeps water service active while resolving debt.
• Restores Trust: Demonstrates that utilities and OPC are working together to support
consumers.
Next Steps for Outreach
• Community Education: Create flyers, social media posts, and webinars explaining the
program.
• Ward-Focused Campaign: Target Wards 5, 7, and 8, where arrears and disconnections are
highest.
• Partner Amplification: Work with local nonprofits and schools to spread awareness.
8. District consumers saw increases in electricity costs starting in July 2025 due to higher
capacity prices across the region resulting from the recent Base Residual Auction
conducted by PJM Interconnection. How did the Office respond to these changes?
In response to the PJM Capacity Auction released on 7/30/24, OPC took three actions:
1. On October 15, 2024, OPC filed a petition with PSC to investigate 1) the financial
impact of the auction, 2) ways to educate consumers on the new charges, and 3) learn
what changes Pepco will make to its business strategy in light of the capacity auctions.
The Commission granted OPC’s petition and directed a task force of parties to develop
a report. The first report was filed on July 31, 2025. A second report will be filed later
this year.
2. OPC commissioned a study with Synapse to examine what happened at the auction to
cause the dramatic increase in costs and the impact on monthly impact on consumers’
bills in the District of Columbia: See attached Study.
3. OPC coordinated with other advocate offices in the PJM region to file comments to
address the structural issues in PJM that contributed to th e cause of the increase in
costs, specifically the lack of generation resources. OPC continues to work with these
offices as these issues evolve.
(See Attachments #1 (PJM Task Force Report, Part 1.PJM Report done by Synapse)
15_59151_FINAL.pdf
12
9. PJM has estimated that existing and projected data center growth will continue to
increase the cost of electric power for consumers. Will this create any cost or capacity
burdens for the Office to respond to these concerns?
Yes. The increase in data center growth will cause cost burdens for District of Columbia
consumers. As noted in response to Question 9, OPC continues to work with other advocate
offices in the PJM region to file comments with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
and PJM to recommend solutions to the factors causing costs to rise. OPC is also inquiring
with Pepco as to the specific amount of cost increase that is attributable to data centers in the
PJM region.
Governance and Personnel:
1. Please provide a complete and current organizational chart for the agency and each
division and subdivision within the agency, including:
a. The names and titles of all senior personnel;
(See Attachment #2 OPC Organizational Chart)
b. A description of the roles and responsibilities for each division and
subdivision;
• The People’s Counsel leads the office and determines all policy decisions
advanced by the O ffice to ensure the agency meets i ts statutory mandate to
represent and advocate for DC utility consumers.
• The Directorate Division determines policy that is consistent with the
Agency's mission to advocate for and protect the interests of DC utility
consumers.
• The Operations Division is responsible for agency fiscal management,
procurement, human resources, staff development, benefits administration,
communications, policy, and Information Technology functions.
• The Litigation Services Division engages diverse energy, telecommunications,
technical, and market monitoring functions as it litigates cases involving utility
companies before the Public Service Commission, federal regulatory agencies,
and the DC Court of Appeals.
• The Consumer Services Division provides education and outreach on utility
issues to District consumers, assists in the resolution of consumer complaints,
and provides technical assistance to lay advocates seeking to participate in the
regulatory process.
12
9. PJM has estimated that existing and projected data center growth will continue to
increase the cost of electric power for consumers. Will this create any cost or capacity
burdens for the Office to respond to these concerns?
Yes. The increase in data center growth will cause cost burdens for District of Columbia
consumers. As noted in response to Question 9, OPC continues to work with other advocate
offices in the PJM region to file comments with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
and PJM to recommend solutions to the factors causing costs to rise. OPC is also inquiring
with Pepco as to the specific amount of cost increase that is attributable to data centers in the
PJM region.
Governance and Personnel:
1. Please provide a complete and current organizational chart for the agency and each
division and subdivision within the agency, including:
a. The names and titles of all senior personnel;
(See Attachment #2 OPC Organizational Chart)
b. A description of the roles and responsibilities for each division and
subdivision;
• The People’s Counsel leads the office and determines all policy decisions
advanced by the O ffice to ensure the agency meets i ts statutory mandate to
represent and advocate for DC utility consumers.
• The Directorate Division determines policy that is consistent with the
Agency's mission to advocate for and protect the interests of DC utility
consumers.
• The Operations Division is responsible for agency fiscal management,
procurement, human resources, staff development, benefits administration,
communications, policy, and Information Technology functions.
• The Litigation Services Division engages diverse energy, telecommunications,
technical, and market monitoring functions as it litigates cases involving utility
companies before the Public Service Commission, federal regulatory agencies,
and the DC Court of Appeals.
• The Consumer Services Division provides education and outreach on utility
issues to District consumers, assists in the resolution of consumer complaints,
and provides technical assistance to lay advocates seeking to participate in the
regulatory process.
16_59151_FINAL.pdf
13
• The Water Services Division serves as the statutory advocate for water
consumers. WSD provides legal advocacy, education , and outreach, and
individual complaint resolution assistance for DC Water consumers.
c. A narrative explanation of any changes to the organizational chart made in
the last calendar year; and
No changes were made to the narrative
d. An indication of whether any positions in the chart are vacant.
The Office of People’s Counsel currently has three vacant positions:
1. Associate Director of Consumer Services
2. Water Services Attorney
3. Assistant People’s Counsel
2. Please provide a complete, up-to-date list of contract workers working directly for
your agency, ordered by program and activity, and including the following
information for each position: (see table below)
a. Title of position;
b. Indication that the position is filled or vacant;
c. Date employee began in the position;
d. Whether the position must be filled to comply with federal or local law;
e. If applicable, the federal or local law that requires the position be filled;
f. The entity from which they are contracted; and
g. The contracted annual cost.
Title Filled
or
Vacant
Start
Date
Federal or
local law
compliance
required?
Applicable
law
Contracting
entity
Contracted
annual cost
Production
Control
Clerk
Vacant 10/1/25 N/A N/A Aspen DC
Management
Solutions
$70,332.00
Executive
Assistance
Vacant 12/15/25 N/A N/A Aspen DC
Management
Solutions
$11,136.00
Info Tech
(Intern)
Vacant 12/15/25 N/A N/A Aspen DC
Management
Solutions
$14,364.00
13
• The Water Services Division serves as the statutory advocate for water
consumers. WSD provides legal advocacy, education , and outreach, and
individual complaint resolution assistance for DC Water consumers.
c. A narrative explanation of any changes to the organizational chart made in
the last calendar year; and
No changes were made to the narrative
d. An indication of whether any positions in the chart are vacant.
The Office of People’s Counsel currently has three vacant positions:
1. Associate Director of Consumer Services
2. Water Services Attorney
3. Assistant People’s Counsel
2. Please provide a complete, up-to-date list of contract workers working directly for
your agency, ordered by program and activity, and including the following
information for each position: (see table below)
a. Title of position;
b. Indication that the position is filled or vacant;
c. Date employee began in the position;
d. Whether the position must be filled to comply with federal or local law;
e. If applicable, the federal or local law that requires the position be filled;
f. The entity from which they are contracted; and
g. The contracted annual cost.
Title Filled
or
Vacant
Start
Date
Federal or
local law
compliance
required?
Applicable
law
Contracting
entity
Contracted
annual cost
Production
Control
Clerk
Vacant 10/1/25 N/A N/A Aspen DC
Management
Solutions
$70,332.00
Executive
Assistance
Vacant 12/15/25 N/A N/A Aspen DC
Management
Solutions
$11,136.00
Info Tech
(Intern)
Vacant 12/15/25 N/A N/A Aspen DC
Management
Solutions
$14,364.00
17_59151_FINAL.pdf
14
3. Please provide, for each month of FY25 through FY26 to date, the net number of
personnel separated from and hired to the agency.
Hired in FY25-FY26 Separated from FY25-FY26
Program Support Receptionist Assistant People’s Counsel-Water
Supervisory Trial Attorney Assistant People’s Counsel-Utility
Operations Support Services Consumer Outreach Specialist- Bilingual
Utility and Regulatory Program Analyst
Consumer Outreach Specialist- Bilingual
Total: 5 Total: 3
4. Does the agency conduct annual performance evaluations of all its employees? If so,
who conducts such evaluations? What steps are taken to ensure that all office
employees meet individual job requirements?
Managers conduct performance planning sessions with each staff member. This provides a
basis for evaluating performance. Each team member has 3 -5 goals they are responsible
for completing before the end of each fiscal year.
Managers conduct evaluations and ensure their assigned staff members meet job
requirements and perform their principal job functions. Managers also conduct individual
monthly meetings with team members. This enables supervisors to provide feedback on
individual performance.
The agency has further enhanced the performance management system in critical areas of
performance planning, performance execution, performance assessment, and performance
review, through its implementation and utilization of the District Government’s
Performance Management process.
5. Please provide the following for each collective bargaining agreement that is
currently in effect for agency employees:
a. The bargaining unit (name and local number);
b. The start and end date of each agreement;
c. The number of employees covered;
d. Whether the agency is currently bargaining;
e. If currently bargaining, anticipated completion date;
f. For each agreement, the union leader’s name title and contact information;
and
g. A copy of the ratified collective bargaining agreement.
Not applicable to OPC.
14
3. Please provide, for each month of FY25 through FY26 to date, the net number of
personnel separated from and hired to the agency.
Hired in FY25-FY26 Separated from FY25-FY26
Program Support Receptionist Assistant People’s Counsel-Water
Supervisory Trial Attorney Assistant People’s Counsel-Utility
Operations Support Services Consumer Outreach Specialist- Bilingual
Utility and Regulatory Program Analyst
Consumer Outreach Specialist- Bilingual
Total: 5 Total: 3
4. Does the agency conduct annual performance evaluations of all its employees? If so,
who conducts such evaluations? What steps are taken to ensure that all office
employees meet individual job requirements?
Managers conduct performance planning sessions with each staff member. This provides a
basis for evaluating performance. Each team member has 3 -5 goals they are responsible
for completing before the end of each fiscal year.
Managers conduct evaluations and ensure their assigned staff members meet job
requirements and perform their principal job functions. Managers also conduct individual
monthly meetings with team members. This enables supervisors to provide feedback on
individual performance.
The agency has further enhanced the performance management system in critical areas of
performance planning, performance execution, performance assessment, and performance
review, through its implementation and utilization of the District Government’s
Performance Management process.
5. Please provide the following for each collective bargaining agreement that is
currently in effect for agency employees:
a. The bargaining unit (name and local number);
b. The start and end date of each agreement;
c. The number of employees covered;
d. Whether the agency is currently bargaining;
e. If currently bargaining, anticipated completion date;
f. For each agreement, the union leader’s name title and contact information;
and
g. A copy of the ratified collective bargaining agreement.
Not applicable to OPC.
18_59151_FINAL.pdf
15
6. Please list all employees currently detailed to or from your agency. For each detailed
employee, include: (see table below)
a. The reason for the detail;
b. The job duties if detailed to your agency;
c. The start date of detail;
d. The agency the employee is detailed to/from; and
e. The projected date of return.
Employee Reason for
Detail
Detail start
date
Agency detailed To / From Projected date
of return
Abigail Marcus-
Garvie
Personnel
Matters
4/17/15 From: Office of the People’s
Counsel;
To: DC Department of Human
Services
Undetermined
7. Please provide a copy of your agency’s Schedule A, as of the date of receipt of this
questionnaire. (see link below: attachment 3 Position Funding Report)
DJ0 FY26_Position Funding Report_12-29-2025.xlsx
8. Please provide a list and description of all memorandums of understanding and
memorandums of agreement in effect during [previous fiscal year] and [current
fiscal year], to date.
• Revised Telework Policy
• Americans with Disabilities Act Policy
• V oluntary Leave Transfer Program Agreement
Finance and Budget:
9. Please provide a status report, including timeframe of completion, for all projects
for which your agency currently has capital funds available.
Not applicable to OPC.
10. Please provide copies of all budget enhancement requests (The Form B or similar
form) submitted in the formulation of the FY25 and FY26 proposed budgets.
This request asks for information that is protected from disclosure by the deliberative
process and executive privileges.
11. Please list all budget enhancements in FY26 and provide a status report on the
implementation of each enhancement.
15
6. Please list all employees currently detailed to or from your agency. For each detailed
employee, include: (see table below)
a. The reason for the detail;
b. The job duties if detailed to your agency;
c. The start date of detail;
d. The agency the employee is detailed to/from; and
e. The projected date of return.
Employee Reason for
Detail
Detail start
date
Agency detailed To / From Projected date
of return
Abigail Marcus-
Garvie
Personnel
Matters
4/17/15 From: Office of the People’s
Counsel;
To: DC Department of Human
Services
Undetermined
7. Please provide a copy of your agency’s Schedule A, as of the date of receipt of this
questionnaire. (see link below: attachment 3 Position Funding Report)
DJ0 FY26_Position Funding Report_12-29-2025.xlsx
8. Please provide a list and description of all memorandums of understanding and
memorandums of agreement in effect during [previous fiscal year] and [current
fiscal year], to date.
• Revised Telework Policy
• Americans with Disabilities Act Policy
• V oluntary Leave Transfer Program Agreement
Finance and Budget:
9. Please provide a status report, including timeframe of completion, for all projects
for which your agency currently has capital funds available.
Not applicable to OPC.
10. Please provide copies of all budget enhancement requests (The Form B or similar
form) submitted in the formulation of the FY25 and FY26 proposed budgets.
This request asks for information that is protected from disclosure by the deliberative
process and executive privileges.
11. Please list all budget enhancements in FY26 and provide a status report on the
implementation of each enhancement.
19_59151_FINAL.pdf
16
This request asks for information that is protected from disclosure by the deliberative
process and executive privileges.
12. Please fill out the attached spreadsheet titled “Question 12 Grants Received,” and list
all federal and/or private grants received by your agency in FY25 and FY26 to date,
current balances, and indicate any that lapsed during or at the end of [previous fiscal
year].
a. Please submit the completed document in both Excel and PDF formats.
b. Please include your Agency Code in the filename (e.g.,
question_12_AB0_2026.xls).
Not applicable to OPC.
13. List all grants issued by your agency in FY25 and FY26, to date in the attachment
labeled “Question 13 Grants Issued”.
a. Please submit the completed document in both Excel and PDF formats.
b. Please include your Agency Code in the filename (e.g.,
Question_13_AB0_2026.xls).
Not applicable to OPC.
Operations:
14. Please provide the Committee with a list of all vehicles owned or leased by the
agency; the purpose of the vehicle; the division the vehicle is assigned to, if
applicable; and whether the vehicle is assigned to an individual employee.
(See table below & Attachment #4 (OPC Vehicle List):
FY2025-
2026
Year Make & model Agency Lease or
Own
Assigned to Accident(s)
2019 Grand Caravan Agency Owned N/A None
2019 Grand Caravan Agency Owned N/A None
2019 Chevrolet Bolt
EV
Agency Water
Services Division
N/A None
15. For each objective and activity in the agency’s FY25 Performance Plan, please list:
a. The measure of greatest improvement for the agency, and the actions the
agency took to improve that measure’s outcome, efficiency or quantity; and
16
This request asks for information that is protected from disclosure by the deliberative
process and executive privileges.
12. Please fill out the attached spreadsheet titled “Question 12 Grants Received,” and list
all federal and/or private grants received by your agency in FY25 and FY26 to date,
current balances, and indicate any that lapsed during or at the end of [previous fiscal
year].
a. Please submit the completed document in both Excel and PDF formats.
b. Please include your Agency Code in the filename (e.g.,
question_12_AB0_2026.xls).
Not applicable to OPC.
13. List all grants issued by your agency in FY25 and FY26, to date in the attachment
labeled “Question 13 Grants Issued”.
a. Please submit the completed document in both Excel and PDF formats.
b. Please include your Agency Code in the filename (e.g.,
Question_13_AB0_2026.xls).
Not applicable to OPC.
Operations:
14. Please provide the Committee with a list of all vehicles owned or leased by the
agency; the purpose of the vehicle; the division the vehicle is assigned to, if
applicable; and whether the vehicle is assigned to an individual employee.
(See table below & Attachment #4 (OPC Vehicle List):
FY2025-
2026
Year Make & model Agency Lease or
Own
Assigned to Accident(s)
2019 Grand Caravan Agency Owned N/A None
2019 Grand Caravan Agency Owned N/A None
2019 Chevrolet Bolt
EV
Agency Water
Services Division
N/A None
15. For each objective and activity in the agency’s FY25 Performance Plan, please list:
a. The measure of greatest improvement for the agency, and the actions the
agency took to improve that measure’s outcome, efficiency or quantity; and
20_59151_FINAL.pdf
17
The Water Summit served as a primary catalyst for the agency's improved engagement metrics.
Key Highlights of the Water Summit
• 700+ Attendees: Strong turnout from residents across the District.
• Diverse Participation: Included keynote speakers, utility agencies, and community
organizations.
• Comprehensive Support: Provided resources, education, and direct assistance to
residents.
• Focus on Equity: Ensured representation from underserved wards and addressed
pressing utility issues.
Impact
• Increased awareness of consumer rights and available programs.
• Strengthened relationships with stakeholders (DC Water, other agencies).
• Positioned OPC as a trusted advocate and resource hub for residents.
Opportunities to Build on this Success
1. Annual Water Summit: Make it a signature event with expanded topics (energy and
sustainability).
2. Ward-Specific Mini Summits: Host smaller, localized events in Wards 5, 7, and 8 to
maintain momentum.
3. Digital Engagement: Record sessions and share highlights online for residents who
couldn’t attend.
4. Feedback: Collect attendee feedback to improve future events and identify emerging
issues.
Measure: The number of general consumer inquiries regarding programs,
assistance, or services.
- This measure showed the greatest improvement because inquiries significantly
increased, reflecting stronger community engagement and awareness of agency
services.
- Established citywide partnerships to expand reach and collaboration.
- Conducted community meetings and outreach events to connect directly with
residents.
- Implemented diverse advertising strategies, including newsletters and targeted
campaigns, to inform the public about available programs and assistance.
17
The Water Summit served as a primary catalyst for the agency's improved engagement metrics.
Key Highlights of the Water Summit
• 700+ Attendees: Strong turnout from residents across the District.
• Diverse Participation: Included keynote speakers, utility agencies, and community
organizations.
• Comprehensive Support: Provided resources, education, and direct assistance to
residents.
• Focus on Equity: Ensured representation from underserved wards and addressed
pressing utility issues.
Impact
• Increased awareness of consumer rights and available programs.
• Strengthened relationships with stakeholders (DC Water, other agencies).
• Positioned OPC as a trusted advocate and resource hub for residents.
Opportunities to Build on this Success
1. Annual Water Summit: Make it a signature event with expanded topics (energy and
sustainability).
2. Ward-Specific Mini Summits: Host smaller, localized events in Wards 5, 7, and 8 to
maintain momentum.
3. Digital Engagement: Record sessions and share highlights online for residents who
couldn’t attend.
4. Feedback: Collect attendee feedback to improve future events and identify emerging
issues.
Measure: The number of general consumer inquiries regarding programs,
assistance, or services.
- This measure showed the greatest improvement because inquiries significantly
increased, reflecting stronger community engagement and awareness of agency
services.
- Established citywide partnerships to expand reach and collaboration.
- Conducted community meetings and outreach events to connect directly with
residents.
- Implemented diverse advertising strategies, including newsletters and targeted
campaigns, to inform the public about available programs and assistance.
21_59151_FINAL.pdf
18
b. For all measures with missed targets (if any), explain the actions the agency
is taking to improve that measure’s outcome, efficiency, or quantity.
The Office is pleased to report that there were no missed targets for the
performance measures identified in the FY25 Performance Plan.
16. List all new objectives, activities and projects in the agency’s [current fiscal year]
Performance Plan and explain why they were added.
FY 26 Projects
Quarterly Social Service Summit Meetings (Pepco, Washington Gas, Telephone)
The Quarterly Social Service Summit is a collaborative forum hosted by the Office of the
People’s Counsel (OPC) Consumer Services Division. It brings together representatives
from all major utility agencies in the District and provides an open platform for residents
to engage directly with service providers. We discuss utility trends, reviewing current and
emerging trends that impact utility services across the district. S peakers share updates.
Utility companies present updates on programs, assistance optio ns, and service
improvements for residents. Highlight daily operations to learn what each utility does to
maintain reliable service and support customers. Resident Engagement to open a Q&A
session for residents to ask questions and share concerns. Collabor ative Innovation,
including brainstorming new strategies to ensure residents maintain utility services year -
round.
Anacostia Adopt -A- School Program
The Office of the People’s Counsel (OPC) serves as a School Program Provider and District
of Columbia Public Schools Partner with Anacostia High School. OPC sponsors a Youth-
Powered Climate Action Initiative Program (the “Program”). The Program intends to
empower Anacostia High School's environmentally focused youth to become informed
advocates for their community and environment through environmental justice workshops
and curriculum. The interactive workshops focus on building community advocacy skills
on utility rates, environmental justice, and policymaking. Additionally, the sessions educate
students in career exploration in sustainability, energy, and law.
OPC Agency Climate Change Conference
OPC will sponsor a one -day “Youth Climate Summit” for Gen Z, and millennials. The
event is aimed to educate the youth on: “What is Climate Change 101?” “Climate
Resiliency,” “Climate Advocacy” and “How to Prepare for a Green Future with Green
Jobs.” OPC’s Youth Climate Summit brings together industry experts, climate change
18
b. For all measures with missed targets (if any), explain the actions the agency
is taking to improve that measure’s outcome, efficiency, or quantity.
The Office is pleased to report that there were no missed targets for the
performance measures identified in the FY25 Performance Plan.
16. List all new objectives, activities and projects in the agency’s [current fiscal year]
Performance Plan and explain why they were added.
FY 26 Projects
Quarterly Social Service Summit Meetings (Pepco, Washington Gas, Telephone)
The Quarterly Social Service Summit is a collaborative forum hosted by the Office of the
People’s Counsel (OPC) Consumer Services Division. It brings together representatives
from all major utility agencies in the District and provides an open platform for residents
to engage directly with service providers. We discuss utility trends, reviewing current and
emerging trends that impact utility services across the district. S peakers share updates.
Utility companies present updates on programs, assistance optio ns, and service
improvements for residents. Highlight daily operations to learn what each utility does to
maintain reliable service and support customers. Resident Engagement to open a Q&A
session for residents to ask questions and share concerns. Collabor ative Innovation,
including brainstorming new strategies to ensure residents maintain utility services year -
round.
Anacostia Adopt -A- School Program
The Office of the People’s Counsel (OPC) serves as a School Program Provider and District
of Columbia Public Schools Partner with Anacostia High School. OPC sponsors a Youth-
Powered Climate Action Initiative Program (the “Program”). The Program intends to
empower Anacostia High School's environmentally focused youth to become informed
advocates for their community and environment through environmental justice workshops
and curriculum. The interactive workshops focus on building community advocacy skills
on utility rates, environmental justice, and policymaking. Additionally, the sessions educate
students in career exploration in sustainability, energy, and law.
OPC Agency Climate Change Conference
OPC will sponsor a one -day “Youth Climate Summit” for Gen Z, and millennials. The
event is aimed to educate the youth on: “What is Climate Change 101?” “Climate
Resiliency,” “Climate Advocacy” and “How to Prepare for a Green Future with Green
Jobs.” OPC’s Youth Climate Summit brings together industry experts, climate change
22_59151_FINAL.pdf
19
activists, influential figures, and others who will activate youth advocacy in DC and inspire
transformational climate change solutions. Additionally, the “Youth Climate Summit” is an
opportunity to connect to the next generations of change makers who are at the forefront
of climate change activism. A tangible benefit to the summit is that OPC educates the youth
to become Climate Change Ambassadors in their communities and to use their voice s for
policy change and advocacy.
FC 1167 - Utility Climate Business Plan
The Climate Business Plan proceeding is the Commission’s proceeding to review how
electric and gas utilities propose to address the District’s climate laws and emissions -
reduction requirements and to facilitate transportation and building electrification while
providing safe and reliable service. Utilities must show how their long -term investment
plans, infrastructure proposals, and spending decisions support the district’s climate
commitments, including greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets and the avoidance of
stranded investments and unnecessary customer costs. The proceeding will help provide
the Commission, policymakers, and the public with greater transparency int o whether
utility plans align with the District’s clean energy transition. OPC’s position is that
affordability and equity must be at the center of the Commission’s review and decision -
making so that progress on the District’s climate goals does not have a disproportionate
impact on low-income and vulnerable residents.
17. Describe problems and challenges, including chronic maintenance issues and design
flaws, in agency-owned or leased facilities. (see response below):
OPC leases approximately 21,030 square feet of office space at 655 15 th Street NW from
Boston Properties. The flaws: The space design includes concrete floors, concrete walls ,
and concrete pillars with a predominantly open floor plan with cubicles bordered by offices.
The challenge- A substantial component of OPC’s work involves engaging and assisting
residents through in -person meetings, phone calls , and other outreach activities.
Unfortunately, OPC’s mission and vision are challenged by its current office space design.
OPC’s open floor plan design is not well-suited for in -person meetings or telephone
engagement and conversations with residents, as sound bounces off the concrete floors and
walls. The current design does not allow for private discussions with residents about issues,
concerns, and problems they are facing with their utilities, and at the same time, the noise
created by multiple concurrent conversations in the open space negatively impacts
customer engagement. Additionally, OPC’s outreach and engagement plans include the
production, distribution, and airing of podcasts where important information, discussion,
engagement, and the dissemination of vital informati on and tools related to utilities could
be created and shared. However, the space initially designed to accommodate the podcast
is inadequate in size and function and is also ill -equipped. To address these flaws and
challenges, OPC is working with DGS to execute renovations to create more actual offices
19
activists, influential figures, and others who will activate youth advocacy in DC and inspire
transformational climate change solutions. Additionally, the “Youth Climate Summit” is an
opportunity to connect to the next generations of change makers who are at the forefront
of climate change activism. A tangible benefit to the summit is that OPC educates the youth
to become Climate Change Ambassadors in their communities and to use their voice s for
policy change and advocacy.
FC 1167 - Utility Climate Business Plan
The Climate Business Plan proceeding is the Commission’s proceeding to review how
electric and gas utilities propose to address the District’s climate laws and emissions -
reduction requirements and to facilitate transportation and building electrification while
providing safe and reliable service. Utilities must show how their long -term investment
plans, infrastructure proposals, and spending decisions support the district’s climate
commitments, including greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets and the avoidance of
stranded investments and unnecessary customer costs. The proceeding will help provide
the Commission, policymakers, and the public with greater transparency int o whether
utility plans align with the District’s clean energy transition. OPC’s position is that
affordability and equity must be at the center of the Commission’s review and decision -
making so that progress on the District’s climate goals does not have a disproportionate
impact on low-income and vulnerable residents.
17. Describe problems and challenges, including chronic maintenance issues and design
flaws, in agency-owned or leased facilities. (see response below):
OPC leases approximately 21,030 square feet of office space at 655 15 th Street NW from
Boston Properties. The flaws: The space design includes concrete floors, concrete walls ,
and concrete pillars with a predominantly open floor plan with cubicles bordered by offices.
The challenge- A substantial component of OPC’s work involves engaging and assisting
residents through in -person meetings, phone calls , and other outreach activities.
Unfortunately, OPC’s mission and vision are challenged by its current office space design.
OPC’s open floor plan design is not well-suited for in -person meetings or telephone
engagement and conversations with residents, as sound bounces off the concrete floors and
walls. The current design does not allow for private discussions with residents about issues,
concerns, and problems they are facing with their utilities, and at the same time, the noise
created by multiple concurrent conversations in the open space negatively impacts
customer engagement. Additionally, OPC’s outreach and engagement plans include the
production, distribution, and airing of podcasts where important information, discussion,
engagement, and the dissemination of vital informati on and tools related to utilities could
be created and shared. However, the space initially designed to accommodate the podcast
is inadequate in size and function and is also ill -equipped. To address these flaws and
challenges, OPC is working with DGS to execute renovations to create more actual offices
23_59151_FINAL.pdf
20
and enclosed conference spaces for client engagement in its current space. Additionally,
DGS is assisting with the acquisition of additional space in the current building to design
and build a state-of-the-art podcast studio to produce, distribute, and air podcast programs
to assist and provide residents with information and the tools to address their utility issues
and concerns. These renovations and the acquisition of the additional space will
satisfactorily address and eliminate the challenges and flaws OPC is experiencing.
a. What capital or operating projects arose from these issues in FY25 and FY26 to
date, including cost and actions taken? (see response below):
As a result of the flaws and challenges in OPC’s office design, OPC is working with DGS
to execute renovations to its current space to create more actual offices and enclosed
conference spaces for client engagement. Additionally, DGS is assisting with the
acquisition of additional space in the current building to design and build a state-of-the-art
podcast studio to produce, distribute , and air podcast programs to assist in providing
residents with information and the tools to address their utility issues and concerns. DGS
has engaged the building landlord (BXP), and a letter of intent has been executed between
DGS, OPC, and BXP. The estimated cost for renovations and the build-out is $ 724,561.
18. Please list each new initiative implemented by the agency during FY25 and FY26 to
date. For each new initiative, please provide:
c. A description of the initiative; The Office of the People’s Counsel (OPC) serves as
a School Program Provider and District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS)
Partner with Anacostia High School. OPC sponsors a Youth -Powered Climate
Action Initiative Program (the “Program”). The Program intends to empower
Anacostia High School's environmentally focused youth to become informed
advocates for their community and en vironment through environmental justice
workshops and curriculum. The interactive workshops focus on building
community advocacy ski lls on utility rates, environmental justice, and
policymaking. Additionally, the sessions will educate the students on career
opportunities in sustainability, energy, and law in the utility arena.
d. Actual start date; December 4, 2025 (MOU with Anacostia was approved by
DCPS on August 19, 2024).
e. Actual or anticipated end date; September 30, 2027
f. The funding required to implement the initiative; $40,000
g. Whether the initiative was mandated by legislative action; No
h. Problems or challenges faced in the program’s implementation; N/A
20
and enclosed conference spaces for client engagement in its current space. Additionally,
DGS is assisting with the acquisition of additional space in the current building to design
and build a state-of-the-art podcast studio to produce, distribute, and air podcast programs
to assist and provide residents with information and the tools to address their utility issues
and concerns. These renovations and the acquisition of the additional space will
satisfactorily address and eliminate the challenges and flaws OPC is experiencing.
a. What capital or operating projects arose from these issues in FY25 and FY26 to
date, including cost and actions taken? (see response below):
As a result of the flaws and challenges in OPC’s office design, OPC is working with DGS
to execute renovations to its current space to create more actual offices and enclosed
conference spaces for client engagement. Additionally, DGS is assisting with the
acquisition of additional space in the current building to design and build a state-of-the-art
podcast studio to produce, distribute , and air podcast programs to assist in providing
residents with information and the tools to address their utility issues and concerns. DGS
has engaged the building landlord (BXP), and a letter of intent has been executed between
DGS, OPC, and BXP. The estimated cost for renovations and the build-out is $ 724,561.
18. Please list each new initiative implemented by the agency during FY25 and FY26 to
date. For each new initiative, please provide:
c. A description of the initiative; The Office of the People’s Counsel (OPC) serves as
a School Program Provider and District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS)
Partner with Anacostia High School. OPC sponsors a Youth -Powered Climate
Action Initiative Program (the “Program”). The Program intends to empower
Anacostia High School's environmentally focused youth to become informed
advocates for their community and en vironment through environmental justice
workshops and curriculum. The interactive workshops focus on building
community advocacy ski lls on utility rates, environmental justice, and
policymaking. Additionally, the sessions will educate the students on career
opportunities in sustainability, energy, and law in the utility arena.
d. Actual start date; December 4, 2025 (MOU with Anacostia was approved by
DCPS on August 19, 2024).
e. Actual or anticipated end date; September 30, 2027
f. The funding required to implement the initiative; $40,000
g. Whether the initiative was mandated by legislative action; No
h. Problems or challenges faced in the program’s implementation; N/A
24_59151_FINAL.pdf
21
i. The metrics the agency is collecting to measure the initiative’s success; and –
polling and surveys with responses from teachers and students.
j. An assessment of the initiative’s success thus far. Successful 21-member team to
facilitate engaging and interactive workshops and curriculum with buy-in and
support from the Anacostia HS administration.
19. Please list any legislation that impacts your agency from FY25 and FY26 and
provide a status report on the agency’s implementation related to each piece of
legislation.
OPC has not identified any legislation in FY25 or FY26 that impacts its functioning and/or
operation.
20. Customer feedback
a. How does the agency solicit feedback from customers (i.e., District residents
served)? Please describe.
Current Feedback Process
• Survey Trigger: Sent when a case is created in the CMS system.
• Questions Include:
o How was the service provided?
o What could be improved from a utility standpoint?
• Data Use: Responses are compiled and analyzed.
• Collaboration: OPC works with utility agencies to address recurring issues and develop
solutions.
b. What has the agency learned from this feedback?
Key Insight from Survey Feedback
• Mass Shortage of Assistance Programs: Residents consistently report that available
financial aid is insufficient or inaccessible.
• Impact: Increased risk of arrears, disconnections, and financial stress, especially in
Wards 5, 7, and 8.
• Root Cause: Programs have dwindled while utility costs remain high, creating a gap
between need and support.
Next Steps to Address This
1. Identify Gaps and Opportunities
21
i. The metrics the agency is collecting to measure the initiative’s success; and –
polling and surveys with responses from teachers and students.
j. An assessment of the initiative’s success thus far. Successful 21-member team to
facilitate engaging and interactive workshops and curriculum with buy-in and
support from the Anacostia HS administration.
19. Please list any legislation that impacts your agency from FY25 and FY26 and
provide a status report on the agency’s implementation related to each piece of
legislation.
OPC has not identified any legislation in FY25 or FY26 that impacts its functioning and/or
operation.
20. Customer feedback
a. How does the agency solicit feedback from customers (i.e., District residents
served)? Please describe.
Current Feedback Process
• Survey Trigger: Sent when a case is created in the CMS system.
• Questions Include:
o How was the service provided?
o What could be improved from a utility standpoint?
• Data Use: Responses are compiled and analyzed.
• Collaboration: OPC works with utility agencies to address recurring issues and develop
solutions.
b. What has the agency learned from this feedback?
Key Insight from Survey Feedback
• Mass Shortage of Assistance Programs: Residents consistently report that available
financial aid is insufficient or inaccessible.
• Impact: Increased risk of arrears, disconnections, and financial stress, especially in
Wards 5, 7, and 8.
• Root Cause: Programs have dwindled while utility costs remain high, creating a gap
between need and support.
Next Steps to Address This
1. Identify Gaps and Opportunities
25_59151_FINAL.pdf
22
a. Map existing assistance programs and compare them to average utility costs.
b. Highlight eligibility barriers that exclude vulnerable households.
2. Advocate for Expansion
a. Work with the Public Service Commission, DC Water, and other utilities to
restore or increase funding.
b. Push for new programs or enhancements (e.g., income-based billing, arrearage
forgiveness).
3. Leverage Partnerships
a. Collaborate with nonprofits and community organizations to provide
emergency aid.
b. Explore federal or local grants to supplement assistance programs.
4. Communicate Findings
a. Share survey insights in reports to policymakers and stakeholders.
b. Use data to demonstrate the urgency and equity implications.
i. How has the agency changed its practices because of such feedback?
How OPC Has Changed Its Practices
• Data-Driven Decision Making: OPC now compiles survey feedback and identifies
the most common trends (e.g., financial assistance shortages).
• Solution-Oriented Approach: Instead of just reporting issues, OPC collaborates
with agencies and stakeholders to create actionable programs.
• Example – Financial Assistance Shortage:
o Survey data revealed a major gap in available aid for utilities, especially
water bills.
o OPC partnered with DC Water and external stakeholders to design programs
like payment plans with forgiveness credits, helping residents reduce arrears
faster.
o This proactive approach prevents disconnections and restores trust between
residents and utility providers.
Impact
• Residents receive tangible relief rather than just information.
• Agencies and utilities are aligned with consumer needs, improving service delivery.
• OPC strengthens its role as a consumer advocate and problem solver.
22
a. Map existing assistance programs and compare them to average utility costs.
b. Highlight eligibility barriers that exclude vulnerable households.
2. Advocate for Expansion
a. Work with the Public Service Commission, DC Water, and other utilities to
restore or increase funding.
b. Push for new programs or enhancements (e.g., income-based billing, arrearage
forgiveness).
3. Leverage Partnerships
a. Collaborate with nonprofits and community organizations to provide
emergency aid.
b. Explore federal or local grants to supplement assistance programs.
4. Communicate Findings
a. Share survey insights in reports to policymakers and stakeholders.
b. Use data to demonstrate the urgency and equity implications.
i. How has the agency changed its practices because of such feedback?
How OPC Has Changed Its Practices
• Data-Driven Decision Making: OPC now compiles survey feedback and identifies
the most common trends (e.g., financial assistance shortages).
• Solution-Oriented Approach: Instead of just reporting issues, OPC collaborates
with agencies and stakeholders to create actionable programs.
• Example – Financial Assistance Shortage:
o Survey data revealed a major gap in available aid for utilities, especially
water bills.
o OPC partnered with DC Water and external stakeholders to design programs
like payment plans with forgiveness credits, helping residents reduce arrears
faster.
o This proactive approach prevents disconnections and restores trust between
residents and utility providers.
Impact
• Residents receive tangible relief rather than just information.
• Agencies and utilities are aligned with consumer needs, improving service delivery.
• OPC strengthens its role as a consumer advocate and problem solver.
26_59151_FINAL.pdf
23
Laws, Audits, and Reports:
21. Please identify any legislative modifications that would enable the agency to better
meet its mission.
OPC supports legislative modifications that strengthen consumer protections, expand
access to affordability programs, and enhance transparency in utility operations. To better
meet its mission of ensuring equitable, reliable, and affordable utility services fo r District
residents, the agency identifies the following legislative priorities and recommended
modifications.
The DC Water Billing and Disconnection Modernization Amendment Act of 2025 (Bill 26-
443) aims to enhance transparency and provide stronger protections for District residents
facing water service shutoffs. This legislation requires the DC Water and Sewer Authority
to establish an amnesty program for outstanding balances and creates clear, consistent
timelines for the disconnection process, including extended windows for seniors and
residents with disabilities. The bill addresses inequities in multi-unit buildings by allowing
tenants to establish service in their own names if a landlord fails to pay a master -metered
bill, and it prohibits disconnections during periods of extreme weather. Adding provisions
that clarify legal procedures for multi -unit tenants would further reduce billing inequities
and prevent service disruptions for vulnerable populations.
The Automatic Enrollment for Utility Affordability Programs Act of 2025 (Bill 26 -243)
seeks to increase participation in financial assistance programs by removing administrative
hurdles for income -qualified households. The bill directs the Department of En ergy and
Environment to create a system that automatically enrolls eligible residents into utility
discount programs, such as LIHEAP and the Clean Rivers Residential Relief Program,
based on their participation in other programs like SNAP or Medicaid. By r equiring data-
sharing between the Department of Human Services and the Department of Health Care
Finance, the legislation aims to reach thousands of eligible residents who currently miss
out on assistance.
Overall, the passage of these legislative measures would enable the agency to better fulfill
its mission of ensuring that all District utility consumers receive safe, affordable, and
equitable services.
22. Please identify any regulatory impediments to your agency’s operations.
OPC identifies a significant regulatory impediment regarding its lack of jurisdiction over
third-party utility suppliers. When a property owner or resident enrolls with a third -party
supplier, the agency is legally restricted from representing the consumer in disputes or
complaints. This limitation creates a gap in advocacy for residents facing billing errors,
service issues, or contract disputes with these entities. Consequently, this leads to
23
Laws, Audits, and Reports:
21. Please identify any legislative modifications that would enable the agency to better
meet its mission.
OPC supports legislative modifications that strengthen consumer protections, expand
access to affordability programs, and enhance transparency in utility operations. To better
meet its mission of ensuring equitable, reliable, and affordable utility services fo r District
residents, the agency identifies the following legislative priorities and recommended
modifications.
The DC Water Billing and Disconnection Modernization Amendment Act of 2025 (Bill 26-
443) aims to enhance transparency and provide stronger protections for District residents
facing water service shutoffs. This legislation requires the DC Water and Sewer Authority
to establish an amnesty program for outstanding balances and creates clear, consistent
timelines for the disconnection process, including extended windows for seniors and
residents with disabilities. The bill addresses inequities in multi-unit buildings by allowing
tenants to establish service in their own names if a landlord fails to pay a master -metered
bill, and it prohibits disconnections during periods of extreme weather. Adding provisions
that clarify legal procedures for multi -unit tenants would further reduce billing inequities
and prevent service disruptions for vulnerable populations.
The Automatic Enrollment for Utility Affordability Programs Act of 2025 (Bill 26 -243)
seeks to increase participation in financial assistance programs by removing administrative
hurdles for income -qualified households. The bill directs the Department of En ergy and
Environment to create a system that automatically enrolls eligible residents into utility
discount programs, such as LIHEAP and the Clean Rivers Residential Relief Program,
based on their participation in other programs like SNAP or Medicaid. By r equiring data-
sharing between the Department of Human Services and the Department of Health Care
Finance, the legislation aims to reach thousands of eligible residents who currently miss
out on assistance.
Overall, the passage of these legislative measures would enable the agency to better fulfill
its mission of ensuring that all District utility consumers receive safe, affordable, and
equitable services.
22. Please identify any regulatory impediments to your agency’s operations.
OPC identifies a significant regulatory impediment regarding its lack of jurisdiction over
third-party utility suppliers. When a property owner or resident enrolls with a third -party
supplier, the agency is legally restricted from representing the consumer in disputes or
complaints. This limitation creates a gap in advocacy for residents facing billing errors,
service issues, or contract disputes with these entities. Consequently, this leads to
27_59151_FINAL.pdf
24
increased consumer frustration and confusion, as residents often expect the agency to
intervene in all utility-related matters.
This impediment is significant because third -party suppliers often utilize aggressive
marketing tactics, which can lead residents to unknowingly sign contracts with
unfavorable terms. Vulnerable communities, including those in Wards 5, 7, and 8, are
disproportionately affected due to a lack of resources and awareness of these specific market
risks.
To address these challenges, the agency has identified the following potential solutions:
1. Consumer Education: Launching campaigns to explain the risks and responsibilities
associated with third-party enrollment and providing guidance on verifying legitimacy to
avoid predatory practices.
2. Policy Advocacy: Working with the Public Service Commission to explore regulatory
modifications that could expand the agency's authority or create stronger consumer
protections, such as mandatory transparency and simplified opt -out provisions in third -
party contracts.
3. Referral Network: Establishing partnerships with legal aid organizations and consumer
protection agencies to assist residents in disputes that fall outside of the Office's current
jurisdiction.
From the perspective of the Litigation Services Division, there are no legislative
requirements for which the Office lacks resources to properly implement OPC’s operations.
23. Please list and describe any ongoing investigations, audits, reports on your agency
or any employee of your agency, or any investigations, studies, audits, or reports on
your agency or any employee of your agency that were completed during FY25 and
FY26 to date. (Coard)
OPC is not aware of any ongoing investigations, audits, reports, or studies completed
during FY25 or FY26.
24. Please identify and provide an update on what actions have been taken to address
all recommendations made during the previous three years by:
a. Office of the Inspector General;
b. D.C. Auditor;
c. Internal audit; and
d. Any other federal or local oversight entities.
In FY25, the OIG conducted the FY25 audit. OPC had to provide information on sample
procurements that were selected for review. OPC provided the requested information,
and no further action was requested.
24
increased consumer frustration and confusion, as residents often expect the agency to
intervene in all utility-related matters.
This impediment is significant because third -party suppliers often utilize aggressive
marketing tactics, which can lead residents to unknowingly sign contracts with
unfavorable terms. Vulnerable communities, including those in Wards 5, 7, and 8, are
disproportionately affected due to a lack of resources and awareness of these specific market
risks.
To address these challenges, the agency has identified the following potential solutions:
1. Consumer Education: Launching campaigns to explain the risks and responsibilities
associated with third-party enrollment and providing guidance on verifying legitimacy to
avoid predatory practices.
2. Policy Advocacy: Working with the Public Service Commission to explore regulatory
modifications that could expand the agency's authority or create stronger consumer
protections, such as mandatory transparency and simplified opt -out provisions in third -
party contracts.
3. Referral Network: Establishing partnerships with legal aid organizations and consumer
protection agencies to assist residents in disputes that fall outside of the Office's current
jurisdiction.
From the perspective of the Litigation Services Division, there are no legislative
requirements for which the Office lacks resources to properly implement OPC’s operations.
23. Please list and describe any ongoing investigations, audits, reports on your agency
or any employee of your agency, or any investigations, studies, audits, or reports on
your agency or any employee of your agency that were completed during FY25 and
FY26 to date. (Coard)
OPC is not aware of any ongoing investigations, audits, reports, or studies completed
during FY25 or FY26.
24. Please identify and provide an update on what actions have been taken to address
all recommendations made during the previous three years by:
a. Office of the Inspector General;
b. D.C. Auditor;
c. Internal audit; and
d. Any other federal or local oversight entities.
In FY25, the OIG conducted the FY25 audit. OPC had to provide information on sample
procurements that were selected for review. OPC provided the requested information,
and no further action was requested.
28_59151_FINAL.pdf
25
In FY23, the OIG conducted the FY23 audit. OPC had to provide information on sample
procurements that were selected for review. OPC provided the requested information, and
no further action was requested.
25. Please list all pending lawsuits in which the agency, or its officers or employees
acting in their official capacities, are named as defendants, and for each case
provide the following:
a. Charge of Discrimination
b. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
c. EEOC: 570-2026-00184
d. OPC Position Statement Filed 11/24/2025
e. Allegations of discrimination and retaliation
26. Please list the total amount of money the agency or the District, on behalf of the
agency, expended to settle claims against it, or its officers or employees acting in
their official capacities, in FY25 and FY26 to date.
Not applicable to OPC.
27. Please list each settlement the agency or the District, on behalf of the agency,
entered into in FY25 and FY26 to date that involved claims against the agency, or its
officers or employees in their official capacity, including any settlements covered by
D.C. Code § 2-402(a)(3). For each settlement, provide:
a. The amount of the settlement;
b. If related to litigation, the case name and brief description; and
c. If unrelated to litigation, please describe the underlying issue or reason for
the settlement (e.g. administrative complaint, etc.).
Not applicable to OPC.
28. Please list all administrative complaints or grievances that the agency received in
FY25 and FY26 to date. For each complaint, list:
a. The source of complaint;
b. The process utilized to respond to the complaint or grievance;
c. Any changes to agency policies or procedures that resulted from the
complaint or grievance; and
d. If resolved, describe the resolution.
Not applicable to OPC.
29. Is the agency currently party to any active non-disclosure agreements? If so, please
provide all allowable information on all such agreements, including:
a. The number of agreements;
25
In FY23, the OIG conducted the FY23 audit. OPC had to provide information on sample
procurements that were selected for review. OPC provided the requested information, and
no further action was requested.
25. Please list all pending lawsuits in which the agency, or its officers or employees
acting in their official capacities, are named as defendants, and for each case
provide the following:
a. Charge of Discrimination
b. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
c. EEOC: 570-2026-00184
d. OPC Position Statement Filed 11/24/2025
e. Allegations of discrimination and retaliation
26. Please list the total amount of money the agency or the District, on behalf of the
agency, expended to settle claims against it, or its officers or employees acting in
their official capacities, in FY25 and FY26 to date.
Not applicable to OPC.
27. Please list each settlement the agency or the District, on behalf of the agency,
entered into in FY25 and FY26 to date that involved claims against the agency, or its
officers or employees in their official capacity, including any settlements covered by
D.C. Code § 2-402(a)(3). For each settlement, provide:
a. The amount of the settlement;
b. If related to litigation, the case name and brief description; and
c. If unrelated to litigation, please describe the underlying issue or reason for
the settlement (e.g. administrative complaint, etc.).
Not applicable to OPC.
28. Please list all administrative complaints or grievances that the agency received in
FY25 and FY26 to date. For each complaint, list:
a. The source of complaint;
b. The process utilized to respond to the complaint or grievance;
c. Any changes to agency policies or procedures that resulted from the
complaint or grievance; and
d. If resolved, describe the resolution.
Not applicable to OPC.
29. Is the agency currently party to any active non-disclosure agreements? If so, please
provide all allowable information on all such agreements, including:
a. The number of agreements;
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26
b. The department(s) within the agency associated with each agreement; and
c. Whether any agreements are required for specific positions (please list each
position by division and program and indicate whether the position is
contracted)
Not applicable to OPC.
Data
30. In filterable and sortable spreadsheet, please list all electronic databases maintained
by your agency, including the following: (see response and link below):
a. A detailed description of the information tracked within each system;
b. The age of the system and any discussion of substantial upgrades that have
been made or are planned to the system; and
c. Whether the public can be granted access to all or part of each system.
(See attachment # 4 OPC Database)
OPC Database Info
Electronic Databases Maintained by the Office of the People’s Counsel (OPC)
1. Description of Information Tracked Within Each System
Consumer Information Database (CID)
Purpose: The Consumer Information Database (CID) is used by the Consumer Services
and Water Services Divisions to log, track, and manage consumer inquiries and
complaints related to utility services in the District of Columbia.
Information and Functions Tracked:
• Consumer Inquiries and Complaints: Records, inquiries, and complaints received
through multiple channels, including telephone, email, facsimile, in -person visits, and
community meetings.
• Community Outreach and Education: Tracks outreach and educational meetings
attended by OPC staff, including meeting purposes, topics discussed, attendance, and
concerns raised by community members.
• Language Access Compliance: Records complaints in multiple languages to ensure
compliance with the DC Language Access Law and equitable access for all residents.
• Complaint Resolution Chronology: Documents the full lifecycle of each complaint,
including interactions between the complainant, utility companies, and OPC staff.
26
b. The department(s) within the agency associated with each agreement; and
c. Whether any agreements are required for specific positions (please list each
position by division and program and indicate whether the position is
contracted)
Not applicable to OPC.
Data
30. In filterable and sortable spreadsheet, please list all electronic databases maintained
by your agency, including the following: (see response and link below):
a. A detailed description of the information tracked within each system;
b. The age of the system and any discussion of substantial upgrades that have
been made or are planned to the system; and
c. Whether the public can be granted access to all or part of each system.
(See attachment # 4 OPC Database)
OPC Database Info
Electronic Databases Maintained by the Office of the People’s Counsel (OPC)
1. Description of Information Tracked Within Each System
Consumer Information Database (CID)
Purpose: The Consumer Information Database (CID) is used by the Consumer Services
and Water Services Divisions to log, track, and manage consumer inquiries and
complaints related to utility services in the District of Columbia.
Information and Functions Tracked:
• Consumer Inquiries and Complaints: Records, inquiries, and complaints received
through multiple channels, including telephone, email, facsimile, in -person visits, and
community meetings.
• Community Outreach and Education: Tracks outreach and educational meetings
attended by OPC staff, including meeting purposes, topics discussed, attendance, and
concerns raised by community members.
• Language Access Compliance: Records complaints in multiple languages to ensure
compliance with the DC Language Access Law and equitable access for all residents.
• Complaint Resolution Chronology: Documents the full lifecycle of each complaint,
including interactions between the complainant, utility companies, and OPC staff.
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• Consumer Information: Captures detailed consumer data such as name, address,
contact information, gender, utility account numbers, complaint type, utility involved,
and resolution status.
• Reporting and Data Retrieval: Supports the generation of daily, monthly, quarterly, and
annual reports for management review and regulatory oversight.
2. Age of the System and Substantial Upgrades
ServiceNow (Upgrade from CID)
System Age: The original CID was developed in 1998 and ha d been in use for
approximately 28 years. To modernize and enhance system functionality, the CID was
recently upgraded to the ServiceNow platform.
Key Enhancements and Capabilities:
• Improved Responsiveness: Enables faster intake, tracking, and resolution of consumer
inquiries, improving overall service delivery.
• Enhanced Information Management: Provides modern tools for managing consumer
complaint data more efficiently and accurately.
• Complaint Logging and Tracking: Maintains all core CID functions while improving
reliability and usability.
• Community Outreach Tracking: Allows detailed tracking of outreach activities,
attendance, subject matter, and consumer concerns.
• Language Access Tracking: Continues to support multilingual complaint tracking in
compliance with the DC Language Access Law.
• Complaint Resolution Timeline: Automatically creates a detailed chronology of
complaint handling, documenting all interactions and actions taken.
• Reporting and Analytics: Enables customized data extraction and reporting for
operational and performance analysis.
Planned and Ongoing CMS Projects:
· Conduct a comprehensive review of the current ServiceNow configuration to identify
complexity and performance bottlenecks and develop a prioritized refactoring plan.
· Integrate a solar customer satisfaction survey into the Consumer Management System
(CMS).
· Integrate social services data to enhance consumer support and coordination.
27
• Consumer Information: Captures detailed consumer data such as name, address,
contact information, gender, utility account numbers, complaint type, utility involved,
and resolution status.
• Reporting and Data Retrieval: Supports the generation of daily, monthly, quarterly, and
annual reports for management review and regulatory oversight.
2. Age of the System and Substantial Upgrades
ServiceNow (Upgrade from CID)
System Age: The original CID was developed in 1998 and ha d been in use for
approximately 28 years. To modernize and enhance system functionality, the CID was
recently upgraded to the ServiceNow platform.
Key Enhancements and Capabilities:
• Improved Responsiveness: Enables faster intake, tracking, and resolution of consumer
inquiries, improving overall service delivery.
• Enhanced Information Management: Provides modern tools for managing consumer
complaint data more efficiently and accurately.
• Complaint Logging and Tracking: Maintains all core CID functions while improving
reliability and usability.
• Community Outreach Tracking: Allows detailed tracking of outreach activities,
attendance, subject matter, and consumer concerns.
• Language Access Tracking: Continues to support multilingual complaint tracking in
compliance with the DC Language Access Law.
• Complaint Resolution Timeline: Automatically creates a detailed chronology of
complaint handling, documenting all interactions and actions taken.
• Reporting and Analytics: Enables customized data extraction and reporting for
operational and performance analysis.
Planned and Ongoing CMS Projects:
· Conduct a comprehensive review of the current ServiceNow configuration to identify
complexity and performance bottlenecks and develop a prioritized refactoring plan.
· Integrate a solar customer satisfaction survey into the Consumer Management System
(CMS).
· Integrate social services data to enhance consumer support and coordination.
31_59151_FINAL.pdf
28
· Implement trend analysis to identify recurring consumer issues, monitor seasonal
patterns, and proactively address emerging concerns.
· Develop dashboards displaying daily accepted cases, unassigned cases, and the age of the
oldest unassigned cases.
· Create automated scripts to flag cases as high priority once they exceed defined age
thresholds.
· Implemented in the Water Services Division an Adobe Digital Sign to have the consumer
electronically sign the OPC water consent form in the CMS system
Ongoing enhancements to the Consumer Information Database and ServiceNow platform
ensure OPC can continue to serve the public effectively while maintaining compliance with
legal and regulatory requirements.
3. Public Access to the System
Public Access Policy : The Consumer Information Database (CID), including its
ServiceNow implementation, is not accessible to the public. All information contained
within the system is used exclusively for internal operations and is maintained as
confidential to protect consumer privacy and sensitive personal information.
31. Please provide a list of all studies, research papers, and analyses (“studies”) the
agency or an agency’s employee requested, prepared, presented or contracted for
during FY25. For each study please list:
a. The status;
b. The purpose; and
c. A link (if published) to the study, research paper or analysis.
Drivers of PJM’ s Capacity Market Price Surge and its Impacts on Electricity Consumers
in the District of Columbia Bill and Rate Impacts Associated with
Recent and Upcoming Changes to PJM’ s Capacity Market Prepared for the Office of the
People’s Counsel for the District of Columbia Completed: April 25, 2025.
This study was done to explain the Base Residual Auction that takes place annually at the
PJM and discuss the factors that lead to the large price increase.
Energy Affordability in Washington, DC Tracking and Enhancing Energy Affordability for
District Residents Prepared for the Office of the People’s Counsel for the District of
Columbia Completed: September 25, 2025
28
· Implement trend analysis to identify recurring consumer issues, monitor seasonal
patterns, and proactively address emerging concerns.
· Develop dashboards displaying daily accepted cases, unassigned cases, and the age of the
oldest unassigned cases.
· Create automated scripts to flag cases as high priority once they exceed defined age
thresholds.
· Implemented in the Water Services Division an Adobe Digital Sign to have the consumer
electronically sign the OPC water consent form in the CMS system
Ongoing enhancements to the Consumer Information Database and ServiceNow platform
ensure OPC can continue to serve the public effectively while maintaining compliance with
legal and regulatory requirements.
3. Public Access to the System
Public Access Policy : The Consumer Information Database (CID), including its
ServiceNow implementation, is not accessible to the public. All information contained
within the system is used exclusively for internal operations and is maintained as
confidential to protect consumer privacy and sensitive personal information.
31. Please provide a list of all studies, research papers, and analyses (“studies”) the
agency or an agency’s employee requested, prepared, presented or contracted for
during FY25. For each study please list:
a. The status;
b. The purpose; and
c. A link (if published) to the study, research paper or analysis.
Drivers of PJM’ s Capacity Market Price Surge and its Impacts on Electricity Consumers
in the District of Columbia Bill and Rate Impacts Associated with
Recent and Upcoming Changes to PJM’ s Capacity Market Prepared for the Office of the
People’s Counsel for the District of Columbia Completed: April 25, 2025.
This study was done to explain the Base Residual Auction that takes place annually at the
PJM and discuss the factors that lead to the large price increase.
Energy Affordability in Washington, DC Tracking and Enhancing Energy Affordability for
District Residents Prepared for the Office of the People’s Counsel for the District of
Columbia Completed: September 25, 2025
32_59151_FINAL.pdf
29
This study was done to establish an affordability framework the measures the energy
burden in the District of Columbia and to measure and assess the impact of energy
assistance programs and utility discount rates
32. Please list contracts and procurements awarded, entered into, extended, or for
which an option year was exercised, by the agency during FY25 and FY26, to date in
the attached spreadsheet titled “Contracts and Procurements”. (see links below)
a. Please include your Agency Code in the filename (e.g., AB0_2026_Contracts
and Procurements.xls).
b. You may add additional lines to the sheet but please do not change any other
formatting.
(See Attachment 6a Contracts & Procurements FY25 & 6b FY27)
Question 32 Contracts and Procurements FY25.xlsx
Question 32 Contracts and Procurements FY26.xlsx
29
This study was done to establish an affordability framework the measures the energy
burden in the District of Columbia and to measure and assess the impact of energy
assistance programs and utility discount rates
32. Please list contracts and procurements awarded, entered into, extended, or for
which an option year was exercised, by the agency during FY25 and FY26, to date in
the attached spreadsheet titled “Contracts and Procurements”. (see links below)
a. Please include your Agency Code in the filename (e.g., AB0_2026_Contracts
and Procurements.xls).
b. You may add additional lines to the sheet but please do not change any other
formatting.
(See Attachment 6a Contracts & Procurements FY25 & 6b FY27)
Question 32 Contracts and Procurements FY25.xlsx
Question 32 Contracts and Procurements FY26.xlsx
33_59151_FINAL.pdf
30
30
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CLA 202 GRIs 1 & 2ATTACHMENT 1
OPC PERFORMANCE
OVERSIGHT HEARING
Response to Supplemental Question #9
PJM Task Force Report, Part 1
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CLA 203 GRIs 3 & 4
OPC PERFORMANCE
OVERSIGHT HEARING
Response to Supplemental Question #9
PJM Report done by Synapse
ATTACHMENT 1
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63_59151_FINAL.pdf
485 Massachusetts Avenue, Suite 3
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
617.661.3248 | www.synapse-energy.com
Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market
Price Surge and its Impacts on
Electricity Consumers in the District
of Columbia
Bill and Rate Impacts Associated with Recent
and Upcoming Changes to PJM’s Capacity
Market
Prepared for the Office of the People’s Counsel for the
District of Columbia
April 25, 2024
AUTHORS
Sarah Shenstone-Harris
Chelsea Mattioda
Ariella Fuzaylov
Wooddynne Dejeanlouis
Bob Fagan
485 Massachusetts Avenue, Suite 3
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
617.661.3248 | www.synapse-energy.com
Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market
Price Surge and its Impacts on
Electricity Consumers in the District
of Columbia
Bill and Rate Impacts Associated with Recent
and Upcoming Changes to PJM’s Capacity
Market
Prepared for the Office of the People’s Counsel for the
District of Columbia
April 25, 2024
AUTHORS
Sarah Shenstone-Harris
Chelsea Mattioda
Ariella Fuzaylov
Wooddynne Dejeanlouis
Bob Fagan
64_59151_FINAL.pdf
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ I
1. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW ............................................................................ 1
1.1. Capacity Market Basics ................................ ................................ ................................ ....1
1.2. Supply and Demand Curves ................................ ................................ .............................. 2
2. THE 2025/2026 BRA RESULTS AND ITS IMPACT ON DC ELECTRICITY CUSTOMERS ........... 5
2.1. Auction Results ................................ ................................ ................................ ................5
2.2. Bill and Rate Impact for DC Electricity Customers ................................ .............................. 5
2.3. Driving Factors Behind the Capacity Market Price Increase ................................ ...............6
3. UPCOMING CHANGES TO THE 2026/2027 AND 2027/2028 CAPACITY MARKETS ......... 13
3.1. Upcoming Changes to Supply ................................ ................................ ......................... 14
3.2. Upcoming Changes to the Demand Curve ................................ ................................ ....... 18
4. POTENTIAL ELECTRIC BILL IMPACT OF 2026/2027 CAPACITY AUCTION ....................... 22
4.1. Potential Impacts for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year ................................ ......................... 25
5. INTERCONNECTION QUEUE REFORMS .................................................................. 25
5.1. Background on DC’s Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards ................................ ............ 26
5.2. Current PJM Interconnection Queue ................................ ................................ .............. 26
5.3. Interconnection Queue Reforms ................................ ................................ .................... 27
6. ONGOING REFORM DISCUSSIONS ....................................................................... 31
6.1. Seasonal ELCC Adjustments for Gas-Fired Generators ................................ ..................... 31
6.2. Load Forecasting Issues ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 32
6.3. RMR Reforms: Pro Forma RMR Arrangements ................................ ................................ 33
6.4. Energy Efficiency and its Treatment in the Capacity Market ................................ ............ 34
7. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 34
8. GLOSSARY .................................................................................................... 35
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ I
1. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW ............................................................................ 1
1.1. Capacity Market Basics ................................ ................................ ................................ ....1
1.2. Supply and Demand Curves ................................ ................................ .............................. 2
2. THE 2025/2026 BRA RESULTS AND ITS IMPACT ON DC ELECTRICITY CUSTOMERS ........... 5
2.1. Auction Results ................................ ................................ ................................ ................5
2.2. Bill and Rate Impact for DC Electricity Customers ................................ .............................. 5
2.3. Driving Factors Behind the Capacity Market Price Increase ................................ ...............6
3. UPCOMING CHANGES TO THE 2026/2027 AND 2027/2028 CAPACITY MARKETS ......... 13
3.1. Upcoming Changes to Supply ................................ ................................ ......................... 14
3.2. Upcoming Changes to the Demand Curve ................................ ................................ ....... 18
4. POTENTIAL ELECTRIC BILL IMPACT OF 2026/2027 CAPACITY AUCTION ....................... 22
4.1. Potential Impacts for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year ................................ ......................... 25
5. INTERCONNECTION QUEUE REFORMS .................................................................. 25
5.1. Background on DC’s Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards ................................ ............ 26
5.2. Current PJM Interconnection Queue ................................ ................................ .............. 26
5.3. Interconnection Queue Reforms ................................ ................................ .................... 27
6. ONGOING REFORM DISCUSSIONS ....................................................................... 31
6.1. Seasonal ELCC Adjustments for Gas-Fired Generators ................................ ..................... 31
6.2. Load Forecasting Issues ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 32
6.3. RMR Reforms: Pro Forma RMR Arrangements ................................ ................................ 33
6.4. Energy Efficiency and its Treatment in the Capacity Market ................................ ............ 34
7. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 34
8. GLOSSARY .................................................................................................... 35
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Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PJM Interconnection (PJM) is the regional transmission organization (RTO) that coordinates the
movement of wholesale electricity across the District of Columbia (DC) and 13 states. Its capacity market
auction procures power to ensure that electricity demand can be met on the hottest and coldest days of
the year when demand is highest. PJM's most recent capacity market auction, its Base Residual Auction
(BRA) that secured capacity for the 2025/2026 delivery year, resulted in the highest capacity prices ever
seen in the region. System-wide prices rose from the 2024/2025 delivery year by a factor of nine,
increasing from $28.92/MW-day to $269.92/MW-day. PJM-wide total capacity costs increased from $2.2
billion to $14.7 billion.1 These auction results prompted PJM and stakeholders to reexamine the market
dynamics that led to such high prices and explore various market reforms. The Office of People’s
Counsel (OPC) for DC commissioned Synapse Energy Economics (Synapse) to evaluate these market
dynamics, assess market reforms, and quantify both recent and anticipated bill impacts for electricity
customers in Washington, DC.
PJM’s Pepco zone, where Washington, DC is located, saw a five-fold increase in capacity prices. Capacity
clearing prices jumped for the sub-region from $49.49/MW-day in 2024/2025 to $269.92/MW-day for
2025/2026.2 We estimate that starting in June 2025, the start of the 2025/2026 delivery year, the
average residential electric customer will see a $10 increase in their monthly bill as a result of this latest
capacity auction (holding all other bill changes constant), or a 9 percent increase (Table 1).
Table 1. DC bill and rate impacts of the 2025/2026 capacity auction results relative to the 2024/2025 delivery
year
Rate Class Monthly Bill Change
(%)
Additional $/kWh
Rate
Additional Cost on Month
Bills ($)
Residential 9% $0.017 $10
Commercial 9% $0.016 $345
These unprecedented prices are primarily due to a few key factors—in a real sense, these factors
represent a perfect storm of fundamental economic drivers causing prices to rise.
1) Existing Supply Decreases. PJM recently updated its resource accreditation methodology (which
determines the capacity value of a resource, existing or new). It also entered into two new
Reliability-Must-Run (RMR) arrangements and removed those units from the capacity market.
1 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM Interconnection, LLC. https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-auction-report.pdf.
2 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM Interconnection, LLC. https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-auction-report.pdf.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PJM Interconnection (PJM) is the regional transmission organization (RTO) that coordinates the
movement of wholesale electricity across the District of Columbia (DC) and 13 states. Its capacity market
auction procures power to ensure that electricity demand can be met on the hottest and coldest days of
the year when demand is highest. PJM's most recent capacity market auction, its Base Residual Auction
(BRA) that secured capacity for the 2025/2026 delivery year, resulted in the highest capacity prices ever
seen in the region. System-wide prices rose from the 2024/2025 delivery year by a factor of nine,
increasing from $28.92/MW-day to $269.92/MW-day. PJM-wide total capacity costs increased from $2.2
billion to $14.7 billion.1 These auction results prompted PJM and stakeholders to reexamine the market
dynamics that led to such high prices and explore various market reforms. The Office of People’s
Counsel (OPC) for DC commissioned Synapse Energy Economics (Synapse) to evaluate these market
dynamics, assess market reforms, and quantify both recent and anticipated bill impacts for electricity
customers in Washington, DC.
PJM’s Pepco zone, where Washington, DC is located, saw a five-fold increase in capacity prices. Capacity
clearing prices jumped for the sub-region from $49.49/MW-day in 2024/2025 to $269.92/MW-day for
2025/2026.2 We estimate that starting in June 2025, the start of the 2025/2026 delivery year, the
average residential electric customer will see a $10 increase in their monthly bill as a result of this latest
capacity auction (holding all other bill changes constant), or a 9 percent increase (Table 1).
Table 1. DC bill and rate impacts of the 2025/2026 capacity auction results relative to the 2024/2025 delivery
year
Rate Class Monthly Bill Change
(%)
Additional $/kWh
Rate
Additional Cost on Month
Bills ($)
Residential 9% $0.017 $10
Commercial 9% $0.016 $345
These unprecedented prices are primarily due to a few key factors—in a real sense, these factors
represent a perfect storm of fundamental economic drivers causing prices to rise.
1) Existing Supply Decreases. PJM recently updated its resource accreditation methodology (which
determines the capacity value of a resource, existing or new). It also entered into two new
Reliability-Must-Run (RMR) arrangements and removed those units from the capacity market.
1 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM Interconnection, LLC. https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-auction-report.pdf.
2 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM Interconnection, LLC. https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-auction-report.pdf.
66_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact ii
Added to this, older, uneconomic polluting fossil resources at the end of their life are also
retiring. These three factors reduced total supply in the market, thereby increasing prices.
2) New Supply Entry Barriers. Meanwhile, the clogged PJM interconnection queue has prevented
new, mostly cleaner resources from being able to enter the market in recent years. This is
despite increasing prices and a clear market signal that more supply is needed.
3) Dramatically Increasing Demand Projection. Lastly, demand projections are also increasing
across the PJM footprint, further exacerbating these issues and putting upward pressure on
capacity prices.
PJM has already put several reforms in motion to change some of these market dynamics before its next
auction (scheduled for July 2025). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved these
reforms in February 2025. On the supply side, these reforms include removing exemptions where
certain resources were not required to offer into the capacity market and changes that require RMR
units to offer into the capacity market if they are providing capacity to the system. On the demand side,
PJM will change certain parameters of its demand curve. More recently, PJM proposed a capacity price
maximum and minimum, which was approved on April 21, 2025. These approved changes will apply to
the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 delivery years; PJM considers these changes to be stop-gap measures
and will consider longer-term reforms for the 2028/2029 delivery year and beyond. Interconnection
queue reform is also underway.
These reforms, along with planned retirements and updates to PJM’s resource accreditation
methodology (new ratings for effective load carrying capacity, or ELCC), could increase average monthly
electric bills in DC by $1 for the 2026/2027 delivery year, incremental to the bill impact from the
2025/2026 auction results (Table 2). Synapse estimated the potential bill impacts of these reforms
across four scenarios: (1) no new additional supply enters the market, (2) 2,000 MW of reliable (i.e.,
unforced) capacity enters the market, (3) 15,000 MW come online to enable the capacity price to fall to
the proposed floor of $175/MW-day, and (4) 2,000 MW of capacity enters but there is no $325/MW-day
price cap. Actual impacts will depend on a range of factors that remain in flux; these results
demonstrate a potential range of impacts.
Table 2. DC bill impacts estimated for the 2026/2027 capacity auction relative to the 2025/2026 delivery year
No Additional
New Builds
Some New Entry Price Floor Some New Entry
with No Price Cap
Residential Average
Monthly Bill Change
(relative to previous
year)
+ $1 + $1 - $5 + $9
Commercial Average
Monthly Bill
Increase (relative to
previous year)
+ $26 + $26 - $172 + $321
Source: Synapse analysis, see Section 4.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact ii
Added to this, older, uneconomic polluting fossil resources at the end of their life are also
retiring. These three factors reduced total supply in the market, thereby increasing prices.
2) New Supply Entry Barriers. Meanwhile, the clogged PJM interconnection queue has prevented
new, mostly cleaner resources from being able to enter the market in recent years. This is
despite increasing prices and a clear market signal that more supply is needed.
3) Dramatically Increasing Demand Projection. Lastly, demand projections are also increasing
across the PJM footprint, further exacerbating these issues and putting upward pressure on
capacity prices.
PJM has already put several reforms in motion to change some of these market dynamics before its next
auction (scheduled for July 2025). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved these
reforms in February 2025. On the supply side, these reforms include removing exemptions where
certain resources were not required to offer into the capacity market and changes that require RMR
units to offer into the capacity market if they are providing capacity to the system. On the demand side,
PJM will change certain parameters of its demand curve. More recently, PJM proposed a capacity price
maximum and minimum, which was approved on April 21, 2025. These approved changes will apply to
the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 delivery years; PJM considers these changes to be stop-gap measures
and will consider longer-term reforms for the 2028/2029 delivery year and beyond. Interconnection
queue reform is also underway.
These reforms, along with planned retirements and updates to PJM’s resource accreditation
methodology (new ratings for effective load carrying capacity, or ELCC), could increase average monthly
electric bills in DC by $1 for the 2026/2027 delivery year, incremental to the bill impact from the
2025/2026 auction results (Table 2). Synapse estimated the potential bill impacts of these reforms
across four scenarios: (1) no new additional supply enters the market, (2) 2,000 MW of reliable (i.e.,
unforced) capacity enters the market, (3) 15,000 MW come online to enable the capacity price to fall to
the proposed floor of $175/MW-day, and (4) 2,000 MW of capacity enters but there is no $325/MW-day
price cap. Actual impacts will depend on a range of factors that remain in flux; these results
demonstrate a potential range of impacts.
Table 2. DC bill impacts estimated for the 2026/2027 capacity auction relative to the 2025/2026 delivery year
No Additional
New Builds
Some New Entry Price Floor Some New Entry
with No Price Cap
Residential Average
Monthly Bill Change
(relative to previous
year)
+ $1 + $1 - $5 + $9
Commercial Average
Monthly Bill
Increase (relative to
previous year)
+ $26 + $26 - $172 + $321
Source: Synapse analysis, see Section 4.
67_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact iii
PJM must be able to bring new resources online to be able to (a) respond to high prices and market
signals, (b) continue to meet growing levels of demand, and (c) enable states in PJM to meet their
renewable energy and emissions targets. Although PJM began implementing interconnection reforms in
2024, many stakeholders have expressed concern that these reforms are insufficient. PJM has
responded to these concerns with its Resource Reliability Initiative (RRI), another stop-gap measure,
aimed at accelerating the interconnection of qualifying resources to bring more generation online
before the 2029/2030 delivery year. Consumer advocates in the region called for reforms to prioritize
ready-to-study projects sited in areas that are more likely to be constrained. However, RRI will prioritize
larger capacity projects that can provide firm capacity and have high reliability ratings. Environmental
groups are worried that RRI is unduly discriminatory against non-dispatchable resources in favor of gas,
which has a high reliability rating, and there is additional concern that it may create challenges for PJM
states and the District as they strive to meet renewable energy targets. Furthermore, the initiative does
not guarantee that new resources will be online by the 2029/2030 delivery year.
Stakeholders will continue to have the opportunity to weigh in on these items and other market
dynamics impacting future auctions, especially as many of these measures are intended to be
temporary. This report assesses these market changes and their impacts on DC electricity customers to
support DC OPC’s navigation of these topics that are essential to managing the impact for DC residents
and electricity consumers.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact iii
PJM must be able to bring new resources online to be able to (a) respond to high prices and market
signals, (b) continue to meet growing levels of demand, and (c) enable states in PJM to meet their
renewable energy and emissions targets. Although PJM began implementing interconnection reforms in
2024, many stakeholders have expressed concern that these reforms are insufficient. PJM has
responded to these concerns with its Resource Reliability Initiative (RRI), another stop-gap measure,
aimed at accelerating the interconnection of qualifying resources to bring more generation online
before the 2029/2030 delivery year. Consumer advocates in the region called for reforms to prioritize
ready-to-study projects sited in areas that are more likely to be constrained. However, RRI will prioritize
larger capacity projects that can provide firm capacity and have high reliability ratings. Environmental
groups are worried that RRI is unduly discriminatory against non-dispatchable resources in favor of gas,
which has a high reliability rating, and there is additional concern that it may create challenges for PJM
states and the District as they strive to meet renewable energy targets. Furthermore, the initiative does
not guarantee that new resources will be online by the 2029/2030 delivery year.
Stakeholders will continue to have the opportunity to weigh in on these items and other market
dynamics impacting future auctions, especially as many of these measures are intended to be
temporary. This report assesses these market changes and their impacts on DC electricity customers to
support DC OPC’s navigation of these topics that are essential to managing the impact for DC residents
and electricity consumers.
68_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact iv
Joint Consumer Advocates’ Response to PJM’s Recent Base Residual Auction
In response to the BRA results for the 2025/2026 delivery year, the DC OPC along with state
advocate offices from Maryland, New Jersey, Illinois, and Ohio (the “Joint Consumer Advocates” or
“JCA”) filed a complaint before FERC on November 18, 2024, requesting (1) a Rule 206 refund
effective date be established; (2) a finding that PJM’s existing capacity market rules are unjust and
unreasonable, due to the failure to mitigate market power and excessive capacity charges; and (3)
establishment of reasonable replacement rates based on recommended changes to the auction.
These changes included:
1. Removing exemptions for resources to participate in the capacity auction, thus
requiring the participation of intermittent resources, battery storage, demand
response, and generation resources operating under RMR arrangements;
2. Reforming RMR resource treatment, including longer notice periods for generator
deactivation and creating standardized provisions for RMR including a pro forma
agreement delaying retirements as long as the resource is needed for reliability.
Where continued service is required, compensation should be at the full cost of
service and include a return on investment;
3. Using the winter ELCC ratings for gas-fired generators that seasonally match the
winter risks for such resources when calculating their capacity values—thus allowing
for more supply to be reflected in the auction;
4. Addressing the interconnection queues by prioritizing “ready-to-study” projects
sited at Locational Deliverability Areas that are more likely to be constrained;
5. Requiring demand response resources to submit offers based on the maximum
dispatchable demand reduction that the resource is making available to PJM and
measure the actual reduction delivered (metered consumption before instruction
less metered consumption after instruction) in response to a dispatch instruction
during a system stress event; and
6. Imposing an offer cap on demand response resources when the structural market
power tests fail.
The JCA also filed comments in support of Pennsylvania’s challenge to PJM’s use of Net CONE and
later in opposition to the price cap and price floor proposed in the joint settlement filed by
Pennsylvania and PJM of Pennsylvania’s Complaint. With respect to Net CONE, in addition to
supporting a multiplier of 1.5 times Net CONE as opposed to 1.75, the JCA advocated abandoning the
use of the Reference Resource’s Gross CONE to set the price cap. The JCA also recommended that
PJM calculate Net CONE empirically, using an average of past auction clearing prices that have
supported new entry. The JCA have argued that both the price floor and price cap are too high,
though they acknowledge that the price floor could be reasonably accepted if proposed on its own.
Since the cap and floor are not severable, both must be rejected. PJM’s subsequent filings have
adopted some of the recommendations initially proposed by the JCA.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact iv
Joint Consumer Advocates’ Response to PJM’s Recent Base Residual Auction
In response to the BRA results for the 2025/2026 delivery year, the DC OPC along with state
advocate offices from Maryland, New Jersey, Illinois, and Ohio (the “Joint Consumer Advocates” or
“JCA”) filed a complaint before FERC on November 18, 2024, requesting (1) a Rule 206 refund
effective date be established; (2) a finding that PJM’s existing capacity market rules are unjust and
unreasonable, due to the failure to mitigate market power and excessive capacity charges; and (3)
establishment of reasonable replacement rates based on recommended changes to the auction.
These changes included:
1. Removing exemptions for resources to participate in the capacity auction, thus
requiring the participation of intermittent resources, battery storage, demand
response, and generation resources operating under RMR arrangements;
2. Reforming RMR resource treatment, including longer notice periods for generator
deactivation and creating standardized provisions for RMR including a pro forma
agreement delaying retirements as long as the resource is needed for reliability.
Where continued service is required, compensation should be at the full cost of
service and include a return on investment;
3. Using the winter ELCC ratings for gas-fired generators that seasonally match the
winter risks for such resources when calculating their capacity values—thus allowing
for more supply to be reflected in the auction;
4. Addressing the interconnection queues by prioritizing “ready-to-study” projects
sited at Locational Deliverability Areas that are more likely to be constrained;
5. Requiring demand response resources to submit offers based on the maximum
dispatchable demand reduction that the resource is making available to PJM and
measure the actual reduction delivered (metered consumption before instruction
less metered consumption after instruction) in response to a dispatch instruction
during a system stress event; and
6. Imposing an offer cap on demand response resources when the structural market
power tests fail.
The JCA also filed comments in support of Pennsylvania’s challenge to PJM’s use of Net CONE and
later in opposition to the price cap and price floor proposed in the joint settlement filed by
Pennsylvania and PJM of Pennsylvania’s Complaint. With respect to Net CONE, in addition to
supporting a multiplier of 1.5 times Net CONE as opposed to 1.75, the JCA advocated abandoning the
use of the Reference Resource’s Gross CONE to set the price cap. The JCA also recommended that
PJM calculate Net CONE empirically, using an average of past auction clearing prices that have
supported new entry. The JCA have argued that both the price floor and price cap are too high,
though they acknowledge that the price floor could be reasonably accepted if proposed on its own.
Since the cap and floor are not severable, both must be rejected. PJM’s subsequent filings have
adopted some of the recommendations initially proposed by the JCA.
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Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 1
1. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
PJM Interconnection (PJM) is the regional transmission organization (RTO) that coordinates the
movement of wholesale electricity across the District of Columbia (DC) and 13 states.3 It manages
competitive electricity markets, oversees long-term planning, and balances supply and demand to
maintain a stable and reliable power system.
1.1. Capacity Market Basics
PJM’s wholesale electricity marketplace consists of three important and distinct markets:
1. The energy market includes day-ahead and real-time auctions, responding to near-
instantaneous fluctuations in supply and demand. It is designed to provide the lowest-
cost electricity to consumers.
2. The capacity market ensures there is enough electricity supply to meet future demand
by paying power plants and other resources to be available when needed in the future.
The market selects the most cost-effective mix of resources, including thermal power
plants, renewables and intermittent resources, grid-connected battery storage, and
demand response programs.
3. The ancillary services markets help maintain grid reliability by providing essential
services such as frequency regulation, operating reserves, and voltage control.
In the electricity market, capacity refers to the commitment of power resources—such as power plants,
energy storage, and demand response programs—to be available when needed, particularly during peak
demand periods and grid emergencies. Capacity represents the ability to supply electricity rather than
the actual energy produced, to ensure grid reliability.
In PJM, the capacity market is called the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM), which is meant to cost-
effectively procure enough power supply and demand response resources to meet future electricity
demand, on the hottest and coldest days of the year. This procurement occurs through annual capacity
auctions (the Base Residual Auction, or BRA, and subsequent incremental auctions),4 which secure
commitments from power generators and demand response resources to be available for one 12-month
period. This 12-month period is referred to as the delivery year, from June through May. This auction
3 In addition to the District of Columbia, PJM operates in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
4 PJM holds incremental auctions between BRAs. These supplemental auctions provide flexibility to account for changes in
demand or supply conditions that may occur after the initial BRA.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 1
1. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
PJM Interconnection (PJM) is the regional transmission organization (RTO) that coordinates the
movement of wholesale electricity across the District of Columbia (DC) and 13 states.3 It manages
competitive electricity markets, oversees long-term planning, and balances supply and demand to
maintain a stable and reliable power system.
1.1. Capacity Market Basics
PJM’s wholesale electricity marketplace consists of three important and distinct markets:
1. The energy market includes day-ahead and real-time auctions, responding to near-
instantaneous fluctuations in supply and demand. It is designed to provide the lowest-
cost electricity to consumers.
2. The capacity market ensures there is enough electricity supply to meet future demand
by paying power plants and other resources to be available when needed in the future.
The market selects the most cost-effective mix of resources, including thermal power
plants, renewables and intermittent resources, grid-connected battery storage, and
demand response programs.
3. The ancillary services markets help maintain grid reliability by providing essential
services such as frequency regulation, operating reserves, and voltage control.
In the electricity market, capacity refers to the commitment of power resources—such as power plants,
energy storage, and demand response programs—to be available when needed, particularly during peak
demand periods and grid emergencies. Capacity represents the ability to supply electricity rather than
the actual energy produced, to ensure grid reliability.
In PJM, the capacity market is called the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM), which is meant to cost-
effectively procure enough power supply and demand response resources to meet future electricity
demand, on the hottest and coldest days of the year. This procurement occurs through annual capacity
auctions (the Base Residual Auction, or BRA, and subsequent incremental auctions),4 which secure
commitments from power generators and demand response resources to be available for one 12-month
period. This 12-month period is referred to as the delivery year, from June through May. This auction
3 In addition to the District of Columbia, PJM operates in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
4 PJM holds incremental auctions between BRAs. These supplemental auctions provide flexibility to account for changes in
demand or supply conditions that may occur after the initial BRA.
70_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 2
traditionally occurs three years ahead of the delivery year, but PJM is currently off schedule and is
conducting BRAs six to 12 months in advance of the start of the delivery year.
PJM’s capacity market serves two primary purposes. First, it aims to send clear price signals to generator
owners/developers and demand response program administrators. When the market is oversupplied,
low-capacity prices can encourage costly and uneconomic resources to retire. Conversely, when there is
a shortage in capacity, high-capacity prices incentivize the implementation of new generation. Second, it
solves the “missing money” problem, whereby some resources may not make enough revenue in the
energy market alone to remain online and provide a 12-month capacity commitment. The capacity
market provides generators with an additional revenue stream (typically more stable than the price-
volatile energy markets) to recover their capital investments and fixed costs.
1.2. Supply and Demand Curves
PJM’s capacity market balances supply and demand to set a cost-effective market clearing price in each
of numerous Locational Deliverability Areas (LDA), with clearing prices remaining the same across LDAs
if transmission constraints between regions are not binding. When such constraints bind, a ‘congested’
region will have a higher clearing price than its uncongested neighboring region.
1. Supply Curve (Seller Bids) – Capacity suppliers (power plants, demand response resources, etc.)
submit bids with the quantity and price at which they are willing to provide capacity. The seller
bids are stacked from lowest to highest price, to create an upward sloping curve.
2. Demand Curve (Variable Resource Requirement Curve) – PJM sets a demand curve which
reflects how much capacity is needed to ensure grid reliability. The demand curve is a
downward sloping 3-point “curve” called the variable resource requirement (VRR) curve and
reflects aggregate consumers’ willingness to buy slightly more reliability if supply costs are low
enough.
3. Market Clearing Price – The auction clears where the supply curve intersects the demand curve.
This means PJM selects the lowest-cost resources first, moving up the supply curve, until the
capacity requirement is met. The highest-priced accepted bid sets the uniform clearing price,
which is paid to all cleared capacity resources.
Resources with a capacity commitment have “cleared” in the capacity auction in a respective LDA and
are subsequently paid the market clearing price ($/MW-day) for that delivery year for the LDA. Figure 1
shows the VRR curve, supply curve, and clearing price dynamics (the supply curve is illustrative, and the
clearing price is thus an example). We discuss each of these three components in more detail below.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 2
traditionally occurs three years ahead of the delivery year, but PJM is currently off schedule and is
conducting BRAs six to 12 months in advance of the start of the delivery year.
PJM’s capacity market serves two primary purposes. First, it aims to send clear price signals to generator
owners/developers and demand response program administrators. When the market is oversupplied,
low-capacity prices can encourage costly and uneconomic resources to retire. Conversely, when there is
a shortage in capacity, high-capacity prices incentivize the implementation of new generation. Second, it
solves the “missing money” problem, whereby some resources may not make enough revenue in the
energy market alone to remain online and provide a 12-month capacity commitment. The capacity
market provides generators with an additional revenue stream (typically more stable than the price-
volatile energy markets) to recover their capital investments and fixed costs.
1.2. Supply and Demand Curves
PJM’s capacity market balances supply and demand to set a cost-effective market clearing price in each
of numerous Locational Deliverability Areas (LDA), with clearing prices remaining the same across LDAs
if transmission constraints between regions are not binding. When such constraints bind, a ‘congested’
region will have a higher clearing price than its uncongested neighboring region.
1. Supply Curve (Seller Bids) – Capacity suppliers (power plants, demand response resources, etc.)
submit bids with the quantity and price at which they are willing to provide capacity. The seller
bids are stacked from lowest to highest price, to create an upward sloping curve.
2. Demand Curve (Variable Resource Requirement Curve) – PJM sets a demand curve which
reflects how much capacity is needed to ensure grid reliability. The demand curve is a
downward sloping 3-point “curve” called the variable resource requirement (VRR) curve and
reflects aggregate consumers’ willingness to buy slightly more reliability if supply costs are low
enough.
3. Market Clearing Price – The auction clears where the supply curve intersects the demand curve.
This means PJM selects the lowest-cost resources first, moving up the supply curve, until the
capacity requirement is met. The highest-priced accepted bid sets the uniform clearing price,
which is paid to all cleared capacity resources.
Resources with a capacity commitment have “cleared” in the capacity auction in a respective LDA and
are subsequently paid the market clearing price ($/MW-day) for that delivery year for the LDA. Figure 1
shows the VRR curve, supply curve, and clearing price dynamics (the supply curve is illustrative, and the
clearing price is thus an example). We discuss each of these three components in more detail below.
71_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 3
Figure 1. The 2025/2026 VRR Curve for the Pepco LDA, where P is price ($/MW-day), Q is quantity (MW), and RR is reliability
requirement, alongside an illustrative example supply curve (which does not reflect 2025/2026 supply offers and the
resulting clearing price)
Source: VRR curve for Pepco LDA, 2025/2026 Planning Period Parameters for Base Residual Auction, April 12, 2024. Figure
originally developed by Synapse for the Bill and Rate Impacts of PJM’s 2025/2026 Capacity Market Results & Reliability Must-
Run Units in Maryland, August 2024, Maryland Office of People’s Counsel, Available at:
https://opc.maryland.gov/Portals/0/Files/Publications/RMR%20Bill%20and%20Rates%20Impact%20Report_2024-08-
14%20Final.pdf?ver=V9hZfyTmjLeNVt2Dg3cTgw%3D%3D.
Supply Curve: Offer Prices and UCAP Quantity
Generators and demand response resources submit offers that reflect their megawatt (MW) value and
price. The MW quantity in a resource’s offer is defined by how much capacity it can provide at peak
periods and grid emergencies, to contribute to the system’s reliability (referred to as its unforced
capacity (UCAP)). A resource’s UCAP is less than its nameplate or “installed” capacity (ICAP).
An existing resource offers its UCAP value at a price equal or less than the costs it would avoid by not
operating for the delivery year, as defined by the Market Seller Offer Cap (MSOC) rules. New market
participants can enter at a price of zero (price takers) or at prices that reflect their net costs of entering.
VRR Curve: Reliability Requirements and Net CONE
PJM has an RTO-wide VRR curve, while LDAs that are transmission or capacity constrained have LDA-
specific VRR curves. Each point on the VRR curve is defined by the reliability requirement (based on peak
load) and Net Cost of New Entry (CONE). For instance, in the 2025/2026 BRA, Point A on the VRR Curve
was 98.8 percent times the reliability requirements (quantity (MW), on the x axis) and either the greater
of 1.5 x Net CONE or Gross CONE (price, on the y axis) (as shown in Figure 1). These three points,
defined by the reliability requirement and Net CONE, create a three-point downward-sloping curve.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 3
Figure 1. The 2025/2026 VRR Curve for the Pepco LDA, where P is price ($/MW-day), Q is quantity (MW), and RR is reliability
requirement, alongside an illustrative example supply curve (which does not reflect 2025/2026 supply offers and the
resulting clearing price)
Source: VRR curve for Pepco LDA, 2025/2026 Planning Period Parameters for Base Residual Auction, April 12, 2024. Figure
originally developed by Synapse for the Bill and Rate Impacts of PJM’s 2025/2026 Capacity Market Results & Reliability Must-
Run Units in Maryland, August 2024, Maryland Office of People’s Counsel, Available at:
https://opc.maryland.gov/Portals/0/Files/Publications/RMR%20Bill%20and%20Rates%20Impact%20Report_2024-08-
14%20Final.pdf?ver=V9hZfyTmjLeNVt2Dg3cTgw%3D%3D.
Supply Curve: Offer Prices and UCAP Quantity
Generators and demand response resources submit offers that reflect their megawatt (MW) value and
price. The MW quantity in a resource’s offer is defined by how much capacity it can provide at peak
periods and grid emergencies, to contribute to the system’s reliability (referred to as its unforced
capacity (UCAP)). A resource’s UCAP is less than its nameplate or “installed” capacity (ICAP).
An existing resource offers its UCAP value at a price equal or less than the costs it would avoid by not
operating for the delivery year, as defined by the Market Seller Offer Cap (MSOC) rules. New market
participants can enter at a price of zero (price takers) or at prices that reflect their net costs of entering.
VRR Curve: Reliability Requirements and Net CONE
PJM has an RTO-wide VRR curve, while LDAs that are transmission or capacity constrained have LDA-
specific VRR curves. Each point on the VRR curve is defined by the reliability requirement (based on peak
load) and Net Cost of New Entry (CONE). For instance, in the 2025/2026 BRA, Point A on the VRR Curve
was 98.8 percent times the reliability requirements (quantity (MW), on the x axis) and either the greater
of 1.5 x Net CONE or Gross CONE (price, on the y axis) (as shown in Figure 1). These three points,
defined by the reliability requirement and Net CONE, create a three-point downward-sloping curve.
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Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 4
The reliability requirement is the target level of capacity required to meet PJM’s reliability standards.
This is expressed as forecasted peak load plus a reserve margin and is meant to reflect the amount of
capacity necessary to meet the reliability criteria of a loss of load expectation (LOLE) of one day in 10
years for the RTO as a whole (or one day in 25 years for individual LDAs). PJM determines this reliability
requirement through probabilistic risk modeling, which incorporates load forecasts, outage rates, and
the availability of different resource types.
CONE is the average revenue that a newly built resource—specifically a reference resource selected by
PJM—would need to earn in the capacity market within its first year of operation.5 PJM currently uses a
simple-cycle combustion turbine (CT) as the reference resource to calculate CONE.6 Net CONE is
calculated by subtracting the reference resource’s expected revenues in the energy and ancillary
services (E&AS) markets from the total gross CONE value. Net CONE changes from year to year, based
on estimates of capital costs, ongoing operating and maintenance expenses, and expected E&AS offsets
for the reference technology. PJM publishes the reliability requirement, Net CONE, and VRR curve for
the RTO and each constrained LDA in its Planning Period Parameters no more than 100 days before the
auction.
LDAs and Price Separation
In PJM’s capacity market, LDAs are geographic subregions used to model transmission constraints and
reliability needs. These LDAs can be nested within larger LDAs, creating a hierarchy (e.g., Baltimore Gas
and Electric, or BGE, and Pepco are both nested within SWMAAC, which is nested within MAAC, which is
in turn is nested within the RTO). This nesting hierarchy is referred to as child and parent (e.g., SWMAAC
is the child of MAAC). During the capacity auction, each LDA clears sequentially, starting with the
smallest/narrowest areas. If a specific LDA has limited import capability, it may need more local (and
higher priced) capacity, leading to a higher clearing price compared to its parent LDA, referred to as
price separation. The nesting allows PJM to reflect transmission limitations and localized scarcity more
accurately. A constrained nested LDA (such as BGE within SWMAAC) may clear at a significantly higher
price than the broader area if local capacity is scarce, signaling the need for more local investment or
upgrades to transmission infrastructure.
DC is located within the Pepco LDA, which is nested within SWMAAC LDA (along with BGE LDA). Pepco
has not experienced price separation in recent years.
5 Newell, S., Hagerty, J.M., Pfeifenberger, J., Zhou, B., Carless, T., Janakiraman, R., Gang, S., Daou, P., Junge, J. April 21, 2022.
PJM CONE 2026/2027 Report. Prepared for PJM Interconnection. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2022/20220422-brattle-final-cone-report.ashx.
6 Ibid.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 4
The reliability requirement is the target level of capacity required to meet PJM’s reliability standards.
This is expressed as forecasted peak load plus a reserve margin and is meant to reflect the amount of
capacity necessary to meet the reliability criteria of a loss of load expectation (LOLE) of one day in 10
years for the RTO as a whole (or one day in 25 years for individual LDAs). PJM determines this reliability
requirement through probabilistic risk modeling, which incorporates load forecasts, outage rates, and
the availability of different resource types.
CONE is the average revenue that a newly built resource—specifically a reference resource selected by
PJM—would need to earn in the capacity market within its first year of operation.5 PJM currently uses a
simple-cycle combustion turbine (CT) as the reference resource to calculate CONE.6 Net CONE is
calculated by subtracting the reference resource’s expected revenues in the energy and ancillary
services (E&AS) markets from the total gross CONE value. Net CONE changes from year to year, based
on estimates of capital costs, ongoing operating and maintenance expenses, and expected E&AS offsets
for the reference technology. PJM publishes the reliability requirement, Net CONE, and VRR curve for
the RTO and each constrained LDA in its Planning Period Parameters no more than 100 days before the
auction.
LDAs and Price Separation
In PJM’s capacity market, LDAs are geographic subregions used to model transmission constraints and
reliability needs. These LDAs can be nested within larger LDAs, creating a hierarchy (e.g., Baltimore Gas
and Electric, or BGE, and Pepco are both nested within SWMAAC, which is nested within MAAC, which is
in turn is nested within the RTO). This nesting hierarchy is referred to as child and parent (e.g., SWMAAC
is the child of MAAC). During the capacity auction, each LDA clears sequentially, starting with the
smallest/narrowest areas. If a specific LDA has limited import capability, it may need more local (and
higher priced) capacity, leading to a higher clearing price compared to its parent LDA, referred to as
price separation. The nesting allows PJM to reflect transmission limitations and localized scarcity more
accurately. A constrained nested LDA (such as BGE within SWMAAC) may clear at a significantly higher
price than the broader area if local capacity is scarce, signaling the need for more local investment or
upgrades to transmission infrastructure.
DC is located within the Pepco LDA, which is nested within SWMAAC LDA (along with BGE LDA). Pepco
has not experienced price separation in recent years.
5 Newell, S., Hagerty, J.M., Pfeifenberger, J., Zhou, B., Carless, T., Janakiraman, R., Gang, S., Daou, P., Junge, J. April 21, 2022.
PJM CONE 2026/2027 Report. Prepared for PJM Interconnection. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2022/20220422-brattle-final-cone-report.ashx.
6 Ibid.
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Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 5
2. THE 2025/2026 BRA RESULTS AND ITS IMPACT ON DC
ELECTRICITY CUSTOMERS
2.1. Auction Results
In the latest BRA, which occurred in July 2024 for the delivery year 2025/2026, capacity auction clearing
prices reached unprecedented levels. System-wide prices increased by a factor of nine, increasing from
$28.92/MW-day to $269.92/MW-day.7 This resulted in total PJM-wide capacity costs of $14.7 billion for
2025/2026, over $12 billion more than the previous year.8 Prices in the BGE and Dominion (DOM) LDAs
were even higher, clearing at the maximum allowable price. The Pepco LDA, where DC is located, saw a
five-fold increase in capacity prices. It cleared with its parent LDAs SWMAAC and MAAC at $49.49/MW-
day in 2024/2025 and cleared with the RTO as a whole in 2025/2026 at $269.92/MW-day.9 Table 3
outlines the capacity clearing prices for the 2025/2026 and 2024/2025 delivery years for a subset of
LDAs, including the Pepco LDA.
Table 3. BRA clearing pricing for 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 delivery years, for a selection of LDAs
LDA 2024/2025 Clearing Price
($/MW-day)
2025/2026 Clearing Price
($/MW-day)
RTO $28.92 $269.92
MAAC $49.49 $269.92
EMAAC $54.95 $269.92
SWMAAC $49.49 $269.92
PEPCO $49.49 $269.92
BGE $73.00 $466.35
DOM $28.92 $444.26
Source: PJM’s RPM Base Residual Auction Results for 2024/2025 and 2025/2026, available at: https://www.pjm.com/markets-
and-operations/rpm.
2.2. Bill and Rate Impact for DC Electricity Customers
We calculate that the 2025/2026 capacity auction market results will increase the average residential
customer’s energy bill in DC by approximately $10/month relative to the 2024/2025 delivery year,
7 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM Interconnection, LLC. https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-auction-report.pdf.
8 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM Interconnection, LLC. https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-auction-report.pdf.
9 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM Interconnection, LLC. https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-auction-report.pdf.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 5
2. THE 2025/2026 BRA RESULTS AND ITS IMPACT ON DC
ELECTRICITY CUSTOMERS
2.1. Auction Results
In the latest BRA, which occurred in July 2024 for the delivery year 2025/2026, capacity auction clearing
prices reached unprecedented levels. System-wide prices increased by a factor of nine, increasing from
$28.92/MW-day to $269.92/MW-day.7 This resulted in total PJM-wide capacity costs of $14.7 billion for
2025/2026, over $12 billion more than the previous year.8 Prices in the BGE and Dominion (DOM) LDAs
were even higher, clearing at the maximum allowable price. The Pepco LDA, where DC is located, saw a
five-fold increase in capacity prices. It cleared with its parent LDAs SWMAAC and MAAC at $49.49/MW-
day in 2024/2025 and cleared with the RTO as a whole in 2025/2026 at $269.92/MW-day.9 Table 3
outlines the capacity clearing prices for the 2025/2026 and 2024/2025 delivery years for a subset of
LDAs, including the Pepco LDA.
Table 3. BRA clearing pricing for 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 delivery years, for a selection of LDAs
LDA 2024/2025 Clearing Price
($/MW-day)
2025/2026 Clearing Price
($/MW-day)
RTO $28.92 $269.92
MAAC $49.49 $269.92
EMAAC $54.95 $269.92
SWMAAC $49.49 $269.92
PEPCO $49.49 $269.92
BGE $73.00 $466.35
DOM $28.92 $444.26
Source: PJM’s RPM Base Residual Auction Results for 2024/2025 and 2025/2026, available at: https://www.pjm.com/markets-
and-operations/rpm.
2.2. Bill and Rate Impact for DC Electricity Customers
We calculate that the 2025/2026 capacity auction market results will increase the average residential
customer’s energy bill in DC by approximately $10/month relative to the 2024/2025 delivery year,
7 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM Interconnection, LLC. https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-auction-report.pdf.
8 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM Interconnection, LLC. https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-auction-report.pdf.
9 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM Interconnection, LLC. https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-auction-report.pdf.
74_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 6
holding all other bill changes constant (Table 4). The additional $10 per month will likely be felt by
residential customers starting in June 2025 through May 2026, the length of the delivery year.
Table 4. DC bill and rate impacts of the 2025/2026 capacity auction results relative to the 2024/2025 delivery year
Rate Class Monthly Bill Change
(%)
Additional $/kWh
Rate
Additional Cost on Month
Bills ($)
Residential 9% $0.017 $10
Commercial 9% $0.016 $345
Source: see description in text.
Synapse calculated the average bill increase by first determining the incremental cost to electricity
customers in the Pepco LDA between the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 delivery years, using auction result
data from PJM.10 The Pepco LDA covers DC and portions of Maryland. Using data from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration’s (EIA) Form EIA-861,11 we first allocated the incremental cost to electricity
customers to the DC portion of the Pepco LDA. Based on EIA data, the DC portion of the Pepco LDA is
responsible for 38 percent of total electricity consumption in the LDA. We therefore assume that the DC
portion of the Pepco LDA is also responsible for 38 percent of the LDA’s capacity market costs. We then
allocated the DC portion of the Pepco LDA capacity costs to either residential or commercial customers,
using EIA data on electricity consumption.12 We exclude any other bill changes for electricity customers
that may be in effect during this period, such as distribution and delivery costs, transmission costs,
energy costs, or others.
Capacity procurement schedules (both for Pepco’s standard offer service and for third-party suppliers)
may occur on slightly different schedules than PJM’s auction timing. Capacity procurement schedules
may affect the estimated timing of the expected bill impacts; our estimated $10/month increase for
residential customers is the annual expected average over 12 months.
2.3. Driving Factors Behind the Capacity Market Price Increase
There are four key factors that help explain the soaring prices, which have led to concerns about the
region’s ability to effectively and affordably meet demand:
1. Changes to capacity market rules, in particular how capacity is valued in the market
10 PJM, Base Residual Auction Results and Third Incremental Auction Results for Delivery Years 2024/2025 and 2025/2026,
available at: https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm
11 United States Energy Information Administration, Annual Electric Power Industry Report Form EIA-861,
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/
12 Ibid.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 6
holding all other bill changes constant (Table 4). The additional $10 per month will likely be felt by
residential customers starting in June 2025 through May 2026, the length of the delivery year.
Table 4. DC bill and rate impacts of the 2025/2026 capacity auction results relative to the 2024/2025 delivery year
Rate Class Monthly Bill Change
(%)
Additional $/kWh
Rate
Additional Cost on Month
Bills ($)
Residential 9% $0.017 $10
Commercial 9% $0.016 $345
Source: see description in text.
Synapse calculated the average bill increase by first determining the incremental cost to electricity
customers in the Pepco LDA between the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 delivery years, using auction result
data from PJM.10 The Pepco LDA covers DC and portions of Maryland. Using data from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration’s (EIA) Form EIA-861,11 we first allocated the incremental cost to electricity
customers to the DC portion of the Pepco LDA. Based on EIA data, the DC portion of the Pepco LDA is
responsible for 38 percent of total electricity consumption in the LDA. We therefore assume that the DC
portion of the Pepco LDA is also responsible for 38 percent of the LDA’s capacity market costs. We then
allocated the DC portion of the Pepco LDA capacity costs to either residential or commercial customers,
using EIA data on electricity consumption.12 We exclude any other bill changes for electricity customers
that may be in effect during this period, such as distribution and delivery costs, transmission costs,
energy costs, or others.
Capacity procurement schedules (both for Pepco’s standard offer service and for third-party suppliers)
may occur on slightly different schedules than PJM’s auction timing. Capacity procurement schedules
may affect the estimated timing of the expected bill impacts; our estimated $10/month increase for
residential customers is the annual expected average over 12 months.
2.3. Driving Factors Behind the Capacity Market Price Increase
There are four key factors that help explain the soaring prices, which have led to concerns about the
region’s ability to effectively and affordably meet demand:
1. Changes to capacity market rules, in particular how capacity is valued in the market
10 PJM, Base Residual Auction Results and Third Incremental Auction Results for Delivery Years 2024/2025 and 2025/2026,
available at: https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm
11 United States Energy Information Administration, Annual Electric Power Industry Report Form EIA-861,
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/
12 Ibid.
75_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 7
2. Generator retirements and the impact of how PJM treats reliability-must-run (RMR)
units in the capacity market
3. Interconnection queue backlogs
4. Increases in demand as a result of electrification and data center growth
The first two drivers, recent market reforms and PJM’s treatment of RMR units in the capacity market,
reduced supply in the market. As with any market, all else equal, a reduction in supply typically increases
prices. The reduction in supply was further compounded by the third driver, the clogged PJM
interconnection queue. This has meant that few new resources have been able to enter the market in
recent years, despite the increasing prices that sent a clear market signal that more supply is needed.
Lastly, demand is also increasing across the PJM footprint, further exacerbating these issues and putting
upward pressure on capacity prices. Concerningly, PJM expects these dynamics to continue for the
foreseeable future, which could lead to increasingly unaffordable electricity prices across the region.13
We discuss each of these factors in greater detail below.
Changes to PJM’s Capacity Accreditation
Capacity markets are designed to ensure that the electrical grid has sufficient generating resources to
meet current and future electricity demand. Generators and demand response resources with a capacity
commitment are paid the market clearing price times the amount of capacity value they are providing to
the market. The process of measuring and valuing a resource’s capacity value is called capacity
accreditation (i.e., determination of its unforced capacity (UCAP)).
Following winter storm Elliot in 2022, the region saw major outages and reliability shortfalls. In
response, PJM implemented various capacity market reforms for the 2025/2026 delivery year, most
notably its capacity accreditation methodology. Previously, PJM used various methods to determine a
generator’s accredited value (or UCAP). However, starting with the 2025/2026 delivery year, PJM
adopted a Marginal Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) approach.14 This approach accredits
resources based on their marginal contribution to the system’s reliability needs, modeling all 8,760
hours in a year across multiple scenarios.15
This new ELCC approach has resulted in a reduced UCAP value for most resource types, reducing the
total firm supply of capacity participating in the market. As seen in Table 5, solar and natural gas
resources experienced the most significant change in their ELCC values, decreasing by an average of 29
and 22 percent, respectively, between the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 delivery years.
13 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, at page 5.
14 PJM previously used a few capacity accreditation methods for different resource types (e.g., thermal versus intermittent
resources). Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, January 30, 2024. Order Accepting Tariff Revisions Subject to Condition.
Docket ER24-98, at 3-5.
15 PJM’s ELCC approach explicitly models how generator forced outages and other de-rates vary with temperature.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 7
2. Generator retirements and the impact of how PJM treats reliability-must-run (RMR)
units in the capacity market
3. Interconnection queue backlogs
4. Increases in demand as a result of electrification and data center growth
The first two drivers, recent market reforms and PJM’s treatment of RMR units in the capacity market,
reduced supply in the market. As with any market, all else equal, a reduction in supply typically increases
prices. The reduction in supply was further compounded by the third driver, the clogged PJM
interconnection queue. This has meant that few new resources have been able to enter the market in
recent years, despite the increasing prices that sent a clear market signal that more supply is needed.
Lastly, demand is also increasing across the PJM footprint, further exacerbating these issues and putting
upward pressure on capacity prices. Concerningly, PJM expects these dynamics to continue for the
foreseeable future, which could lead to increasingly unaffordable electricity prices across the region.13
We discuss each of these factors in greater detail below.
Changes to PJM’s Capacity Accreditation
Capacity markets are designed to ensure that the electrical grid has sufficient generating resources to
meet current and future electricity demand. Generators and demand response resources with a capacity
commitment are paid the market clearing price times the amount of capacity value they are providing to
the market. The process of measuring and valuing a resource’s capacity value is called capacity
accreditation (i.e., determination of its unforced capacity (UCAP)).
Following winter storm Elliot in 2022, the region saw major outages and reliability shortfalls. In
response, PJM implemented various capacity market reforms for the 2025/2026 delivery year, most
notably its capacity accreditation methodology. Previously, PJM used various methods to determine a
generator’s accredited value (or UCAP). However, starting with the 2025/2026 delivery year, PJM
adopted a Marginal Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) approach.14 This approach accredits
resources based on their marginal contribution to the system’s reliability needs, modeling all 8,760
hours in a year across multiple scenarios.15
This new ELCC approach has resulted in a reduced UCAP value for most resource types, reducing the
total firm supply of capacity participating in the market. As seen in Table 5, solar and natural gas
resources experienced the most significant change in their ELCC values, decreasing by an average of 29
and 22 percent, respectively, between the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 delivery years.
13 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, at page 5.
14 PJM previously used a few capacity accreditation methods for different resource types (e.g., thermal versus intermittent
resources). Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, January 30, 2024. Order Accepting Tariff Revisions Subject to Condition.
Docket ER24-98, at 3-5.
15 PJM’s ELCC approach explicitly models how generator forced outages and other de-rates vary with temperature.
76_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 8
Table 5. PJM’s average capacity class ratings for the 2024/2025, 2025/2026, and 2026/2027 delivery years
Resource Type 2024/2025 2025/2026 2026/2027
Historical Method Marginal ELCC Method
Fixed-Tilt Solar 30% 9% 8%
Tracking solar 50% 14% 11%
Coal 87% 85% 83%
Gas Combined Cycle 96% 80% 74%
Gas Combustion Turbine 90% 62% 60%
Diesel (Oil) 91% 90% 91%
Source: Class ratings for 2025/2026 using historical capacity accreditation method from: PJM Interconnection, December 1,
2023. Docket ER24-99-001. Responses to Deficiency Letter – Capacity Market Reforms to Accommodate the Energy Transition,
at 27. Updated 2025/2026 Class Ratings from: PJM Interconnection, ELCC Class Ratings for the 2025/2026 Base Residual
Auction, March 13, 2024, available at: https://www2.pjm.com/-/media/planning/res-adeq/elcc/2025-26-bra-elcc-class-
ratings.ashx. ELCC Class Ratings for the upcoming 2026/2027 delivery year from: PJM Interconnection, ELCC Class Ratings for
the 2026/2027 Base Residual Auction, February 28, 2025, available at: https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/res-
adeq/elcc/2026-27-bra-elcc-class-ratings.pdf.
The derating of gas and renewable resources between delivery years 2025/2025 and 2025/2026
resulted in a substantial decrease in the UCAP offered into the market. It also meant that affected
resources had to increase their offer prices. As a resource’s effective capacity (UCAP) is reduced—
meaning it can sell fewer megawatts—it must raise its prices to ensure it can still cover its annual costs
and remain financially viable. For instance, consider an 8 MW UCAP resource that previously bid in at
$50/MW-day, reflecting costs of $400/day; if now accredited at 5 MW UCAP, the offer would be
adjusted to $80/MW-day resulting in the same total $400/day amount.16 This dynamic creates a
scenario in which consumers have to pay more for less capacity. PJM’s adoption of the new ELCC
approach caused auction revenues to increase by an estimated 49.1 percent, or $4.4 billion, between
the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 delivery years.17
Retirements and Reliability-Must-Run Units
In recent years, many aging coal power plants and other fossil fuel generators have economically retired
across the PJM region, reducing the amount of conventional, higher-emission supply available to the
capacity market. Between the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 BRAs, 3,640 MW of nameplate capacity retired
16 PJM Market Implementation Committee. January 10, 2024. Informational Posting: Simulation Analysis of PJM CIFP-RA Filing.
Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/2024/20240110/20240110-informational-
only---simulation-analysis-of-pjm-cifp-ra-filing.ashx.
17 Compared to what RPM revenues would have been had PJM cleared the auction without locational constraints and using the
prior, EFORd approach. Monitoring Analytics, Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction Part A. Available at:
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auctio
n_Part_A_20240920.pdf.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 8
Table 5. PJM’s average capacity class ratings for the 2024/2025, 2025/2026, and 2026/2027 delivery years
Resource Type 2024/2025 2025/2026 2026/2027
Historical Method Marginal ELCC Method
Fixed-Tilt Solar 30% 9% 8%
Tracking solar 50% 14% 11%
Coal 87% 85% 83%
Gas Combined Cycle 96% 80% 74%
Gas Combustion Turbine 90% 62% 60%
Diesel (Oil) 91% 90% 91%
Source: Class ratings for 2025/2026 using historical capacity accreditation method from: PJM Interconnection, December 1,
2023. Docket ER24-99-001. Responses to Deficiency Letter – Capacity Market Reforms to Accommodate the Energy Transition,
at 27. Updated 2025/2026 Class Ratings from: PJM Interconnection, ELCC Class Ratings for the 2025/2026 Base Residual
Auction, March 13, 2024, available at: https://www2.pjm.com/-/media/planning/res-adeq/elcc/2025-26-bra-elcc-class-
ratings.ashx. ELCC Class Ratings for the upcoming 2026/2027 delivery year from: PJM Interconnection, ELCC Class Ratings for
the 2026/2027 Base Residual Auction, February 28, 2025, available at: https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/planning/res-
adeq/elcc/2026-27-bra-elcc-class-ratings.pdf.
The derating of gas and renewable resources between delivery years 2025/2025 and 2025/2026
resulted in a substantial decrease in the UCAP offered into the market. It also meant that affected
resources had to increase their offer prices. As a resource’s effective capacity (UCAP) is reduced—
meaning it can sell fewer megawatts—it must raise its prices to ensure it can still cover its annual costs
and remain financially viable. For instance, consider an 8 MW UCAP resource that previously bid in at
$50/MW-day, reflecting costs of $400/day; if now accredited at 5 MW UCAP, the offer would be
adjusted to $80/MW-day resulting in the same total $400/day amount.16 This dynamic creates a
scenario in which consumers have to pay more for less capacity. PJM’s adoption of the new ELCC
approach caused auction revenues to increase by an estimated 49.1 percent, or $4.4 billion, between
the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 delivery years.17
Retirements and Reliability-Must-Run Units
In recent years, many aging coal power plants and other fossil fuel generators have economically retired
across the PJM region, reducing the amount of conventional, higher-emission supply available to the
capacity market. Between the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 BRAs, 3,640 MW of nameplate capacity retired
16 PJM Market Implementation Committee. January 10, 2024. Informational Posting: Simulation Analysis of PJM CIFP-RA Filing.
Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/2024/20240110/20240110-informational-
only---simulation-analysis-of-pjm-cifp-ra-filing.ashx.
17 Compared to what RPM revenues would have been had PJM cleared the auction without locational constraints and using the
prior, EFORd approach. Monitoring Analytics, Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction Part A. Available at:
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auctio
n_Part_A_20240920.pdf.
77_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 9
across the PJM footprint.18 We estimate this to be roughly 3,300 MW of accredited capacity (UCAP),19 or
approximately 2 percent of the capacity that cleared in the 2024/2025 auction.
The reduction in supply has been further compounded by two recent RMR agreements. In 2023, Talen
Energy announced its intent to retire Brandon Shores and Herbert A. Wagner (Wagner) generators. The
units are located in the BGE LDA, which is highly transmission constrained. PJM determined that if
Brandon Shores units 1 and 2, and Wagner units 3 and 4 were to retire, there could be major grid
reliability issues. PJM asked Talen to continue operating these four units beyond their proposed
retirement date of June 2025, through RMR arrangements, until the associated reliability issues can be
addressed with upgrades to the transmission system. These upgrades would alleviate the reliability
concerns by enabling electricity to be imported from neighboring areas. The RMR service20 is a specific
designation applied to generating units that agree to remain operational beyond their planned
retirement dates, until transmission solutions are put in place that address the reliability issue. PJM
entered into two RMR arrangements with Talen Energy for its Brandon Shores and Wagner generators
starting in June 2025, 21 which are expected to extend to May 31, 2029.22
Importantly, although PJM needs RMR units to continue operating to avoid reliability issues (e.g., to
generate energy during critical periods), these units have not participated as supply-side resources in
any previous PJM capacity auction.23 This means that when a unit enters into an RMR arrangement with
PJM, the LDA where it is located will see a sudden drop in capacity market supply (despite having the
same amount of grid-connected resources in that LDA). For instance, in the latest BRA, the removal of
Brandon Shores and Wagner dramatically reduced supply for the BGE LDA. That meant that only 10
percent of the LDA’s capacity was located within the LDA, while the remaining amount was imported
from neighboring regions. However, since the LDA was so transmission-constrained, it could not import
enough capacity to meet its reliability requirements (the target amount of capacity required to meet
PJM’s reliability standard). As a result of the sudden drop in supply, the transmission-constrained zone
cleared at the maximum allowable capacity price in the 2025/2026 BRA. This capacity shortfall in the
BGE LDA, as a result of the RMRs not participating in the capacity auction, had a spillover effect into the
18 PJM Interconnection, LLC. PJM - Generation Deactivations. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/planning/service-
requests/gen-deactivations.
19 Using average class ratings for the 2024/2025 delivery year.
20 RMRs are referred to as “Part V Reliability Service” in the PJM tariff.
21 In 2024, PJM arranged to retain one resource under RMR contracts: the Indian River plant (“IR4”), a 410 MW coal facility
owned by NRG Power Marketing, located in Delaware in the DPL South LDA. The Indian River RMR arrangement terminated
in February 2025, approximately 22 months ahead of schedule. PJM Inside Lines. December 23, 2024. “Delaware Generator
To Retire Ahead of Schedule.” Available at: https://insidelines.pjm.com/delaware-generator-to-retire-ahead-of-schedule/.
22 Talen Energy, January 27, 2025. “Talen Energy, Other Parties Reach Reliability Must Run Settlement Agreement for Brandon
Shores and H.A. Wagner Power Plants.” Available at: https://ir.talenenergy.com/news-releases/news-release-details/talen-
energy-other-parties-reach-reliability-must-run-settlement.
23 PJM Interconnection, LLC. 2024. “PJM Response to Independent Market Monitor Report on 2025/2026 Base Residual
Auction.” Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/reliability-pricing-model/20241011-
response-to-imm-25-26-bra-report.ashx.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 9
across the PJM footprint.18 We estimate this to be roughly 3,300 MW of accredited capacity (UCAP),19 or
approximately 2 percent of the capacity that cleared in the 2024/2025 auction.
The reduction in supply has been further compounded by two recent RMR agreements. In 2023, Talen
Energy announced its intent to retire Brandon Shores and Herbert A. Wagner (Wagner) generators. The
units are located in the BGE LDA, which is highly transmission constrained. PJM determined that if
Brandon Shores units 1 and 2, and Wagner units 3 and 4 were to retire, there could be major grid
reliability issues. PJM asked Talen to continue operating these four units beyond their proposed
retirement date of June 2025, through RMR arrangements, until the associated reliability issues can be
addressed with upgrades to the transmission system. These upgrades would alleviate the reliability
concerns by enabling electricity to be imported from neighboring areas. The RMR service20 is a specific
designation applied to generating units that agree to remain operational beyond their planned
retirement dates, until transmission solutions are put in place that address the reliability issue. PJM
entered into two RMR arrangements with Talen Energy for its Brandon Shores and Wagner generators
starting in June 2025, 21 which are expected to extend to May 31, 2029.22
Importantly, although PJM needs RMR units to continue operating to avoid reliability issues (e.g., to
generate energy during critical periods), these units have not participated as supply-side resources in
any previous PJM capacity auction.23 This means that when a unit enters into an RMR arrangement with
PJM, the LDA where it is located will see a sudden drop in capacity market supply (despite having the
same amount of grid-connected resources in that LDA). For instance, in the latest BRA, the removal of
Brandon Shores and Wagner dramatically reduced supply for the BGE LDA. That meant that only 10
percent of the LDA’s capacity was located within the LDA, while the remaining amount was imported
from neighboring regions. However, since the LDA was so transmission-constrained, it could not import
enough capacity to meet its reliability requirements (the target amount of capacity required to meet
PJM’s reliability standard). As a result of the sudden drop in supply, the transmission-constrained zone
cleared at the maximum allowable capacity price in the 2025/2026 BRA. This capacity shortfall in the
BGE LDA, as a result of the RMRs not participating in the capacity auction, had a spillover effect into the
18 PJM Interconnection, LLC. PJM - Generation Deactivations. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/planning/service-
requests/gen-deactivations.
19 Using average class ratings for the 2024/2025 delivery year.
20 RMRs are referred to as “Part V Reliability Service” in the PJM tariff.
21 In 2024, PJM arranged to retain one resource under RMR contracts: the Indian River plant (“IR4”), a 410 MW coal facility
owned by NRG Power Marketing, located in Delaware in the DPL South LDA. The Indian River RMR arrangement terminated
in February 2025, approximately 22 months ahead of schedule. PJM Inside Lines. December 23, 2024. “Delaware Generator
To Retire Ahead of Schedule.” Available at: https://insidelines.pjm.com/delaware-generator-to-retire-ahead-of-schedule/.
22 Talen Energy, January 27, 2025. “Talen Energy, Other Parties Reach Reliability Must Run Settlement Agreement for Brandon
Shores and H.A. Wagner Power Plants.” Available at: https://ir.talenenergy.com/news-releases/news-release-details/talen-
energy-other-parties-reach-reliability-must-run-settlement.
23 PJM Interconnection, LLC. 2024. “PJM Response to Independent Market Monitor Report on 2025/2026 Base Residual
Auction.” Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/reliability-pricing-model/20241011-
response-to-imm-25-26-bra-report.ashx.
78_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 10
RTO as a whole. It increased the RTO-wide clearing prices and pushed up consumer prices in the Pepco
zone and beyond, resulting in a 41.2 percent increase in overall auction revenues, or an increase of $4.3
billion.24
Electricity customers compensate units retained through RMR arrangements for their continued
operation through out-of-market payments administered by PJM. These payments are in addition to the
capacity price spike associated with their removal from the capacity auction, as described above. RMR
costs are allocated to LDAs proportionally to the cost allocation of the transmission upgrades that will
address the reliability issues that necessitated the RMRs to begin with. Table 6 shows the total out-of-
market costs of Brandon Shores and Wagner RMRs, and the bill impact of these procurements on DC
Pepco customers. The Pepco LDA is responsible for 11 percent of total RMR costs, the second largest
share after the BGE LDA. The DC portion of Pepco is responsible for roughly 4 percent of total annual
RMR costs, with the Maryland portion paying for the remaining 7 percent.
Table 6. Initial RMR costs for Brandon Shores and Wagner RMR arrangements, and the costs allocated to DC Pepco electricity
customers
Generator Nameplate
MW
Annual RMR
Costs
Percent of
Costs Allocated
to DC Pepco
Customers
Annual RMR
Costs Allocated
to DC Pepco
Customers
Additional cost on
the average
residential monthly
electric bill
Brandon
Shores
(units 1&2)
1,282 $145.9 million
4 percent
$5.9 million -
Wagner
(units 3&4)
703 $35.2 million $1.4 million -
Combined
Total
1,985 $181.1 million $7.3 million $0.50 per month
Notes: Brandon Shores and Wagner RMR cost recovery is subject to litigation by intervening stakeholders in a proceeding before
FERC. As a result, the final cost recovery amount approved by FERC may be lower than the initial proposal. Cost data Talen
Energy, January 27, 2025. “Talen Energy, Other Parties Reach Reliability Must Run Settlement Agreement for Brandon Shores
and H.A. Wagner Power Plants”, Available at: https://ir.talenenergy.com/news-releases/news-release-details/talen-energy-
other-parties-reach-reliability-must-run-settlement
Brandon Shores and Wagner units are scheduled for use as RMR units through May 2029,25 when the
transmission enhancements are complete that will address the reliability issues associated with these
24 Holding everything else constant, the fact that the RMR resources in the BGE LDA were not included in the supply curve at $0
per MW-day resulted in a 41.2 percent increase in RPM revenues, $4,287,256,309, for the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual
Auction compared to what RPM revenues would have been had the capacity of those RMR resources been included in the
supply curve at $0 per MW-day. Monitoring Analytics, Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction Part A.
Available at:
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auctio
n_Part_A_20240920.pdf.
25 According to the latest settlement agreement, Talen Energy, January 27, 2025. “Talen Energy, Other Parties Reach Reliability
Must Run Settlement Agreement for Brandon Shores and H.A. Wagner Power Plants.” Available at:
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 10
RTO as a whole. It increased the RTO-wide clearing prices and pushed up consumer prices in the Pepco
zone and beyond, resulting in a 41.2 percent increase in overall auction revenues, or an increase of $4.3
billion.24
Electricity customers compensate units retained through RMR arrangements for their continued
operation through out-of-market payments administered by PJM. These payments are in addition to the
capacity price spike associated with their removal from the capacity auction, as described above. RMR
costs are allocated to LDAs proportionally to the cost allocation of the transmission upgrades that will
address the reliability issues that necessitated the RMRs to begin with. Table 6 shows the total out-of-
market costs of Brandon Shores and Wagner RMRs, and the bill impact of these procurements on DC
Pepco customers. The Pepco LDA is responsible for 11 percent of total RMR costs, the second largest
share after the BGE LDA. The DC portion of Pepco is responsible for roughly 4 percent of total annual
RMR costs, with the Maryland portion paying for the remaining 7 percent.
Table 6. Initial RMR costs for Brandon Shores and Wagner RMR arrangements, and the costs allocated to DC Pepco electricity
customers
Generator Nameplate
MW
Annual RMR
Costs
Percent of
Costs Allocated
to DC Pepco
Customers
Annual RMR
Costs Allocated
to DC Pepco
Customers
Additional cost on
the average
residential monthly
electric bill
Brandon
Shores
(units 1&2)
1,282 $145.9 million
4 percent
$5.9 million -
Wagner
(units 3&4)
703 $35.2 million $1.4 million -
Combined
Total
1,985 $181.1 million $7.3 million $0.50 per month
Notes: Brandon Shores and Wagner RMR cost recovery is subject to litigation by intervening stakeholders in a proceeding before
FERC. As a result, the final cost recovery amount approved by FERC may be lower than the initial proposal. Cost data Talen
Energy, January 27, 2025. “Talen Energy, Other Parties Reach Reliability Must Run Settlement Agreement for Brandon Shores
and H.A. Wagner Power Plants”, Available at: https://ir.talenenergy.com/news-releases/news-release-details/talen-energy-
other-parties-reach-reliability-must-run-settlement
Brandon Shores and Wagner units are scheduled for use as RMR units through May 2029,25 when the
transmission enhancements are complete that will address the reliability issues associated with these
24 Holding everything else constant, the fact that the RMR resources in the BGE LDA were not included in the supply curve at $0
per MW-day resulted in a 41.2 percent increase in RPM revenues, $4,287,256,309, for the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual
Auction compared to what RPM revenues would have been had the capacity of those RMR resources been included in the
supply curve at $0 per MW-day. Monitoring Analytics, Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction Part A.
Available at:
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auctio
n_Part_A_20240920.pdf.
25 According to the latest settlement agreement, Talen Energy, January 27, 2025. “Talen Energy, Other Parties Reach Reliability
Must Run Settlement Agreement for Brandon Shores and H.A. Wagner Power Plants.” Available at:
79_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 11
unit retirements. However, there are multiple factors that could delay the construction and completion
of the required transmission projects, making this timeline uncertain.
PJM Interconnection Queue Constraints
Capacity supply across the region has decreased in recent years, as result of PJM’s new capacity
accreditation methodology and PJM’s historical treatment of RMRs in the auction. This led to historically
high capacity market prices in the last BRA. High market prices should incentivize new market entry to
ultimately bring prices down. However, the PJM interconnection queue is currently experiencing major
delays and constraints, meaning that it has been increasingly difficult for new generation to enter PJM’s
capacity markets in recent years. This is evident in Figure 2, which shows that the volume of new supply
resources clearing in the capacity market has been substantially lower in the last two auctions
(2024/2025 and 2025/2026) relative to previous delivery years. New supply is not able to replace the
retiring resources and the reductions in supply associated with the new capacity accreditation
methodology. The impact of delayed new resource entry has been compounded by the truncated
periods between the most recent auctions and the start of delivery years, which further reduces the
ability of capacity prices to incentivize new entry.26 Ultimately, because of the clogged queue and
shortened auction schedule, generator owners and developers are not able to respond to the capacity
market’s price signal with new entry as quickly as needed, thus reducing the market’s efficiency and
effectiveness.
Figure 2. Cleared MWs (UCAP) of new generation, upgrades, imports by delivery year (excludes existing generation)
Source: 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-auction-report.pdf.
https://ir.talenenergy.com/news-releases/news-release-details/talen-energy-other-parties-reach-reliability-must-run-
settlement.
26 Complaint of Joint Consumer Advocates. FERC EL25-18, page 3.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 11
unit retirements. However, there are multiple factors that could delay the construction and completion
of the required transmission projects, making this timeline uncertain.
PJM Interconnection Queue Constraints
Capacity supply across the region has decreased in recent years, as result of PJM’s new capacity
accreditation methodology and PJM’s historical treatment of RMRs in the auction. This led to historically
high capacity market prices in the last BRA. High market prices should incentivize new market entry to
ultimately bring prices down. However, the PJM interconnection queue is currently experiencing major
delays and constraints, meaning that it has been increasingly difficult for new generation to enter PJM’s
capacity markets in recent years. This is evident in Figure 2, which shows that the volume of new supply
resources clearing in the capacity market has been substantially lower in the last two auctions
(2024/2025 and 2025/2026) relative to previous delivery years. New supply is not able to replace the
retiring resources and the reductions in supply associated with the new capacity accreditation
methodology. The impact of delayed new resource entry has been compounded by the truncated
periods between the most recent auctions and the start of delivery years, which further reduces the
ability of capacity prices to incentivize new entry.26 Ultimately, because of the clogged queue and
shortened auction schedule, generator owners and developers are not able to respond to the capacity
market’s price signal with new entry as quickly as needed, thus reducing the market’s efficiency and
effectiveness.
Figure 2. Cleared MWs (UCAP) of new generation, upgrades, imports by delivery year (excludes existing generation)
Source: 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-auction-report.pdf.
https://ir.talenenergy.com/news-releases/news-release-details/talen-energy-other-parties-reach-reliability-must-run-
settlement.
26 Complaint of Joint Consumer Advocates. FERC EL25-18, page 3.
80_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 12
In the latest auction, natural gas represented the largest share of cleared resources (UCAP),
representing 45 percent, followed by nuclear and coal (21 percent each) (Figure 3). Conversely, the
interconnection queue is made up of 94 percent renewables and storage, and only 6 percent gas-fired
resources, on a MW basis.27
Figure 3. Cleared resources by type, in UCAP MW, in the latest 2025-2026 BRA
Notes: Other includes “Aggregate Resources” and “Other” (as defined by PJM), Oil includes “Oil” and “Distillate Oil (No.2)”, and
Intermittent Resources include Solar, Wind, and Battery/Hybrid. 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM.
Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-
auction-report.pdf.
Increasing Load and Demand
Alongside PJM's new capacity accreditation, recent retirements, new RMR agreements, and clogged
queue, increasing demand is also contributing to rising capacity costs. Total load across the PJM
footprint increased by 3,243 MW (or 2 percent) between the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 delivery years,
representing a substantial increase relative to historical changes to demand. A similar increase is
expected for the next delivery year, followed by rapid escalation beyond 2026 (Figure 4).28 Much of this
is due to projected demand from new data centers, as well as growing electrification of buildings and
27 Energy Transition in PJM: Resource Retirements, Replacements & Risks, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 2 (Feb.
https://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2023/energytransition-in-pjm-resource-retirements-
replacements-and-risks.ashx (“Four Rs Report”).
28 2025 Preliminary PJM Load Forecast, Load Analysis Subcommittee. December 9, 2024. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/committees-groups/subcommittees/las/2024/20241209/20241209-item-03---2025-preliminary-pjm-load-
forecast.ashx
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 12
In the latest auction, natural gas represented the largest share of cleared resources (UCAP),
representing 45 percent, followed by nuclear and coal (21 percent each) (Figure 3). Conversely, the
interconnection queue is made up of 94 percent renewables and storage, and only 6 percent gas-fired
resources, on a MW basis.27
Figure 3. Cleared resources by type, in UCAP MW, in the latest 2025-2026 BRA
Notes: Other includes “Aggregate Resources” and “Other” (as defined by PJM), Oil includes “Oil” and “Distillate Oil (No.2)”, and
Intermittent Resources include Solar, Wind, and Battery/Hybrid. 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report. July 30, 2024. PJM.
Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-base-residual-
auction-report.pdf.
Increasing Load and Demand
Alongside PJM's new capacity accreditation, recent retirements, new RMR agreements, and clogged
queue, increasing demand is also contributing to rising capacity costs. Total load across the PJM
footprint increased by 3,243 MW (or 2 percent) between the 2024/2025 and 2025/2026 delivery years,
representing a substantial increase relative to historical changes to demand. A similar increase is
expected for the next delivery year, followed by rapid escalation beyond 2026 (Figure 4).28 Much of this
is due to projected demand from new data centers, as well as growing electrification of buildings and
27 Energy Transition in PJM: Resource Retirements, Replacements & Risks, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 2 (Feb.
https://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2023/energytransition-in-pjm-resource-retirements-
replacements-and-risks.ashx (“Four Rs Report”).
28 2025 Preliminary PJM Load Forecast, Load Analysis Subcommittee. December 9, 2024. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/committees-groups/subcommittees/las/2024/20241209/20241209-item-03---2025-preliminary-pjm-load-
forecast.ashx
81_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 13
transportation (e.g., heat pumps and EVs). The increasing load forecasts further exacerbate these
market dynamics and the tightening balance of supply and demand in PJM, and thus drives up prices.
Figure 4. PJM’s summer peak forecast (MW) for the RTO
Source: 2025 PJM Long-Term Load Forecast Report. January 24, 2025. PJM. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/load-forecast/2025-load-report.pdf.
3. UPCOMING CHANGES TO THE 2026/2027 AND 2027/2028
CAPACITY MARKETS
Given the very high clearing prices in the 2025/2026 delivery year, and the strong likelihood that these
recent market dynamics will continue for the foreseeable future, there have been widespread calls for
capacity market reform in PJM.29 As a result, PJM recently reexamined several of its capacity market
rules and proposed “stop gap” measures for the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 delivery years. In February
2025, FERC approved these reforms, which will affect how PJM treats RMRs in the capacity market, what
resources must offer into the capacity market, and the selection of the reference resource used for Net
CONE calculations and the VRR Curve. On April 21, 2025, FERC also approved PJM and Pennsylvania’s
proposal to set a new price maximum and minimum. These approved reforms will affect how much
29 Several entities filed a complaint in Docket No. El24-148.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 13
transportation (e.g., heat pumps and EVs). The increasing load forecasts further exacerbate these
market dynamics and the tightening balance of supply and demand in PJM, and thus drives up prices.
Figure 4. PJM’s summer peak forecast (MW) for the RTO
Source: 2025 PJM Long-Term Load Forecast Report. January 24, 2025. PJM. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/load-forecast/2025-load-report.pdf.
3. UPCOMING CHANGES TO THE 2026/2027 AND 2027/2028
CAPACITY MARKETS
Given the very high clearing prices in the 2025/2026 delivery year, and the strong likelihood that these
recent market dynamics will continue for the foreseeable future, there have been widespread calls for
capacity market reform in PJM.29 As a result, PJM recently reexamined several of its capacity market
rules and proposed “stop gap” measures for the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 delivery years. In February
2025, FERC approved these reforms, which will affect how PJM treats RMRs in the capacity market, what
resources must offer into the capacity market, and the selection of the reference resource used for Net
CONE calculations and the VRR Curve. On April 21, 2025, FERC also approved PJM and Pennsylvania’s
proposal to set a new price maximum and minimum. These approved reforms will affect how much
29 Several entities filed a complaint in Docket No. El24-148.
82_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 14
supply will participate in the auction, as well as how the VRR demand curve is defined. This section
discusses these reforms.
Separately, PJM plans to continue to evaluate and develop its rules around RMR treatment before the
2028/2029 BRA; and later in 2026, PJM will review the reference technology and other parameters that
influence the VRR curve. Section 6 (Ongoing Reform Discussions) summarizes these longer-term
reforms.
3.1. Upcoming Changes to Supply
Ending the Must-Offer Exemption for Intermittent, Storage, and Hybrid Resources
Since 2015, all existing generation capacity resources with capacity interconnection rights (CIR) have
been required to submit a supply offer into the BRA, except for intermittent resources, storage, hybrid,
and demand response resources. However, FERC recently ended the must-offer exemption for
intermittent, storage, and hybrid resources, effective for the upcoming 2026/2027 delivery year. This
change will increase the total amount of available supply. Only demand response resources will remain
categorically exempt.
This change was proposed by PJM and supported by various stakeholders. As PJM explains, the resource
mix in PJM has changed substantially over the last decade. The amount of UCAP supplied by
intermittent, storage, and hybrid resources has tripled since 2018/2019 alone, and these resource types
now make up 97 percent of the planned MW in the PJM interconnection queue (substantially more than
in 2015).30 PJM and the market monitor also argue that the must-offer exemption could lead to market
power issues, especially as the share of solar, wind, and storage resources continues to grow in the
future.31 The Joint Consumer Advocates in PJM (the District of Columbia, Maryland, Ohio, New Jersey,
and Illinois) also supported lifting the must-offer exemption for demand response resources, citing
market power issues.32 Lastly, the market monitor argued that the exemption for resources with CIRs tie
up CIRs that could be allocated to other resources.33
However, some intervenors opposed the change. For instance, certain parties argued that if intermittent
resources are forced to participate in the capacity market, they could face an elevated risk of high non-
performance charges as they may not always be able perform reliably in emergency conditions (e.g.,
solar cannot perform at night). They argued that this could discourage investment in future intermittent
resources across PJM.34 However, FERC dismisses this concern with the explanation that the ELCC
30 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions. FERC ER25-785-000. February 20, 2025, page 5.
31 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions. FERC ER25-785-000. February 20, 2025, page 23.
32 Complaint of Joint Consumer Advocates. FERC EL25-18, page 5.
33 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions. FERC ER25-785-000. February 20, 2025, page 22.
34 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions. FERC ER25-785-000. February 20, 2025, page 26.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 14
supply will participate in the auction, as well as how the VRR demand curve is defined. This section
discusses these reforms.
Separately, PJM plans to continue to evaluate and develop its rules around RMR treatment before the
2028/2029 BRA; and later in 2026, PJM will review the reference technology and other parameters that
influence the VRR curve. Section 6 (Ongoing Reform Discussions) summarizes these longer-term
reforms.
3.1. Upcoming Changes to Supply
Ending the Must-Offer Exemption for Intermittent, Storage, and Hybrid Resources
Since 2015, all existing generation capacity resources with capacity interconnection rights (CIR) have
been required to submit a supply offer into the BRA, except for intermittent resources, storage, hybrid,
and demand response resources. However, FERC recently ended the must-offer exemption for
intermittent, storage, and hybrid resources, effective for the upcoming 2026/2027 delivery year. This
change will increase the total amount of available supply. Only demand response resources will remain
categorically exempt.
This change was proposed by PJM and supported by various stakeholders. As PJM explains, the resource
mix in PJM has changed substantially over the last decade. The amount of UCAP supplied by
intermittent, storage, and hybrid resources has tripled since 2018/2019 alone, and these resource types
now make up 97 percent of the planned MW in the PJM interconnection queue (substantially more than
in 2015).30 PJM and the market monitor also argue that the must-offer exemption could lead to market
power issues, especially as the share of solar, wind, and storage resources continues to grow in the
future.31 The Joint Consumer Advocates in PJM (the District of Columbia, Maryland, Ohio, New Jersey,
and Illinois) also supported lifting the must-offer exemption for demand response resources, citing
market power issues.32 Lastly, the market monitor argued that the exemption for resources with CIRs tie
up CIRs that could be allocated to other resources.33
However, some intervenors opposed the change. For instance, certain parties argued that if intermittent
resources are forced to participate in the capacity market, they could face an elevated risk of high non-
performance charges as they may not always be able perform reliably in emergency conditions (e.g.,
solar cannot perform at night). They argued that this could discourage investment in future intermittent
resources across PJM.34 However, FERC dismisses this concern with the explanation that the ELCC
30 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions. FERC ER25-785-000. February 20, 2025, page 5.
31 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions. FERC ER25-785-000. February 20, 2025, page 23.
32 Complaint of Joint Consumer Advocates. FERC EL25-18, page 5.
33 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions. FERC ER25-785-000. February 20, 2025, page 22.
34 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions. FERC ER25-785-000. February 20, 2025, page 26.
83_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 15
accreditation methodology objectively accounts for each capacity resource’s expected availability during
grid emergencies (e.g., solar has lower ELCC ratings to account for its inability to perform at night).35
We estimate that lifting the exemption for intermittent and storage resources will increase supply in the
upcoming BRA by an estimated 2,000 (UCAP).36 This is in addition to the 3,969 MW UCAP of solar, wind,
and battery resources offered into the market in the 2025/2026 BRA (3,027 MW of which cleared).
RMR Participation in the Capacity Market
The capacity market clearing price should reflect the actual level of supply in the market. However, as
discussed above, RMRs have been removed from the capacity supply curve and do not participate in the
auction. This reduces apparent supply, often resulting in artificially high clearing prices. This occurred in
the BGE LDA, where capacity prices cleared at the maximum. Astoundingly, Brandon Shores and
Wagner’s removal from capacity market participation had a spillover effect into the rest of the RTO,
costing PJM customers as a whole an additional $4.3 billion in the 2025/2026 delivery year,37 in addition
to the annual $181 million that the local LDA customers are paying for the out-of-market RMR
arrangement.
PJM’s historical treatment of RMRs in the market leads to customers paying twice for the same capacity:
(1) for the out-of-market RMR arrangement costs and (2) in the capacity market to procure the capacity
that is already provided by the RMR resource.38 In their November 2025 filing arguing that PJM’s current
BRA construct is unjust and unreasonable, a group of consumer advocates within the PJM region
(including the DC OPC) requested that FERC require PJM to compensate RMR resources at a full cost-of-
service rate in exchange for their full participation in PJM’s capacity, energy, and ancillary service
markets where they are eligible.39 This would include requiring them to function as price takers in BRAs,
which would increase the capacity market supply and prevent double-payment by consumers. PJM’s
accepted reforms partly accomplish this.
PJM now agrees that RMRs should participate in the PJM auction to reflect more accurate price signals
and prevent electricity customers from paying twice for capacity. FERC approved PJM’s proposal to
35 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions. FERC ER25-785-000. February 20, 2025, page 26.
36 We estimate that there is an additional 2,000 MW (UCAP) of solar, wind, and battery/hybrid resources that are not
participating in the market. We estimate this by reviewing the capacity (nameplate MW) of all existing resources in PJM
(from U.S. EIA form 923 and 860), applying ELCC ratings to estimate the total UCAP by resource type, and comparing that
value against the offered and cleared amount of capacity in the 2025/2026 BRA.
37 Monitoring Analytics, IMM Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part A, September 20, 2024,
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auctio
n_Part_A_20240920.pdf.
38 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 30.
39 Complaint of Joint Consumer Advocates. FERC EL25-18, page 5.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 15
accreditation methodology objectively accounts for each capacity resource’s expected availability during
grid emergencies (e.g., solar has lower ELCC ratings to account for its inability to perform at night).35
We estimate that lifting the exemption for intermittent and storage resources will increase supply in the
upcoming BRA by an estimated 2,000 (UCAP).36 This is in addition to the 3,969 MW UCAP of solar, wind,
and battery resources offered into the market in the 2025/2026 BRA (3,027 MW of which cleared).
RMR Participation in the Capacity Market
The capacity market clearing price should reflect the actual level of supply in the market. However, as
discussed above, RMRs have been removed from the capacity supply curve and do not participate in the
auction. This reduces apparent supply, often resulting in artificially high clearing prices. This occurred in
the BGE LDA, where capacity prices cleared at the maximum. Astoundingly, Brandon Shores and
Wagner’s removal from capacity market participation had a spillover effect into the rest of the RTO,
costing PJM customers as a whole an additional $4.3 billion in the 2025/2026 delivery year,37 in addition
to the annual $181 million that the local LDA customers are paying for the out-of-market RMR
arrangement.
PJM’s historical treatment of RMRs in the market leads to customers paying twice for the same capacity:
(1) for the out-of-market RMR arrangement costs and (2) in the capacity market to procure the capacity
that is already provided by the RMR resource.38 In their November 2025 filing arguing that PJM’s current
BRA construct is unjust and unreasonable, a group of consumer advocates within the PJM region
(including the DC OPC) requested that FERC require PJM to compensate RMR resources at a full cost-of-
service rate in exchange for their full participation in PJM’s capacity, energy, and ancillary service
markets where they are eligible.39 This would include requiring them to function as price takers in BRAs,
which would increase the capacity market supply and prevent double-payment by consumers. PJM’s
accepted reforms partly accomplish this.
PJM now agrees that RMRs should participate in the PJM auction to reflect more accurate price signals
and prevent electricity customers from paying twice for capacity. FERC approved PJM’s proposal to
35 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions. FERC ER25-785-000. February 20, 2025, page 26.
36 We estimate that there is an additional 2,000 MW (UCAP) of solar, wind, and battery/hybrid resources that are not
participating in the market. We estimate this by reviewing the capacity (nameplate MW) of all existing resources in PJM
(from U.S. EIA form 923 and 860), applying ELCC ratings to estimate the total UCAP by resource type, and comparing that
value against the offered and cleared amount of capacity in the 2025/2026 BRA.
37 Monitoring Analytics, IMM Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction – Part A, September 20, 2024,
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2024/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20252026_RPM_Base_Residual_Auctio
n_Part_A_20240920.pdf.
38 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 30.
39 Complaint of Joint Consumer Advocates. FERC EL25-18, page 5.
84_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 16
allow Brandon Shores and Wagner to provide capacity, as long as they meet the four criteria developed
by PJM.
Four Criteria for RMR Participation in the Capacity Market
Starting in the upcoming 2026/2027 auction (currently scheduled for July 2025), RMR units will
participate in the capacity market as supply-side resources if they meet four criteria:
1. The RMR resource must have sufficient CIRs. In other words, the transmission system
must be able to accommodate the injection of the resource’s energy.
2. The RMR resource must have an RMR agreement that has been accepted by FERC at
least three months before the planning parameters are published, ensuring that PJM
can properly incorporate the resource into its planning.40,41
3. The RMR resource must be reasonably expected to be able to operate for the entire
delivery year. It must have all the necessary permits to operate, and no conditions or
contractual commitments that would unduly prevent it from operating.
4. The RMR arrangement terms must not preclude PJM dispatching the RMR unit for such
emergencies (each RMR agreement is negotiated between PJM and the resource owner,
and the terms can vary).42
The four criteria are designed to provide assurance that the resource is physically and contractually
capable of performing during grid emergencies and therefore can and should be considered a capacity
resource. As PJM argues, if an RMR resource is not able to meet all four criteria, then the unit cannot
reasonably provide capacity to the system, and consumers would therefore not be double-paying for
capacity.43 If a resource does meet all four criteria, then PJM can rely on the resource to contribute to
the region’s resource adequacy.
Brandon Shores and Wagner Expected Future Participation in the Capacity Market
Brandon Shores units 1 and 2, and Wagner units 3 and 4 are expected to meet all four criteria above and
provide supply in the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 delivery years (until transmission solutions are put in
place to address the related reliability issues). No other units are expected to be needed for RMR service
for the next two delivery years. If Brandon Shores and Wagner are needed for RMR service beyond that
40 PJM’s planning parameters are released no later than 100 days ahead of the auction.
41 The RMR resource also cannot have cleared in an RPM auction for the relevant delivery year. If it is already counted as
capacity, PJM need not separately deem that resource as capacity supply.
42 There have been some cases where the RMR agreement have been limited to addressing transmission needs, and specifically
not capacity emergencies. PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-
682, page 21.
43 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 23.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 16
allow Brandon Shores and Wagner to provide capacity, as long as they meet the four criteria developed
by PJM.
Four Criteria for RMR Participation in the Capacity Market
Starting in the upcoming 2026/2027 auction (currently scheduled for July 2025), RMR units will
participate in the capacity market as supply-side resources if they meet four criteria:
1. The RMR resource must have sufficient CIRs. In other words, the transmission system
must be able to accommodate the injection of the resource’s energy.
2. The RMR resource must have an RMR agreement that has been accepted by FERC at
least three months before the planning parameters are published, ensuring that PJM
can properly incorporate the resource into its planning.40,41
3. The RMR resource must be reasonably expected to be able to operate for the entire
delivery year. It must have all the necessary permits to operate, and no conditions or
contractual commitments that would unduly prevent it from operating.
4. The RMR arrangement terms must not preclude PJM dispatching the RMR unit for such
emergencies (each RMR agreement is negotiated between PJM and the resource owner,
and the terms can vary).42
The four criteria are designed to provide assurance that the resource is physically and contractually
capable of performing during grid emergencies and therefore can and should be considered a capacity
resource. As PJM argues, if an RMR resource is not able to meet all four criteria, then the unit cannot
reasonably provide capacity to the system, and consumers would therefore not be double-paying for
capacity.43 If a resource does meet all four criteria, then PJM can rely on the resource to contribute to
the region’s resource adequacy.
Brandon Shores and Wagner Expected Future Participation in the Capacity Market
Brandon Shores units 1 and 2, and Wagner units 3 and 4 are expected to meet all four criteria above and
provide supply in the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 delivery years (until transmission solutions are put in
place to address the related reliability issues). No other units are expected to be needed for RMR service
for the next two delivery years. If Brandon Shores and Wagner are needed for RMR service beyond that
40 PJM’s planning parameters are released no later than 100 days ahead of the auction.
41 The RMR resource also cannot have cleared in an RPM auction for the relevant delivery year. If it is already counted as
capacity, PJM need not separately deem that resource as capacity supply.
42 There have been some cases where the RMR agreement have been limited to addressing transmission needs, and specifically
not capacity emergencies. PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-
682, page 21.
43 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 23.
85_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 17
period, PJM has stated that it could submit a future filing to extend these provisions and rules.44 This
extension may be necessary, as Talen and PJM recently announced that these RMR units would be in
use until May 31, 2029.
Brandon Shores and Wagner have an estimated UCAP of 1,569 MW, based on ELCC ratings for
2026/2027.45 The inclusion of Brandon Shores and Wagner will provide a much-needed injection of
supply into the BGE LDA, as well as into the SWMAAC LDA, the parent LDA of BGE and Pepco LDAs
(where DC is located).
Rights and Obligations for RMR Resources Participating in the Capacity Market
FERC has approved PJM’s proposal that RMRs that participate in the capacity auction will not be subject
to the same rights and obligations of other generators, such as operational testing or Non-Performance
Charges for underperformance during grid emergencies. PJM argues that the four criteria which
determine RMR participation “provide sufficient structural assurances that these resources will perform
during capacity emergencies.”46 However, this argument is far from certain; PJM’s criteria focus on
whether the RMR is able to perform during grid emergencies, not whether it will indeed perform. As the
current RMR rules stand, there may not be a strong incentive for the RMRs to perform for all grid
emergencies, and the lack of incentive could erode their capacity contributions.
In contrast, the Consumer Advocates’ request was for complete capacity market participation by RMR
resources, which would require full performance when these resources are needed.47 This approach by
PJM also differs from other RTOs. In ISO New England, RMRs have capacity supply obligations,48
suggesting that they are subject to performance penalties. Similarly, it appears that in NYISO and MISO,
RMRs are also subject to performance penalties.49
RMR Capacity Market Revenue Crediting Mechanism
Now that RMRs will be participating as supply in the upcoming auctions, FERC has also approved a
crediting mechanism for any revenues the RMR resource will make in the capacity market. Capacity
market revenues will be credited back to the LDAs that are paying for the out-of-market RMR
44 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 16.
45 ELCC Class Ratings for the 2026/2027 Base Residual Auction. PJM. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/planning/res-adeq/elcc/2026-27-bra-elcc-class-ratings.pdf.
46 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 15.
47 Complaint of Joint Consumer Advocates. FERC EL25-18, page 5.
48 ISO New England. October 9, 2024. ISO’s Thinking on Representing Retained Resources in the Capacity Market. NEPOOL
Markets Committee (MC). Available at: https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/100016/a05_mc_2024_10-
16_representing_retained_resources_iso_memo.pdf.
49 Staevska, A., Foley, P. January 18, 2023. RTO/ISO Deactivation Processes. Deactivation Enhancements Senior Task Force.
PJM.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 17
period, PJM has stated that it could submit a future filing to extend these provisions and rules.44 This
extension may be necessary, as Talen and PJM recently announced that these RMR units would be in
use until May 31, 2029.
Brandon Shores and Wagner have an estimated UCAP of 1,569 MW, based on ELCC ratings for
2026/2027.45 The inclusion of Brandon Shores and Wagner will provide a much-needed injection of
supply into the BGE LDA, as well as into the SWMAAC LDA, the parent LDA of BGE and Pepco LDAs
(where DC is located).
Rights and Obligations for RMR Resources Participating in the Capacity Market
FERC has approved PJM’s proposal that RMRs that participate in the capacity auction will not be subject
to the same rights and obligations of other generators, such as operational testing or Non-Performance
Charges for underperformance during grid emergencies. PJM argues that the four criteria which
determine RMR participation “provide sufficient structural assurances that these resources will perform
during capacity emergencies.”46 However, this argument is far from certain; PJM’s criteria focus on
whether the RMR is able to perform during grid emergencies, not whether it will indeed perform. As the
current RMR rules stand, there may not be a strong incentive for the RMRs to perform for all grid
emergencies, and the lack of incentive could erode their capacity contributions.
In contrast, the Consumer Advocates’ request was for complete capacity market participation by RMR
resources, which would require full performance when these resources are needed.47 This approach by
PJM also differs from other RTOs. In ISO New England, RMRs have capacity supply obligations,48
suggesting that they are subject to performance penalties. Similarly, it appears that in NYISO and MISO,
RMRs are also subject to performance penalties.49
RMR Capacity Market Revenue Crediting Mechanism
Now that RMRs will be participating as supply in the upcoming auctions, FERC has also approved a
crediting mechanism for any revenues the RMR resource will make in the capacity market. Capacity
market revenues will be credited back to the LDAs that are paying for the out-of-market RMR
44 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 16.
45 ELCC Class Ratings for the 2026/2027 Base Residual Auction. PJM. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/planning/res-adeq/elcc/2026-27-bra-elcc-class-ratings.pdf.
46 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 15.
47 Complaint of Joint Consumer Advocates. FERC EL25-18, page 5.
48 ISO New England. October 9, 2024. ISO’s Thinking on Representing Retained Resources in the Capacity Market. NEPOOL
Markets Committee (MC). Available at: https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/100016/a05_mc_2024_10-
16_representing_retained_resources_iso_memo.pdf.
49 Staevska, A., Foley, P. January 18, 2023. RTO/ISO Deactivation Processes. Deactivation Enhancements Senior Task Force.
PJM.
86_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 18
arrangement. As discussed above, an RMR resource is already being compensated for its operation and
maintenance through the RMR arrangement. These costs are allocated to LDAs and their electricity
customers following the cost allocation of the transmission investments that will eventually eliminate
the RMR need. As part of the RMR and auction reforms, the LDAs that are paying for the cost of the
RMR arrangement will now be the ones who receive the resource’s capacity market revenues. This
approach will prevent electricity customers from paying twice for the RMR. On the other hand, it will
have no impact on the owner of the RMR resource, who will continue to receive the full approved RMR
cost recovery amount. As PJM stated, “The RMR resource owner is already being fully compensated for
its operation through the RMR agreement, and the RMR resource owner faces no performance risk as
the resource is not eligible for Non-Performance Charges. Thus, there is no reason to compensate the
RMR resource owner” with any capacity market revenues.50
RMR Participation as a Price Taker
Going forward, the RMR resource will participate in the capacity auction as a “price taker,” meaning it
will have an offer price of $0/MW-day and is therefore guaranteed to clear in the market. The resource
thus cannot be the marginal resource and set the clearing price. This approach is consistent with ISO
New England’s treatment of RMRs in its capacity markets. PJM’s Internal Markets Monitor also
recommended that PJM include RMRs as price takers in its future BRAs.51
Some argue that RMRs participating as a price-taker could result in artificial price suppression, as the
offer price does not reflect its true forward-going avoidable costs. For this reason, the New York ISO
(NYISO) requires RMRs to offer in at levels no lower than their going-forward costs, which when
considering revenues received through the out-of-market RMR agreement, should be relatively low.52
3.2. Upcoming Changes to the Demand Curve
Recent History of PJM’s Demand Curve Parameters
Every four years, PJM reviews its VRR curve in its Quadrennial Review. Since 2011, PJM has defined the
maximum auction price (i.e., maximum point on the VRR curve) as the higher of either Gross CONE or
1.5 times Net CONE.53 For all previous auctions, PJM estimated Net CONE using a gas-fired simple-cycle
CT plant. As described in Section 1.2 (Supply and Demand Curves), Net CONE is a key parameter in
defining the shape of the VRR curve. When Net CONE changes, the VRR curve shifts up and down. For
instance, when there is a higher cost of new entry, Net CONE increases, which pushes point A and B on
50 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 33.
51 Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM. January 6, 2025. Docket No. ER25-682-000.
52 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 28.
53 Complaint of Governor Josh Shapiro and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Docket No. EL-25-46. December 30, 2024, at
page 8.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 18
arrangement. As discussed above, an RMR resource is already being compensated for its operation and
maintenance through the RMR arrangement. These costs are allocated to LDAs and their electricity
customers following the cost allocation of the transmission investments that will eventually eliminate
the RMR need. As part of the RMR and auction reforms, the LDAs that are paying for the cost of the
RMR arrangement will now be the ones who receive the resource’s capacity market revenues. This
approach will prevent electricity customers from paying twice for the RMR. On the other hand, it will
have no impact on the owner of the RMR resource, who will continue to receive the full approved RMR
cost recovery amount. As PJM stated, “The RMR resource owner is already being fully compensated for
its operation through the RMR agreement, and the RMR resource owner faces no performance risk as
the resource is not eligible for Non-Performance Charges. Thus, there is no reason to compensate the
RMR resource owner” with any capacity market revenues.50
RMR Participation as a Price Taker
Going forward, the RMR resource will participate in the capacity auction as a “price taker,” meaning it
will have an offer price of $0/MW-day and is therefore guaranteed to clear in the market. The resource
thus cannot be the marginal resource and set the clearing price. This approach is consistent with ISO
New England’s treatment of RMRs in its capacity markets. PJM’s Internal Markets Monitor also
recommended that PJM include RMRs as price takers in its future BRAs.51
Some argue that RMRs participating as a price-taker could result in artificial price suppression, as the
offer price does not reflect its true forward-going avoidable costs. For this reason, the New York ISO
(NYISO) requires RMRs to offer in at levels no lower than their going-forward costs, which when
considering revenues received through the out-of-market RMR agreement, should be relatively low.52
3.2. Upcoming Changes to the Demand Curve
Recent History of PJM’s Demand Curve Parameters
Every four years, PJM reviews its VRR curve in its Quadrennial Review. Since 2011, PJM has defined the
maximum auction price (i.e., maximum point on the VRR curve) as the higher of either Gross CONE or
1.5 times Net CONE.53 For all previous auctions, PJM estimated Net CONE using a gas-fired simple-cycle
CT plant. As described in Section 1.2 (Supply and Demand Curves), Net CONE is a key parameter in
defining the shape of the VRR curve. When Net CONE changes, the VRR curve shifts up and down. For
instance, when there is a higher cost of new entry, Net CONE increases, which pushes point A and B on
50 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 33.
51 Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM. January 6, 2025. Docket No. ER25-682-000.
52 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 28.
53 Complaint of Governor Josh Shapiro and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Docket No. EL-25-46. December 30, 2024, at
page 8.
87_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 19
VRR curve upwards and increases the steepness of the VRR curve’s slope. This could lead to more price
volatility and/or higher prices. When Net CONE is at zero (which can occur if the E&AS offsets are higher
than gross CONE), Point B falls to zero, creating a steep two-point VRR curve (known as a “collapsed”
curve).
In recent years, PJM’s capacity market was consistently over-procuring capacity above the reliability
requirement (the target level of capacity to meet PJM’s reliability standard). As a result, FERC had
originally approved PJM’s shift of its reference source to a combined-cycle (CC) plant and set the
maximum price at the larger of Gross CONE or 1.75 times Net CONE (instead of using a 1.5 multiplier),
starting in the 2026/2027 delivery year. These two changes produce a steeper VRR curve “that more
strongly controls RPM quantity clearing outcomes, increasing certainty that sufficient quantity will be
procured while guarding against over procurement.”54 However, a steeper VRR curve trades controlling
quantity over more volatile prices.
Today, over-procurement of capacity is no longer the primary concern for PJM’s wholesale markets. As
discussed elsewhere in this report, increasing demand along with changes to supply (e.g., new ELCC
accreditation, etc.) and a clogged interconnection queue has led to increasingly eroding reserve margins
across PJM. Instead of over-procurement, PJM now faces potential capacity shortfalls.55 As a result, in
February 2025, PJM received approval from FERC to not switch to a CC plant as its reference resource
and instead maintain the CT reference resource. However, in that same PJM reform package proposed
in December 2024, PJM did not address the 1.75 multiplier for Point A on the VRR curve. In February
2025, PJM and the Pennsylvania Governor’s Office jointly proposed to add a price cap and floor to the
VRR curve; this is recently approved by FERC at the end of April 2025.56
VRR Curve Price Cap and Price Floor
In response to over-procuring capacity in recent years, PJM previously made adjustments to both the
reference resource and point A on the VRR curve (the 1.5 vs 1.75 multiplier to Net CONE). However,
despite their correlation, in its more recent capacity market reforms for the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028
auctions, PJM only adjusted the reference technology. It did not address the maximum price; Point A on
the VRR curve is still set to either Gross CONE or 1.75 Net CONE, whichever is larger. However, the
multiplier does not affect the shape of the VRR curve for the RTO and the majority of modeled LDAs,
including Pepco, and its parents SWMAAC and MAAC. In all these cases, Gross CONE is larger than 1.75
times Net CONE, and thus defines the top point on the demand curve. As seen below in Figure 5, using
Gross CONE creates a very steep curve, with maximum prices as high as $505.73/MW-day for the RTO
instead of $371.25/MW-day (1.75 times Net CONE) or $318.21/MW-day (1.5 times Net CONE).
54 PJM Recommendations – Quadrennial Review. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-
groups/committees/mrc/2022/20220824/item-02---3-pjm-position-on-2022-quadrennial-review-recommendations.ashx.
55 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 40.
56 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions and Dismissing Complaint, April 21, 2025. FERC ER25-1357.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 19
VRR curve upwards and increases the steepness of the VRR curve’s slope. This could lead to more price
volatility and/or higher prices. When Net CONE is at zero (which can occur if the E&AS offsets are higher
than gross CONE), Point B falls to zero, creating a steep two-point VRR curve (known as a “collapsed”
curve).
In recent years, PJM’s capacity market was consistently over-procuring capacity above the reliability
requirement (the target level of capacity to meet PJM’s reliability standard). As a result, FERC had
originally approved PJM’s shift of its reference source to a combined-cycle (CC) plant and set the
maximum price at the larger of Gross CONE or 1.75 times Net CONE (instead of using a 1.5 multiplier),
starting in the 2026/2027 delivery year. These two changes produce a steeper VRR curve “that more
strongly controls RPM quantity clearing outcomes, increasing certainty that sufficient quantity will be
procured while guarding against over procurement.”54 However, a steeper VRR curve trades controlling
quantity over more volatile prices.
Today, over-procurement of capacity is no longer the primary concern for PJM’s wholesale markets. As
discussed elsewhere in this report, increasing demand along with changes to supply (e.g., new ELCC
accreditation, etc.) and a clogged interconnection queue has led to increasingly eroding reserve margins
across PJM. Instead of over-procurement, PJM now faces potential capacity shortfalls.55 As a result, in
February 2025, PJM received approval from FERC to not switch to a CC plant as its reference resource
and instead maintain the CT reference resource. However, in that same PJM reform package proposed
in December 2024, PJM did not address the 1.75 multiplier for Point A on the VRR curve. In February
2025, PJM and the Pennsylvania Governor’s Office jointly proposed to add a price cap and floor to the
VRR curve; this is recently approved by FERC at the end of April 2025.56
VRR Curve Price Cap and Price Floor
In response to over-procuring capacity in recent years, PJM previously made adjustments to both the
reference resource and point A on the VRR curve (the 1.5 vs 1.75 multiplier to Net CONE). However,
despite their correlation, in its more recent capacity market reforms for the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028
auctions, PJM only adjusted the reference technology. It did not address the maximum price; Point A on
the VRR curve is still set to either Gross CONE or 1.75 Net CONE, whichever is larger. However, the
multiplier does not affect the shape of the VRR curve for the RTO and the majority of modeled LDAs,
including Pepco, and its parents SWMAAC and MAAC. In all these cases, Gross CONE is larger than 1.75
times Net CONE, and thus defines the top point on the demand curve. As seen below in Figure 5, using
Gross CONE creates a very steep curve, with maximum prices as high as $505.73/MW-day for the RTO
instead of $371.25/MW-day (1.75 times Net CONE) or $318.21/MW-day (1.5 times Net CONE).
54 PJM Recommendations – Quadrennial Review. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-
groups/committees/mrc/2022/20220824/item-02---3-pjm-position-on-2022-quadrennial-review-recommendations.ashx.
55 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 40.
56 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions and Dismissing Complaint, April 21, 2025. FERC ER25-1357.
88_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 20
Pennsylvania Governor Shapiro issued a complaint to FERC arguing that PJM should remove Gross CONE
from the maximum VRR calculation and restore the 1.5 multiplier to Net CONE. The governor’s office
argued that if the market was functioning as intended, the record-setting prices would encourage
investment in new generation. Yet due to the severely clogged interconnection queue and the
compressed auction schedule, market participants are not able to respond to these high prices, and
customers are saddled with the bill.
PJM and the Governor of Pennsylvania’s Office engaged in confidential settlement discussions and on
January 23, 2025, introduced a new proposal for a price cap and price floor for the upcoming two BRAs.
The price cap and floor would be set at $325/MW-day UCAP and $175/MW-day UCAP, respectively
(Figure 5). They argue that the floor protects suppliers while the cap protects consumers.
Figure 5. RTO VRR Curve permutations for the 2026/2027 delivery year
The maximum price of $325/MW-day is higher than the weighted average historical clearing price (prior
to the 2025/2026 BRA) of $116.30/MW-day.57 It is also 14 percent higher than the average of 1.5 times
Net CONE values for all the LDAs.58 Nonetheless, the independent market monitor has estimated that
57 Monitoring Analytics. February 7, 2025. PA/PJM Agreement re Maximum and Minimum RPM Prices. Special Member
Committee meeting. Available at:
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2025/IMM_MC_PA_PJM_Agreement_Max_Min_RPM_Prices_
20250207.pdf.
58 Monitoring Analytics. February 7, 2025. PA/PJM Agreement re Maximum and Minimum RPM Prices. Special Member
Committee meeting. Available at:
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2025/IMM_MC_PA_PJM_Agreement_Max_Min_RPM_Prices_
20250207.pdf.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 20
Pennsylvania Governor Shapiro issued a complaint to FERC arguing that PJM should remove Gross CONE
from the maximum VRR calculation and restore the 1.5 multiplier to Net CONE. The governor’s office
argued that if the market was functioning as intended, the record-setting prices would encourage
investment in new generation. Yet due to the severely clogged interconnection queue and the
compressed auction schedule, market participants are not able to respond to these high prices, and
customers are saddled with the bill.
PJM and the Governor of Pennsylvania’s Office engaged in confidential settlement discussions and on
January 23, 2025, introduced a new proposal for a price cap and price floor for the upcoming two BRAs.
The price cap and floor would be set at $325/MW-day UCAP and $175/MW-day UCAP, respectively
(Figure 5). They argue that the floor protects suppliers while the cap protects consumers.
Figure 5. RTO VRR Curve permutations for the 2026/2027 delivery year
The maximum price of $325/MW-day is higher than the weighted average historical clearing price (prior
to the 2025/2026 BRA) of $116.30/MW-day.57 It is also 14 percent higher than the average of 1.5 times
Net CONE values for all the LDAs.58 Nonetheless, the independent market monitor has estimated that
57 Monitoring Analytics. February 7, 2025. PA/PJM Agreement re Maximum and Minimum RPM Prices. Special Member
Committee meeting. Available at:
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2025/IMM_MC_PA_PJM_Agreement_Max_Min_RPM_Prices_
20250207.pdf.
58 Monitoring Analytics. February 7, 2025. PA/PJM Agreement re Maximum and Minimum RPM Prices. Special Member
Committee meeting. Available at:
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2025/IMM_MC_PA_PJM_Agreement_Max_Min_RPM_Prices_
20250207.pdf.
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Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 21
the price cap of $325/MW-day could save electricity customers across PJM $8.7 billion per year, relative
to the initial maximum price of the greater of Gross CONE or 1.75 times Net CONE.59
The Joint Consumer Advocates protested both the price cap and floor at FERC, arguing that they were
too high and ultimately unjust and unreasonable.60 PJM’s independent market monitor also opposed
the price floor and PJM’s proposed VRR shape, arguing there is no economic logic or support in the tariff
to justify these changes.61 FERC approved the VRR curve price cap and floor for the 2026/2027 and
2027/2028 delivery years in April 2025.62
Reference Technology and the VRR Curve
CC plants have longer run times over the course of a year relative to a CT plant, and thus they typically
make more money in the energy market. As a result, they have much higher E&AS offsets in the Net
CONE calculation; using a CC plant reference technology would mean that Net CONE falls to $0/MW-day
in the RTO and in certain LDAs. Point B on the VRR curve is 0.75 times Net CONE; if net CONE falls to
zero, so does point B on the curve. This results in a very steep 2-point VRR “curve,” which can lead to
substantial price volatility. Since FERC has approved maintaining a CT reference resource, this effect will
no longer occur (until at least the upcoming Quadrennial Review, scheduled for the third quarter of
2025).63
Non-Performance Charges
Net CONE is not just used in determining the points on the VRR curve; it also defines non-performance
charges. The non-performance charge rate ($/MW-5-minute interval) is a penalty charged to generators
who do not fulfil their capacity commitment during grid emergencies (called Performance Assessment
Intervals (PAI)). In other words, generators are charged a penalty if they are not able to provide the
amount of capacity they are contracted to provide through the capacity market. The charge is based on
Net CONE and their capacity shortfall during PAIs. With the switch to a CC plant reference technology,
where Net CONE falls to zero (for the RTO and in certain LDAs), the non-performance charge would also
fall to zero. If this were to happen, power plants could lose their incentive to fulfil their capacity
commitments, yet they would still be paid the clearing price for the entire delivery year. This scenario
poses a potential risk to the reliability of the grid. To minimize this risk going forward, in addition to
retaining a CT as the reference resource, PJM will implement a uniform RTO-wide non-performance
59 The independent market monitor updated CONE values and the higher forecasted peak load but otherwise kept all
parameters the same as the 2025/2026 BRA. Ibid.
60 Protest of Joint Consumer Advocates. FERC ER25-1357-000. March 17, 2025.
61 Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM. FERC ER-25-1357-000. March 17, 2025.
62 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions and Dismissing Complaint, April 21, 2025. FERC ER25-1357.
63 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 37.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 21
the price cap of $325/MW-day could save electricity customers across PJM $8.7 billion per year, relative
to the initial maximum price of the greater of Gross CONE or 1.75 times Net CONE.59
The Joint Consumer Advocates protested both the price cap and floor at FERC, arguing that they were
too high and ultimately unjust and unreasonable.60 PJM’s independent market monitor also opposed
the price floor and PJM’s proposed VRR shape, arguing there is no economic logic or support in the tariff
to justify these changes.61 FERC approved the VRR curve price cap and floor for the 2026/2027 and
2027/2028 delivery years in April 2025.62
Reference Technology and the VRR Curve
CC plants have longer run times over the course of a year relative to a CT plant, and thus they typically
make more money in the energy market. As a result, they have much higher E&AS offsets in the Net
CONE calculation; using a CC plant reference technology would mean that Net CONE falls to $0/MW-day
in the RTO and in certain LDAs. Point B on the VRR curve is 0.75 times Net CONE; if net CONE falls to
zero, so does point B on the curve. This results in a very steep 2-point VRR “curve,” which can lead to
substantial price volatility. Since FERC has approved maintaining a CT reference resource, this effect will
no longer occur (until at least the upcoming Quadrennial Review, scheduled for the third quarter of
2025).63
Non-Performance Charges
Net CONE is not just used in determining the points on the VRR curve; it also defines non-performance
charges. The non-performance charge rate ($/MW-5-minute interval) is a penalty charged to generators
who do not fulfil their capacity commitment during grid emergencies (called Performance Assessment
Intervals (PAI)). In other words, generators are charged a penalty if they are not able to provide the
amount of capacity they are contracted to provide through the capacity market. The charge is based on
Net CONE and their capacity shortfall during PAIs. With the switch to a CC plant reference technology,
where Net CONE falls to zero (for the RTO and in certain LDAs), the non-performance charge would also
fall to zero. If this were to happen, power plants could lose their incentive to fulfil their capacity
commitments, yet they would still be paid the clearing price for the entire delivery year. This scenario
poses a potential risk to the reliability of the grid. To minimize this risk going forward, in addition to
retaining a CT as the reference resource, PJM will implement a uniform RTO-wide non-performance
59 The independent market monitor updated CONE values and the higher forecasted peak load but otherwise kept all
parameters the same as the 2025/2026 BRA. Ibid.
60 Protest of Joint Consumer Advocates. FERC ER25-1357-000. March 17, 2025.
61 Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM. FERC ER-25-1357-000. March 17, 2025.
62 Order Accepting Tariff Revisions and Dismissing Complaint, April 21, 2025. FERC ER25-1357.
63 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 37.
90_59151_FINAL.pdf
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 22
charge (rather than LDA-specific charges). According to PJM, an RTO-wide non-performance charge is
less likely to drop to $0 than LDA-specific non-performance charges.
Net CONE and Reactive Power
PJM is removing Reactive Power compensation from E&AS offsets for the Net CONE calculation effective
for the 2026/2027 delivery year. Unlike real power, reactive power is not consumed by the load;
instead, it is power that oscillates between load and the source within a circuit and is crucial in
maintaining voltage levels. In Order No. 904, FERC determined that it was unreasonable and unjust for
transmission providers to charge for reactive power within the standard power factor range.64 In
response to this final order, PJM is now eliminating the $2,546 per megawatt-year revenue from
reactive power services from the EAS offsets to determine the Net CONE for the 2026/2027 BRA.65 This
change will increase Net CONE and shift the VRR curve upwards, increasing its steepness and potentially
resulting in higher capacity prices.
4. POTENTIAL ELECTRIC BILL IMPACT OF 2026/2027 CAPACITY
AUCTION
We assessed the bill impacts for four scenarios for the upcoming 2026/2027 BRA (currently scheduled
for July 2025). These scenarios are not definitive or fully accurate predictions of the next BRA clearing
price, as there are numerous factors that are changing and impossible to accurately predict. Nonethless,
these scenarios can help estimate a range of possible bill impacts for electricity customers in DC
associated with upcoming changes to PJM’s capacity market.
All scenarios account for updated ELCC values; as shown in Table 5, in Section 2.3 above, ELCC values are
decreasing for the majority of resource types for the 2026/2027 BRA. This will shrink supply by about
4,600 MW across the RTO. All scenarios also include Brandon Shores and Wagner RMRs participating as
supply-side resources, increasing supply by roughly 1,580 MW, along with the resources that were
previously exempt from participating. We used PJM’s “RPM Existing Resource List” for the 2025/2026
delivery year66 and added in planned retirements from PJM’s list of “Generation Deactivations.”67 The
scenarios are as follows:
64 Compensation for Reactive Power Within the Standard Power Factor Range, Order No. 904, 189 FERC
¶ 61,034 (2024)
65 Revision to Reliability Pricing Model FERC docket No. ER25-628-000, at 81.
66 PJM. Capacity Market (RPM): 2026/2027. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm.
67 PJM. Generation Deactivations. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/planning/service-requests/gen-deactivations.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 22
charge (rather than LDA-specific charges). According to PJM, an RTO-wide non-performance charge is
less likely to drop to $0 than LDA-specific non-performance charges.
Net CONE and Reactive Power
PJM is removing Reactive Power compensation from E&AS offsets for the Net CONE calculation effective
for the 2026/2027 delivery year. Unlike real power, reactive power is not consumed by the load;
instead, it is power that oscillates between load and the source within a circuit and is crucial in
maintaining voltage levels. In Order No. 904, FERC determined that it was unreasonable and unjust for
transmission providers to charge for reactive power within the standard power factor range.64 In
response to this final order, PJM is now eliminating the $2,546 per megawatt-year revenue from
reactive power services from the EAS offsets to determine the Net CONE for the 2026/2027 BRA.65 This
change will increase Net CONE and shift the VRR curve upwards, increasing its steepness and potentially
resulting in higher capacity prices.
4. POTENTIAL ELECTRIC BILL IMPACT OF 2026/2027 CAPACITY
AUCTION
We assessed the bill impacts for four scenarios for the upcoming 2026/2027 BRA (currently scheduled
for July 2025). These scenarios are not definitive or fully accurate predictions of the next BRA clearing
price, as there are numerous factors that are changing and impossible to accurately predict. Nonethless,
these scenarios can help estimate a range of possible bill impacts for electricity customers in DC
associated with upcoming changes to PJM’s capacity market.
All scenarios account for updated ELCC values; as shown in Table 5, in Section 2.3 above, ELCC values are
decreasing for the majority of resource types for the 2026/2027 BRA. This will shrink supply by about
4,600 MW across the RTO. All scenarios also include Brandon Shores and Wagner RMRs participating as
supply-side resources, increasing supply by roughly 1,580 MW, along with the resources that were
previously exempt from participating. We used PJM’s “RPM Existing Resource List” for the 2025/2026
delivery year66 and added in planned retirements from PJM’s list of “Generation Deactivations.”67 The
scenarios are as follows:
64 Compensation for Reactive Power Within the Standard Power Factor Range, Order No. 904, 189 FERC
¶ 61,034 (2024)
65 Revision to Reliability Pricing Model FERC docket No. ER25-628-000, at 81.
66 PJM. Capacity Market (RPM): 2026/2027. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm.
67 PJM. Generation Deactivations. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/planning/service-requests/gen-deactivations.
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Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 23
1. The No Additional New Builds scenario includes all PJM existing and new resources (as
per PJM’s Existing Resource List), including the previously exempt wind, solar, storage,
and hybrid resources. When including the RMR units alongside the updated ELCC ratings
and retirements, there is a reduction of supply of approximately 1,500 MW UCAP.
2. The Some New Entry scenario includes an additional 2,000 UCAP of new builds (planned
resources).68 This scenario also includes all the resources included in Scenario 1,
resulting in an addition of 500 UCAP.
3. The Price Floor scenario examines what it would take to reach the recently approved
clearing price minimum of $175/MW-day. We estimate that the region would need
approximately 15,000 MW UCAP more supply (generation capacity and/or demand
response) to reach the price floor. This quantity of new capacity is nearly impossible,
given the current queue constraints and the current capacity under construction.
4. The No Price Cap scenario is a sensitivity on scenario 2, to better understand the bill
impact if the price cap had not been approved (i.e., it demonstrates potential bill savings
of the price cap to DC consumers). The inputs for this scenario are the same as scenario
2 (“some new entry”).
For each of these scenarios, we estimated the VRR curve based on the 2026/2027 planning
requirements69 (the forecasted peak load, installed reserve margin, and Net CONE were released on
March 31, 2025, without the VRR curve itself). We assume no changes to demand response resources
relative to the 2025/2026 BRA.
For the supply curve, we used the smoothed supply curve from the 2025/2026 BRA.70 The supply curve
is not smoothed in reality; it is instead a step-wise function representing discreet offer bids (quantity
and price). We added in Brandon Shores and Wagner’s estimated UCAP as price takers (shifting the
supply curve to the right roughly 1,600 MW). Without having any offer price data, we assumed that all
additional new supply resources were added as price takers (though this is unlikely to be true in reality).
New supply (beyond Brandon Shores and Wagner) was allocated proportionally to each LDA relative to
peak demand. We also shifted the supply curve to the left by roughly 1,400 MW to account for the
planned retirements, and again by 4,600 MW to account for new ELCC ratings. In reality, it is likely that
the supply curve would also shift downward with reductions in supply, not just leftward; however,
without offer prices and specific bid data, we could not include that adjustment in the analysis. This
analysis is simply a best guess and provides a possible range of bill impacts for DC electricity customers
that could be seen as a result of the upcoming capacity market changes in PJM.
68 There are roughly 1,500 MW of UCAP (thermal, intermittent, ant storage) resources that are reporting to EIA as “planned”
resources that are expecting to be online by the beginning of the 2026/2027 delivery year.
69 Assuming the VRR curve maximum is the greater of Gross CONE or 1.75 Net CONE.
70 PJM Interconnection. September 13, 2024. 2025/2026 BRA Supply Curves. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-bra-supply-curves.pdf.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 23
1. The No Additional New Builds scenario includes all PJM existing and new resources (as
per PJM’s Existing Resource List), including the previously exempt wind, solar, storage,
and hybrid resources. When including the RMR units alongside the updated ELCC ratings
and retirements, there is a reduction of supply of approximately 1,500 MW UCAP.
2. The Some New Entry scenario includes an additional 2,000 UCAP of new builds (planned
resources).68 This scenario also includes all the resources included in Scenario 1,
resulting in an addition of 500 UCAP.
3. The Price Floor scenario examines what it would take to reach the recently approved
clearing price minimum of $175/MW-day. We estimate that the region would need
approximately 15,000 MW UCAP more supply (generation capacity and/or demand
response) to reach the price floor. This quantity of new capacity is nearly impossible,
given the current queue constraints and the current capacity under construction.
4. The No Price Cap scenario is a sensitivity on scenario 2, to better understand the bill
impact if the price cap had not been approved (i.e., it demonstrates potential bill savings
of the price cap to DC consumers). The inputs for this scenario are the same as scenario
2 (“some new entry”).
For each of these scenarios, we estimated the VRR curve based on the 2026/2027 planning
requirements69 (the forecasted peak load, installed reserve margin, and Net CONE were released on
March 31, 2025, without the VRR curve itself). We assume no changes to demand response resources
relative to the 2025/2026 BRA.
For the supply curve, we used the smoothed supply curve from the 2025/2026 BRA.70 The supply curve
is not smoothed in reality; it is instead a step-wise function representing discreet offer bids (quantity
and price). We added in Brandon Shores and Wagner’s estimated UCAP as price takers (shifting the
supply curve to the right roughly 1,600 MW). Without having any offer price data, we assumed that all
additional new supply resources were added as price takers (though this is unlikely to be true in reality).
New supply (beyond Brandon Shores and Wagner) was allocated proportionally to each LDA relative to
peak demand. We also shifted the supply curve to the left by roughly 1,400 MW to account for the
planned retirements, and again by 4,600 MW to account for new ELCC ratings. In reality, it is likely that
the supply curve would also shift downward with reductions in supply, not just leftward; however,
without offer prices and specific bid data, we could not include that adjustment in the analysis. This
analysis is simply a best guess and provides a possible range of bill impacts for DC electricity customers
that could be seen as a result of the upcoming capacity market changes in PJM.
68 There are roughly 1,500 MW of UCAP (thermal, intermittent, ant storage) resources that are reporting to EIA as “planned”
resources that are expecting to be online by the beginning of the 2026/2027 delivery year.
69 Assuming the VRR curve maximum is the greater of Gross CONE or 1.75 Net CONE.
70 PJM Interconnection. September 13, 2024. 2025/2026 BRA Supply Curves. Available at: https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2025-2026/2025-2026-bra-supply-curves.pdf.
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Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 24
As described in Section 2, DC electricity customers could see an additional $10 on their monthly bills
starting around June 2025 as a result of the latest BRA for the 2025/2026 delivery year, incremental
from the previous 2024/2025 BRA. We estimate that residential electricity bills in DC could increase by
an additional $1 for the 2026/2027 delivery year (incremental to the $10 price increase expected in the
2025/2026 delivery year (Table 7). If there was approximately 15,000 MW more supply available in all of
PJM for the upcoming auction (a highly unrealistic scenario), average residential monthly bills could
decrease by $5 per month, relative to the 2025/2026 delivery year (Table 7). If the price cap had not
been approved, and some new resources had still been built, average residential bills could have
increased by an additional $9 for the 2026/2027 delivery year. Without substantially more supply, the
RTO could clear at the price maximum.
Table 7. DC bill impacts for potential results of the 2026/2027 capacity auction relative to 2025/2026 results
No Additional
New Builds
Some New Entry Price Floor Some New Entry
with No Price Cap
Estimated RTO
Clearing Price
$325/MW-day $325/MW-day $175/MW-day $506/MW-day
Residential Average
Monthly Bill Change
(relative to previous
year)
+ $1 + $1 - $5 + $9
Commercial Average
Monthly Bill
Increase (relative to
previous year)
+ $26 + $26 - $172 + $321
Source: Synapse analysis; see description in text.
We assume that neither the DOM LDA nor the BGE LDA will separate from parent LDAs as they did in the
2025/2026 BRA. This is due to transmission upgrades which will increase the DOM LDA’s import
capacity, and as a result Brandon Shores and Wagner returning to the BGE LDA’s supply curve. Other
LDAs could separate, such as the MAAC LDA, as it has done in recent years. However, without recent
supply curves available for the MAAC LDA, we are unable to estimate the clearing price for MAAC, or
other LDAs. As a result, for the sake of this bill impact analysis, we assume that no other LDA separates.
MAAC has also only cleared above the RTO by a few dollars in recent years (and did not separate at all in
the 2025/2026 BRA), therefore we do not expect this assumption to substantially affect the results. It is
unlikely that the SWMAAC LDA would separate from the MAAC LDA, or that the PEPCO LDA would
sperate from SWMAAC, given the amount of local capacity and import capability currently available for
both LDAs.
We used the same methodological approach for estimating the 2025/2026 incremental bill impacts (as
described in Section 2.2). In this case, we also estimated the Capacity Transfer Rights (CTR) to estimate
the cost for consumers for the 2026/2027 BRA, a key part of the customer impact analysis. When an LDA
has a higher clearing price than its parent LDA, there is a “locational price adder” to represent the higher
clearing price relative to the RTO clearing price. CTRs are allocated to consumer loads within an LDA that
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 24
As described in Section 2, DC electricity customers could see an additional $10 on their monthly bills
starting around June 2025 as a result of the latest BRA for the 2025/2026 delivery year, incremental
from the previous 2024/2025 BRA. We estimate that residential electricity bills in DC could increase by
an additional $1 for the 2026/2027 delivery year (incremental to the $10 price increase expected in the
2025/2026 delivery year (Table 7). If there was approximately 15,000 MW more supply available in all of
PJM for the upcoming auction (a highly unrealistic scenario), average residential monthly bills could
decrease by $5 per month, relative to the 2025/2026 delivery year (Table 7). If the price cap had not
been approved, and some new resources had still been built, average residential bills could have
increased by an additional $9 for the 2026/2027 delivery year. Without substantially more supply, the
RTO could clear at the price maximum.
Table 7. DC bill impacts for potential results of the 2026/2027 capacity auction relative to 2025/2026 results
No Additional
New Builds
Some New Entry Price Floor Some New Entry
with No Price Cap
Estimated RTO
Clearing Price
$325/MW-day $325/MW-day $175/MW-day $506/MW-day
Residential Average
Monthly Bill Change
(relative to previous
year)
+ $1 + $1 - $5 + $9
Commercial Average
Monthly Bill
Increase (relative to
previous year)
+ $26 + $26 - $172 + $321
Source: Synapse analysis; see description in text.
We assume that neither the DOM LDA nor the BGE LDA will separate from parent LDAs as they did in the
2025/2026 BRA. This is due to transmission upgrades which will increase the DOM LDA’s import
capacity, and as a result Brandon Shores and Wagner returning to the BGE LDA’s supply curve. Other
LDAs could separate, such as the MAAC LDA, as it has done in recent years. However, without recent
supply curves available for the MAAC LDA, we are unable to estimate the clearing price for MAAC, or
other LDAs. As a result, for the sake of this bill impact analysis, we assume that no other LDA separates.
MAAC has also only cleared above the RTO by a few dollars in recent years (and did not separate at all in
the 2025/2026 BRA), therefore we do not expect this assumption to substantially affect the results. It is
unlikely that the SWMAAC LDA would separate from the MAAC LDA, or that the PEPCO LDA would
sperate from SWMAAC, given the amount of local capacity and import capability currently available for
both LDAs.
We used the same methodological approach for estimating the 2025/2026 incremental bill impacts (as
described in Section 2.2). In this case, we also estimated the Capacity Transfer Rights (CTR) to estimate
the cost for consumers for the 2026/2027 BRA, a key part of the customer impact analysis. When an LDA
has a higher clearing price than its parent LDA, there is a “locational price adder” to represent the higher
clearing price relative to the RTO clearing price. CTRs are allocated to consumer loads within an LDA that
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Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 25
experiences price separation. The CTRs are payments equal to the locational price adder times the load’s
pro rata share of the lower-priced capacity imported into that LDA. CTRs serve to offset a portion of the
higher capacity prices for customers in that constrained LDA. We used the CTR allocation and annual
capacity market costs for customers provided in PJM’s 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Results (Excel
workbook), adjusted to be reflective of our expectations for the 2026/2027 BRA.
4.1. Potential Impacts for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year
As PJM has stated itself, we will likely continue to see a tightening of supply and demand for the
foreseeable future.71 As described above, a substantial amount of capacity is needed to maintain
capacity prices close to the proposed floor of $175/MW-day. This suggests the clearing price and
associated bill impacts will remain high until the implementation of more substantial reforms,
particularly those focused on the interconnection queue. As long as load forecasts continue to rise in
PJM, and other market factors (already present in the last auction) persist, we expect that clearing
prices will remain high.
5. INTERCONNECTION QUEUE REFORMS
Delays with PJM’s interconnection queue have prompted concerns about the region’s resource
adequacy. In addition, PJM’s interconnection queue issues have raised concerns about DC and PJM
states’ ability to meet their renewable energy targets. The capacity market is designed to send a price
signal: when prices are high, plant owners and operators should build more plants for new entry into the
market. However, currently, the PJM interconnection queue is clogged and not operating as designed,
thereby limiting the market’s ability to function properly and fairly. This section explores the barriers to
interconnecting new clean energy resources and ongoing changes to PJM interconnection queue
process.
The clogged queue could have a major impact on electricity customers in DC and throughout the region.
On behalf of Evergreen Action, Synapse conducted power sector analysis, bill impact analysis, and job
impact analysis to understand the benefits of resolving these queue constraints to customers and
residents in the PJM states. Our analysis shows that if PJM continues down its current path, residential
electricity bills in the region are expected to increase by nearly 60 percent by the 2036–2040 period
compared to historical levels. However, if PJM adequately implements interconnection reforms to
71 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 5.
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 25
experiences price separation. The CTRs are payments equal to the locational price adder times the load’s
pro rata share of the lower-priced capacity imported into that LDA. CTRs serve to offset a portion of the
higher capacity prices for customers in that constrained LDA. We used the CTR allocation and annual
capacity market costs for customers provided in PJM’s 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Results (Excel
workbook), adjusted to be reflective of our expectations for the 2026/2027 BRA.
4.1. Potential Impacts for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year
As PJM has stated itself, we will likely continue to see a tightening of supply and demand for the
foreseeable future.71 As described above, a substantial amount of capacity is needed to maintain
capacity prices close to the proposed floor of $175/MW-day. This suggests the clearing price and
associated bill impacts will remain high until the implementation of more substantial reforms,
particularly those focused on the interconnection queue. As long as load forecasts continue to rise in
PJM, and other market factors (already present in the last auction) persist, we expect that clearing
prices will remain high.
5. INTERCONNECTION QUEUE REFORMS
Delays with PJM’s interconnection queue have prompted concerns about the region’s resource
adequacy. In addition, PJM’s interconnection queue issues have raised concerns about DC and PJM
states’ ability to meet their renewable energy targets. The capacity market is designed to send a price
signal: when prices are high, plant owners and operators should build more plants for new entry into the
market. However, currently, the PJM interconnection queue is clogged and not operating as designed,
thereby limiting the market’s ability to function properly and fairly. This section explores the barriers to
interconnecting new clean energy resources and ongoing changes to PJM interconnection queue
process.
The clogged queue could have a major impact on electricity customers in DC and throughout the region.
On behalf of Evergreen Action, Synapse conducted power sector analysis, bill impact analysis, and job
impact analysis to understand the benefits of resolving these queue constraints to customers and
residents in the PJM states. Our analysis shows that if PJM continues down its current path, residential
electricity bills in the region are expected to increase by nearly 60 percent by the 2036–2040 period
compared to historical levels. However, if PJM adequately implements interconnection reforms to
71 PJM Interconnection. December 9, 2024. Revisions to Reliability Pricing Model, Docket No. ER25-682, page 5.
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Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. Drivers of PJM’s Capacity Market Price Surge and the DC Impact 26
enable the deployment of more cost-effective energy generation, largely comprised of clean energy
sources, electricity bills are projected to decrease 7 percent within the same time period.72
5.1. Background on DC’s Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards
DC first established renewable energy targets in 2005 when it passed the Renewable Energy Portfolio
Standard (REPs) Act.73 The District has updated these targets several times since. Most recently the
Local Solar Amendment Act of 2022 set the following targets (effective March 10, 2023): under the RPS,
electricity suppliers must buy 100 percent of their power from renewable sources by 2032, with 15
percent coming from local solar power by 2041.74 This is one of the highest renewable energy targets in
the country.75 Pepco, the distribution utility serving DC, estimated that the RPS resulted in a monthly bill
impact of $22 to $26 on the average residential bill, in May and June 2025.76
5.2. Current PJM Interconnection Queue
PJM’s queue currently has 290 GW of potential generating capacity awaiting interconnection.77 The
capacity primarily consists of renewable resources that could help DC and other states in the PJM region
make substantial progress toward their renewable energy goals, as well as bring in much needed
capacity to mitigate potential shortfalls across PJM. The queue is made up of 94 percent renewables and
storage, and only 6 percent gas-fired resources, in MW terms.78 There are currently no solar resources
in DC in the PJM queue, though smaller projects interconnecting at the distribution level will likely be
used to meet the solar carve-out requirement and avoid the PJM queue altogether.
Resources in PJM’s queue have faced long wait times and expensive network upgrades over the past
several years. Between 2000 and 2018, only 24 percent of projects in PJM’s interconnection queue were
completed, and withdrawal rates were higher for solar and battery storage projects than for gas or wind
72 Chavin, S., Knight, P., Shenstone-Harris, S., Zeng, A., Fuzaylov, A., Hittinger, J. April 15, 2025. Tackling the PJM Electricity Cost
Crisis. Prepared for Evergreen Collective by Synapse Energy Economics. Available at: https://www.synapse-
energy.com/tackling-pjm-electricity-cost-crisis.
73 Renew
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Source: Council of the District of Columbia website. First collected Nov 21, 2026.