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Board of Zoning Appeals — Agenda Packet

Chesterfield County · Chesterfield County · Board of Zoning Appeals · meeting of Jun 3, 2026 · Agenda packets

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CHESTERFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS MEETING AGENDA WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3, 2026 Public Meeting Room 10001 Iron Bridge Road, Chesterfield VA 23832 NOTE: Attachments are generally available the Wednesday prior to the Board of Zoning Appeals meeting. Any subsequent changes to this agenda prior to the date of the meeting, and more detailed information regarding items on the agenda can be found at chesterfield.gov/plan, or by calling the Planning Department at 804-748-1050 during regular business hours, 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. Monday through Friday. A map of each case can be found at chesterfield.gov/plancases. Providing a FIRST CHOICE community through excellence in public service 12:00 p.m. Work/Lunch Session in Executive Session Room, 10001 Iron Bridge Road, Chesterfield, Virginia 23832 1. 1 p.m. Meeting called to order in the Public Meeting Room, Lane B. Ramsey Administration Building, Chesterfield, Virginia 2. Invocation 3. Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America 4. Approval of Minutes • April 1, 2026 5. Acknowledgements of withdrawal and requests for deferral 6. Consideration of special exception and appeal requests A. 26SE2091: In Bermuda Magisterial District, Steven Hardison and Michael Love request a special exception to renew a temporary manufactured home (Case 18SN0120) and amendment of zoning district map in a Semi-Urban Neighborhood (SU) District known as 3121 Pineland Avenue. The 0.52 acre property is developed with one temporary manufactured home. The Comprehensive Plan suggests the property is appropriate for Residential Neighborhood 4 use (4.0 units per acre or less). Tax ID 797-630-2478. B. 26SE2111: In Bermuda Magisterial District, Milton Glass requests a special exception to renew a temporary manufactured home (Case 19SN0110) and amendment of zoning district map in a Semi-Urban Neighborhood (SU) District known as 3012 Botone Avenue. The 0.37 acre property is developed with one temporary manufactured home. The Comprehensive Plan suggests the property is appropriate for Residential Neighborhood 4 use (4.0 units per acre or less). Tax ID 789-676-2598. C. 26AP2089: In Bermuda Magisterial District, Washington Single Family Fund3, LLC appeals the February 12, 2026 written determination of the Page 1 of 67 Chesterfield County Board of Zoning Appeals Meeting June 3, 2026 Director of Planning stating that as of January 1, 2026 data center use on the Property requires conditional use approval from the Board of Supervisors pursuant to the zoning ordinance and is not permitted by right. Specifically, the appellants contend that they possess a vested right to use the property as a data center notwithstanding the requirements of the zoning ordinance, and that the planning director made the vesting determination without authority as there was no indication that the zoning administrator reviewed or played any role in the issuance of the vesting analysis or determination. The Property is located within the Employment Center (EC) District on 89.3 acres fronting approximately 305 feet on the south line of Old Bermuda Hundred Road measured approximately 1,150 feet east of the intersection of Old Stage Road and Old Bermuda Hundred Road also known as 1931 Old Bermuda Hundred Road. The Comprehensive Plan suggests the property is appropriate for Manufacturing & Processing. Tax ID 804-647-4181 D. 26AP2096: In Midlothian Magisterial District, Coastal Contractors LLC is appealing the February 27, 2026 denial of a variance request to place a residential driveway in and adjacent to a State road that is encumbered with FEMA Floodplain. The Property is located within the Suburban Community (SC) District on 0.45 acre fronting approximately 100 feet on the south line of Lake Shore Drive measured approximately 580 feet east of the intersection of Buford Road and Lake Shore Drive also known as 8031 Lake Shore Drive. The Comprehensive Plan suggests the property is appropriate for Residential Neighborhood 4 (4.0 units per acre or less). Tax ID 759-708-5070. 7. Miscellaneous 8. Adjournment Page 2 of 67 Steven Hardison & Michael Love 26SE2091 Page 1 of 10 26SE2091 – Steven Hardison & Michael Love Magisterial District – Bermuda Applicant's Contact – Steven Hardison (252-308-3914) BZA Public Hearing – June 3, 2026 Time Remaining 90 Days Case Manager Amy Somervell (804-748-1970) Request Special Exception Renewal of manufactured home (Case 18SN0120) to permit a temporary manufactured home in a Semi- Urban Neighborhood (SU) District. Staff Recommendation Approval The Property 3121 Pineland Avenue Site Size 0.52 Acre Figure 1: Aerial of Request Area – Click Image for Link to GIS Figure 2: View of the Manufactured Home & Property NOTES FOR THE BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS 1. Conditions may be imposed. 2. The ordinance limits the maximum period of time for which a temporary manufactured home may be granted to seven (7) years. Should the Board wish to approve this request, this approval would be for seven (7) years unless conditioned for less time. 3. Recommended conditions as well as conditions of approval from Case 18SN0120 are located within the report. STAFF - APPROVAL • Renewal of previously approved temporary manufactured home permit by the Board of Supervisors. • Minimal impact on existing area development. • Conditions ensure that use remains temporary. Recommendation Page 3 of 67 Steven Hardison & Michael Love 26SE2091 Page 2 of 10 Background Manufactured Home, Temporary. Temporary manufactured home permits may be granted by the Board of Zoning Appeals for a time period not to exceed seven years, and with or without conditions, under any one of the following circumstances: a. Any temporary manufactured home with a valid permit in any zoning district approved prior to January 1, 2026. b. In an A, RC, SR, SC, SU, or AR District when the principal residence has been rendered uninhabitable by fire or Act of God. c. In the CC, EC, EG, or WD Districts, if a manufactured home has been legally on the property within the past six months. • A manufactured home has been located on the Property since 1964 (Cases 64TN0045). • The initial request for the current occupant of the manufactured home, Doris Garcia, was in 1968 (Case 68TN0112). Subsequent renewals were approved by the following cases: 70TR0155, 82SR0063, 87SR0095, 92SR0196, 09SN0219 and most current 18SN0120. • The manufactured home was replaced with an updated model in 2009. • On April 25, 2018, the Board of Supervisors approved the most recent permit, Case 18SN0120, which was approved for seven (7) years, expiring in April 2025. • On April 26, 2024, Michael Love and Steven Hardison purchased the Property from Doris Garcia. This purchase was for financial assistance to allow Ms. Garcia to continue living on the Property. As part of this purchase, Michael Love and Steven Hardison verbally committed to giving Ms. Garcia life rights to continue living in the home. Page 4 of 67 Steven Hardison & Michael Love 26SE2091 Page 3 of 10 Recommendation .................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Aerial ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Planning................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Current Zoning Map ................................................................................................................................................................ 6 Supplemental Analysis ............................................................................................................................................................ 7 Community Enhancement .................................................................................................................................................. 7 Environmental Engineering ................................................................................................................................................. 7 Fire & Emergency Medical Services .................................................................................................................................... 7 Transportation - County Department of Transportation .................................................................................................... 7 Transportation - Virginia Department of Transportation ................................................................................................... 7 Utilities – Water and Wastewater ...................................................................................................................................... 7 Virginia Department of Health ............................................................................................................................................ 7 Conditions ............................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Case 18SN0120 - Approved Conditions .................................................................................................................................. 9 Case Contacts ........................................................................................................................................................................ 10 Table of Contents Page 5 of 67 Steven Hardison & Michael Love 26SE2091 Page 4 of 10 Proposal The applicants are seeking a special exception for the renewal of the temporary manufactured home for an additional seven (7) years. In this situation, Doris Garcia has resided in the temporary manufactured home since 1968. Examination of Request The Property is located within the recorded Pineland Subdivision and is surrounded by single-family dwellings to the north, south and east with property owned by the Islamic Center of Virginia to the west (see Aerial view). The manufactured home exists near the terminus of Pineland Avenue; therefore, the use is not exposed to a high volume of traffic nor is it a highly visible use. Since 1968, Ms. Garcia has been the applicant and occupant of the manufactured home. Since the last renewal in 2018, Ms. Garcia, fell into financial difficulty and has since received assistance with the constraints of owning the Property. On April 26, 2024, Michael Love and Steven Hardison purchased the Property, relieving Ms. Garcia of the financial burden of owning Property. Mr. Love and Mr. Hardison’s intent is to allow Ms. Garcia the ability to live on the Property without financial burden for as long as she needs it as a residence. Ms. Garcia’s daughter, Rebecca Reese, lives in the manufactured home with her mother to assist her with daily living needs. The applicant’s intent is to remove the manufactured home from the Property once Ms. Garcia no longer needs it as a residence. Staff’s inspection of the property revealed the manufactured home and Property to be kept in good condition and in character with the neighborhood. Staff would not be supportive of a manufactured home request for a new applicant as a first-time owner/occupant. Staff is, however, supportive of renewals for previously approved applicants as owners/occupants of the manufactured home, where the manufactured home and Aerial Planning Single-family dwelling Islamic Center of Virginia Single-family dwellings Page 6 of 67 Steven Hardison & Michael Love 26SE2091 Page 5 of 10 Property continue to be maintained in compliance with conditions of their previous approval. Although the Property has changed ownership, the manufactured home is still owned by Ms. Garcia and she remains the occupant of the home with her daughter. A unique situation has occurred triggering this ownership change and staff continues to be supportive due to unforeseen circumstances. Given Ms. Garcia has resided on the Property since 1968 without any known complaints related to the use, the request will have minimal impact on the surrounding properties. Page 7 of 67 Steven Hardison & Michael Love 26SE2091 Page 6 of 10 Current Zoning Map Page 8 of 67 Steven Hardison & Michael Love 26SE2091 Page 7 of 10 No comments. No comments. No comments. This request will have minimal impact. No comments. No impact – the manufactured home is connected to well and septic. No issue with renewal. Supplemental Analysis Community Enhancement Environmental Engineering Fire & Emergency Medical Services Transportation - County Department of Transportation Transportation - Virginia Department of Transportation Utilities – Water and Wastewater Virginia Department of Health Page 9 of 67 Steven Hardison & Michael Love 26SE2091 Page 8 of 10 1. The applicants shall be the Property owners and the occupants of the manufactured home shall be limited to Doris Garcia and her daughter, Rebecca Reese. (P) 2. No permanent type living space may be added to the manufactured home. The manufactured home shall be skirted but shall not be placed on a permanent foundation. (P) 3. Should Doris Garcia cease to reside in the manufactured home, the manufactured home shall be removed from the property. (P) Staff Note: The Zoning Ordinance limits the maximum period of time for which a manufactured home permit may be granted to seven (7) years. Should the Board wish to approve this request, this approval would be for seven (7) years unless conditioned for less time and then subject to renewal. Conditions Page 10 of 67 Steven Hardison & Michael Love 26SE2091 Page 9 of 10 Case 18SN0120 - Approved Conditions Page 11 of 67 Steven Hardison & Michael Love 26SE2091 Page 10 of 10 Applicant • Steven Hardison (252-308-3914) Staff • Planning Department Case Manager: Amy Somervell (804-748-1970) somervella@chesterfield.gov • Environmental Engineering: Scott Dunn (804-748-1030) dunns@chesterfield.gov • Fire & Emergency Medical Services: Christopher Harding (804-971-0399) hardingc@chesterfield.gov • Transportation - County Department of Transportation: Steve Adams (804-751-4461) adamsst@chesterfield.gov • Transportation – Virginia Department of Transportation: Dustin Dunnagan (804-674-2384) Dustin.Dunnagan@vdot.virginia.gov • Utilities: Jamie Bland (804-751-4439) blandj@chesterfield.gov • Virginia Department of Health: Richard Michniak (804-748-1695) Richard.Michniak@vdh.virginia.gov Case Contacts Page 12 of 67 Milton Glass 26SE2111 Page 1 of 9 26SE2111 – Milton Glass Magisterial District – Bermuda Applicant's Contact – Milton Glass (804-908-4656) BZA Public Hearing – June 3, 2026 Time Remaining 90 Days Case Manager Amy Somervell (804-748-1970) Request Special Exception Renewal of manufactured home (Case 19SN0110) to permit a temporary manufactured home in a Semi- Urban Neighborhood (SU) District. Staff Recommendation Approval The Property 3012 Botone Avenue Site Size 0.37 Acre Figure 1: Aerial of Request Area – Click Image for Link to GIS Figure 2: View of the Manufactured Home & Property NOTES FOR THE BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS 1. Conditions may be imposed. 2. The ordinance limits the maximum period of time for which a temporary manufactured home may be granted to seven (7) years. Should the Board wish to approve this request, this approval would be for seven (7) years unless conditioned for less time. 3. Recommended conditions as well as conditions of approval from Case 19SN0110 are located within the report. STAFF - APPROVAL • Renewal of previously approved temporary manufactured home permit by the Board of Supervisors. • Minimal impact on existing area development. • Conditions ensure that use remains temporary. Recommendation Page 13 of 67 Milton Glass 26SE2111 Page 2 of 9 Background Manufactured Home, Temporary. Temporary manufactured home permits may be granted by the Board of Zoning Appeals for a time period not to exceed seven years, and with or without conditions, under any one of the following circumstances: a. Any temporary manufactured home with a valid permit in any zoning district approved prior to January 1, 2026. b. In an A, RC, SR, SC, SU, or AR District when the principal residence has been rendered uninhabitable by fire or Act of God. c. In the CC, EC, EG, or WD Districts, if a manufactured home has been legally on the property within the past six months. • A manufactured home has been located on the Property since 1995 (Cases 95SN0281) and was the initial request for Milton Glass. • On February 27, 2019, the Board of Supervisors approved the most recent permit, Case 19SN0110, which was approved for seven (7) years, expiring February 2026. Page 14 of 67 Milton Glass 26SE2111 Page 3 of 9 Recommendation .................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Aerial ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Planning................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Current Zoning Map ................................................................................................................................................................ 5 Supplemental Analysis ............................................................................................................................................................ 6 Community Enhancement .................................................................................................................................................. 6 Environmental Engineering ................................................................................................................................................. 6 Fire & Emergency Medical Services .................................................................................................................................... 6 Transportation - County Department of Transportation .................................................................................................... 6 Transportation - Virginia Department of Transportation ................................................................................................... 6 Utilities – Water and Wastewater ...................................................................................................................................... 6 Virginia Department of Health ............................................................................................................................................ 6 Conditions ............................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Case 19SN0110 - Approved Conditions .................................................................................................................................. 8 Case Contacts .......................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Table of Contents Page 15 of 67 Milton Glass 26SE2111 Page 4 of 9 Proposal The applicant is seeking a special exception for the renewal of the temporary manufactured home for an additional seven (7) years. In this situation, the applicant has resided in the temporary manufactured home since 1995. Examination of Request The Property is located with the recorded Rayon Park Subdivision, which was recorded in 1928. The Property is surrounded by single-family dwellings to the south, east and west and another manufactured home to the north that was converted to real property (see Aerial view). The manufactured home exists on a corner lot; therefore, it is visible from two (2) rights-of-way. Since 1995, Mr. Glass has been the sole owner and occupant of the manufactured home. Staff’s inspection of the property revealed the manufactured home and Property to be kept in good condition and in character with the neighborhood. Staff would not be supportive of a manufactured home request for a new applicant as a first-time owner/occupant. Staff is, however, supportive of renewals for previously approved applicants as owners/occupants of the manufactured home, where the manufactured home and Property continue to be maintained in compliance with conditions of their previous approval. Given the applicant has resided on the Property since 1995 without any known complaints related to the use, the request will have minimal impact on the surrounding properties. Aerial Planning Single-family dwellings Converted manufactured home Single-family dwellings Page 16 of 67 Milton Glass 26SE2111 Page 5 of 9 Current Zoning Map Page 17 of 67 Milton Glass 26SE2111 Page 6 of 9 No comments. No comments. No comments. This request will have minimal impact. This request will have minimal impact. No comments. No issue with renewal. Supplemental Analysis Community Enhancement Environmental Engineering Fire & Emergency Medical Services Transportation - County Department of Transportation Transportation - Virginia Department of Transportation Utilities – Water and Wastewater Virginia Department of Health Page 18 of 67 Milton Glass 26SE2111 Page 7 of 9 1. The applicant shall be the owner and occupant of the manufactured home. (P) 2. No permanent type living space may be added to the manufactured home. The manufactured home shall be skirted but shall not be placed on a permanent foundation. (P) Staff Note: The Zoning Ordinance limits the maximum period of time for which a special exception for a temporary manufactured home may be granted to seven (7) years. Should the Board wish to approve this request, this approval would be for seven (7) years unless conditioned for less time and then subject to renewal. Conditions Page 19 of 67 Milton Glass 26SE2111 Page 8 of 9 Case 19SN0110 - Approved Conditions Page 20 of 67 Milton Glass 26SE2111 Page 9 of 9 Applicant • Milton Glass (804-908-4656) Staff • Planning Department Case Manager: Amy Somervell (804-748-1970) somervella@chesterfield.gov • Environmental Engineering: Scott Dunn(804-748-1030) dunns@chesterfield.gov • Fire & Emergency Medical Services: Christopher Harding (804-971-0399) hardingc@chesterfield.gov • Transportation - County Department of Transportation: Steve Adams (804-751-4461) adamsst@chesterfield.gov • Transportation – Virginia Department of Transportation: Dustin Dunnagan (804-674-2384) Dustin.Dunnagan@vdot.virginia.gov • Utilities: Jamie Bland (804-751-4439) blandj@chesterfield.gov • Virginia Department of Health: Richard Michniak (804-748-1695) Richard.Michniak@vdh.virginia.gov Case Contacts Page 21 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 1 of 24 26AP2089 – Washington Single Family Fund3, LLC Magisterial District – Bermuda Applicant's Contact – H. Leming (540-659-5155) BZA Public Hearing – June 3, 2026 Time Remaining 90 Days Case Manager Amy Somervell (804-748-1970) Request Appeal Appeal of the February 12, 2026 written determination of the Director of Planning stating that as of January 1, 2026 data center use on the Property requires conditional use approval from the Board of Supervisors pursuant to the new zoning ordinance and is not permitted by-right. The Property is located within the Employment Center (EC) District. Staff Recommendation Denial The Property 1931 Old Bermuda Hundred Road Site Size 89.3 Acres Figure 1: Aerial of Property – Click Image for Link to GIS Figure 2: Area Map of Property & Land Use Plan Map Staff recommends that the Board of Zoning Appeals deny this appeal and affirm the written determination of the Director of Planning. Recommendation Page 22 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 2 of 24 Recommendation .................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Current Zoning Map ................................................................................................................................................................ 9 Exhibit A – Appeal Grounds .................................................................................................................................................. 10 Exhibit B – Vesting Determination ........................................................................................................................................ 16 Exhibit C – Minutes of Adjacent Rezoning ............................................................................................................................ 20 Case Contacts ........................................................................................................................................................................ 24 Table of Contents Page 23 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 3 of 24 Examination of Request Washington Single Family Fund3, LLC (the “appellant”) appeal the February 12, 2026 written determination of the Director of Planning stating that, as of January 1, 2026, the County’s new Zoning Ordinance requires that constructing a data center on the subject property requires conditional use approval from the Board of Supervisors and is not permitted by-right (Exhibit A). Specifically, the appellant contends that it possesses a vested right to use the property as a data center notwithstanding the requirements of the Zoning Ordinance, and that the written determination is invalid because it was issued in the name of the Director of Planning and not the Zoning Administrator. The Property is located within the Employment Center (EC) District on 89.3 acres. I. Background Information The appellant desires to build a data center project on the subject property. Prior to January 1, 2026, the County’s Zoning Ordinance allowed a data center on the property by-right, subject to various restrictions. On September 17, 2025, the Board of Supervisors voted to approve an entirely new Zoning Ordinance that went into effect on January 1, 2026. Under the new Zoning Ordinance, all data center projects, including the appellant’s proposed project, require conditional use approval from the Board of Supervisors. Rather than seek conditional use approval, the appellant asserts that it has a vested right to build the proposed data center project, notwithstanding the change to the County’s Zoning Ordinance. On December 22, 2025, nine days before the new Zoning Ordinance went into effect, the appellant requested a written determination from the County regarding its claim to a vested right (Exhibit B). The vesting determination request set forth two grounds for why the appellant believed it possessed a vested right to construct the data center: First, the appellant claimed that several individual County departments had approved the appellant’s site plan submission showing the proposed data center. The appellant nevertheless acknowledged that the site plan had not been fully approved by the County, and that it still contained numerous deficiencies identified by the County. While individual County departments review and comment on site plans with respect to each’s area of responsibility, site plans are approved or disapproved by the County as a whole pursuant to a detailed process established by Va. Code § 15.2-2259. It is undisputed that the County did not approve the site plan prior to the new Zoning Ordinance going into effect on January 1, 2026. Second, the appellant argued that the rezoning of an adjacent property that is owned by a different entity had the effect of approving the appellant’s proposed data center project on its property. On December 17, 2025, an adjacent property, referred to as the Woods Edge parcel or Property 2 in the appeal paperwork, was rezoned from Agricultural to I-2. The rezoned parcel does not include the subject property, and the conditions in the rezoning case do not reference the subject property (See Exhibit C). The appellant does not—and cannot—claim that the rezoning approval for the adjacent property directly changed or affected the zoning status of the subject property. Nevertheless, the appellant contends that the rezoning of the adjacent property entitles the appellant to a vested right with respect to its own, different piece of property. As described below, the appellant is wrong on all counts, and the Board should uphold the written determination finding that the appellant does not have a vested right. II. Appellant’s Stated Grounds of Appeal On appeal, the appellant first claims that the vesting determination is invalid because it was issued by the Director of Planning and not the Zoning Administrator. Second, the appellant argues that the rezoning approval of the adjacent property amounts to an affirmative approval of the appellant’s proposed data center Page 24 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 4 of 24 project that is sufficient to provide it with a vested right. Unlike the vesting determination request, the appeal does not argue that the site plan provides the appellant with a vested right, but the argument is nevertheless addressed below. III. Analysis of Appeal A. The Vesting Determination from the Director of Planning is Valid The appellant argues that the vesting determination is invalid because it was issued in the name of the Director of Planning and not the Zoning Administrator. The appellant’s argument is meritless. The vesting determination was issued pursuant to Virginia Code § 15.2-2286(A), which provides localities with authority to include certain provisions in their zoning ordinances. Among the authorized provisions in a zoning ordinance is the power to administer and enforce the ordinance, and to appoint or designate a zoning administrator. See Va. Code § 15.2-2284(A)(4). That same section provides that the zoning administrator may “mak[e] findings of fact and, with the concurrence of the attorney for the governing body, conclusions of law regarding” vested rights determinations. Id. The statute also provides that the zoning administrator may hold another office within the locality. Id. The County’s Zoning Ordinance is clear that the Director of Planning issues written determinations such as the vesting determination at issue. County Code § 19.2-63(A) (“The Director of Planning shall respond within 90 days of a request for a decision or determination on zoning matters within the scope of their authority.”); see also County Code § 19.2-82(A) (“The Director of Planning interprets this Chapter . . . . The Director of Planning may render a written interpretation upon request . . . .”). The vesting determination was issued pursuant to this authority provided to the Director of Planning in the County Code. Unlike most counties in the Commonwealth, Chesterfield is chartered by an act of the General Assembly. The Charter is a direct grant of authority from the General Assembly setting forth how the County operates. The Charter provides that the Director of Planning shall be responsible for all matters imposed by general law relating to planning and shall have full control of the planning department. See County Charter § 7.4 (“The director of planning shall perform such responsibilities as are imposed by general law and as may be assigned by the planning commission and board of supervisors. The director of planning shall have immediate direction and control of the planning department . . . .”). The power to issue vesting determinations under Va. Code § 15.2-2286(A)(4) is a responsibility imposed by general law, and the Charter provides that such responsibility lies with the Director of Planning. Further, the Charter’s delegation of authority over the Planning Department to the Director of Planning means that, unlike in some localities, the County’s Zoning Administrator is within the direction and control of the Director of Planning, and thus has no independent authority to issue vesting determinations without the consent of the Director of Planning. Therefore, the Director of Planning correctly signed the vesting determination. Additionally, although the vesting determination at issue here was signed by the Director of Planning, the final letter copied Thomas Jenkins, who holds the title of Zoning Administrator, and two members of the County Attorney’s Office. All four of those individuals were involved in drafting and reviewing the vesting determination before it was signed by the Director of Planning. The Zoning Administrator’s participation in that process is alone sufficient to reject the appellant’s argument that the determination is invalid because it was signed by the Director of Planning. Page 25 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 5 of 24 Finally, even if the appellant was correct in its argument that the vesting determination is invalid because it was signed by the Director of Planning—and it is not correct—that would not leave the appellant with a vested right to the proposed project. It would simply mean that a new vesting determination would need to be issued in the name of the Zoning Administrator—the same person who was already involved in the issuance of the current determination. Invalidation of the vesting determination would not itself create a vested right in the appellant’s favor. In sum, the vesting determination signed by the Director of Planning is valid, and the appellant has not identified a legitimate basis to declare it void. B. The Appellant Has Not Demonstrated a Vested Right in the Data Center Project on its Property In limited circumstances, vested rights protect property owners when a locality approves a particular project but later changes the zoning ordinance in such a way that the approved project would no longer be permitted. Vested rights concern projects that have been approved but have not yet been constructed or gone into use at the time of the zoning change. Vested rights are similar to, but more limited and distinct from, nonconforming uses, which concern uses that are already in existence on the property when the zoning regulations change. Vested rights therefore concern the right of a property owner to begin a use after the zoning regulations have already been changed to forbid that use. Property owners possess vested rights only in “limited circumstances.” City of Suffolk v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 266 Va. 137, 143 (2003). There is a three-pronged test to determine if a landowner has a vested right in a particular use against a subsequent amendment to the zoning ordinance. The property owner bears the burden of proof in establishing each prong of the test. Norfolk 102, LLC v. City of Norfolk, 285 Va. 340, 356 (2013). Virginia Code § 15.2-2307(A) governs vested rights and states: [A] landowner’s rights shall be deemed vested in a land use and such vesting shall not be affected by a subsequent amendment to a zoning ordinance when the landowner (i) obtains or is the beneficiary of a significant affirmative governmental act which remains in effect allowing development of a specific project, (ii) relies in good faith on the significant affirmative governmental act, and (iii) incurs extensive obligations or substantial expenses in diligent pursuit of the specific project in reliance on the significant affirmative governmental act. Regarding the first prong, the property owner must demonstrate a “significant affirmative governmental act” (“SAGA”) that is specifically directed to the claimant’s project. City of Suffolk, 266 Va. at 144. The “mere reliance on a particular zoning classification, whether created by ordinance or variance, creates no vested right in the property owner.” Hale v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals for Town of Blacksburg, 277 Va. 250, 272 (2009). Further, “when vested rights accrue to a landowner as the result of a significant affirmative governmental act, the rights that vest are only those that the government affirmatively acts upon, and the evidence to support the claim to those rights must be clear, express, and unambiguous.” Id. at 275 (emphasis added). Critically, the SAGA must approve “a specific project.” Va. Code § 15.2-2307(A). Virginia Code § 15.2-2307(A) enumerates various examples of a SAGA, stating as follows: Page 26 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 6 of 24 For purposes of this section and without limitation, the following are deemed to be significant affirmative governmental acts allowing development of a specific project: (i) the governing body has accepted proffers or proffered conditions which specify use related to a zoning amendment; (ii) the governing body has approved an application for a rezoning for a specific use or density; (iii) the governing body or board of zoning appeals has granted a special exception or use permit with conditions; (iv) the board of zoning appeals has approved a variance; (v) the governing body or its designated agent has approved a preliminary subdivision plat, site plan or plan of development for the landowner's property and the appellant diligently pursues approval of the final plat or plan within a reasonable period of time under the circumstances; (vi) the governing body or its designated agent has approved a final subdivision plat, site plan or plan of development for the landowner's property; or (vii) the zoning administrator or other administrative officer has issued a written order, requirement, decision or determination regarding the permissibility of a specific use or density of the landowner's property that is no longer subject to appeal and no longer subject to change, modification or reversal under subsection C of § 15.2-2311. Va. Code § 15.2-2307(B). This list is not exhaustive and other governmental actions may qualify as a SAGA in certain circumstances. Board of Supervisors v. Crucible, Inc., 278 Va. 152, 160 (2009). i. The appellant cannot rely on a rezoning of a different parcel for its SAGA To claim a SAGA, a landowner must identify an affirmative approval of a specific project granted to the party claiming the vested right. Here, the appellant’s appeal does not identify any action by the County that affirmatively approved the proposed data center project on its property, nor could it. Instead, the appellant relies on the completely novel theory that the Board’s approval of a different project on a different piece of property somehow provides the appellant with the SAGA needed to establish a vested right to the data center project on its property. There is no legal support for the appellant’s theory, and the Board should reject it. To start, under the statute, the claimant must itself “obtain or be the beneficiary” of a SAGA. Va. Code § 15.2- 2307(A). With respect to the rezoning of the adjacent property, the appellant cannot claim that it obtained or was the beneficiary of the SAGA since it did not have any legal interest in the adjacent property. The adjacent property was, and continues to be, owned by a different entity. Moreover, the appellant cannot identify the existence of a SAGA for the data center project at all. Most fundamentally, the appellant’s problem is that it is relying on approval of a different project on a different piece of land. There is no support in the statute or in any Virginia case recognizing a SAGA when the purported approval constituted either a different development or a different parcel. The appellant’s theory fails for both reasons. It is legally irrelevant that the proposed substation on the adjacent property purportedly works in tandem with the appellant’s proposed data center. Different projects require different approvals; legislative actions like rezonings cannot be transferred across property lines. The idea that the Board of Supervisors could approve a controversial use like a data center by reference in a staff presentation in a rezoning of a different property and for a different use would undermine Virginia’s zoning laws and public notice and participation processes. Governing bodies could circumvent public involvement by approving one project on one property under the guise of a different project on a different property. That is emphatically not the law in Virginia, and the appellant provides no legal authority supporting its position. Further, while the appellant argues that the adjacent property will be used as a substation for the proposed data center, the rezoning approved all I-2 Page 27 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 7 of 24 uses, not just the substation use, meaning that the property may be developed for a different use that has no tie to the proposed data center. The Supreme Court of Virginia has already rejected an attempt by a landowner to establish a vested right for itself by relying on a zoning approval for a neighboring property. In Town of Leesburg v. Long Lane Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, a property was rezoned subject to various proffered conditions. 284 Va. 127, 131-32 (2012). The property was later subdivided, and the owner of one of the new parcels claimed a vested right in certain road improvements and restrictions imposed on the adjoining parcel as part of the rezoning. Id. at 132-33. The Supreme Court rejected the landowner’s position, holding that a landowner does not gain a vested right in the zoning of neighboring parcels, even where the landowner’s parcel was previously part of a unified development (which is not the case here). Id. at 134-35. The Court stated that vested rights protect a landowner “from future changes regarding the use of its own property, [and the landowner] has no vested right as to its expectation that the neighboring properties” would use their property in any particular manner. Id. at 136. Here, the appellant similarly relies on a zoning approval issued to a neighboring property to try and establish a vested right on its own property; Long Lane squarely rejects this contention. A governmental approval for one parcel is, by definition, not an approval for a different parcel. The rezoning did not authorize any use of the appellant’s land, did not approve any project on that land, and did not constitute a governmental act directed to the appellant at all, much less the “clear, express, and unambiguous” approval of a specific project” that is required to establish a vested right. Hale, 277 Va. at 255. The rezoning of the adjacent property did not constitute an express approval of the appellant’s data center project, and the appellant therefore cannot rely on it for the existence of a SAGA. ii. The appellant does not have an approved site plan it can rely on for a SAGA Although the appellant does not directly argue this issue in its appeal papers, its initial vesting determination request claimed that it had a SAGA in the form of a partially approved site plan for the data center project. This, too, is incorrect. The vesting request stated that several County departments approved a site plan for the data center project prior to the January 1, 2026 effective date of the new Zoning Ordinance, and that these departmental approvals constitute a SAGA for the project. However, the site plan was never approved, and no individual County department has authority to approve or deny a site plan on its own. Instead, site plans are approved or disapproved in whole by a designated agent appointed by the governing body. See Va. Code § 15.2-2259. At the time of the vesting request, there were outstanding deficiencies in the site plan that had not been addressed. The fact that the site plan had been signed off on by some County departments does not mean that the plans were approved, either for vesting purposes or any other purposes. There is no authority supporting the appellant’s argument that partial approval by some County departments of a site plan constitutes a SAGA, and it does not. iii. The appellant cannot demonstrate reliance on a SAGA In short, because the appellant cannot demonstrate the existence of a SAGA approving the proposed data center project, the appellant likewise cannot demonstrate substantial expenditures in reliance on a SAGA as is required to satisfy the two remaining prongs of the vested rights analysis. Page 28 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 8 of 24 IV. Conclusion A decision by the Director of Planning on zoning matters “shall be presumed to be correct” and “the appellant has the burden of proof to rebut such presumption of correctness by a preponderance of the evidence.” See Va. Code § 15.2-2309(1). The affirmative vote of at least three members of the Board is necessary to reverse the decision or to decide in favor of the Appellant. See Va. Code § 15.2-2312. For the reasons stated, Staff recommends that the Board affirm the Director’s February 12, 2026 vesting determination and deny this appeal. Page 29 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 9 of 24 Current Zoning Map Page 30 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 10 of 24 Exhibit A – Appeal Grounds Page 31 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 11 of 24 Page 32 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 12 of 24 Page 33 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 13 of 24 Page 34 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 14 of 24 Page 35 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 15 of 24 Page 36 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 16 of 24 Exhibit B – Vesting Determination Page 37 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 17 of 24 Page 38 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 18 of 24 Page 39 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 19 of 24 Page 40 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 20 of 24 Exhibit C – Minutes of Adjacent Rezoning Page 41 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 21 of 24 Page 42 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 22 of 24 Page 43 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 23 of 24 Page 44 of 67 Washington Single Family Fund3 26AP2089 Page 24 of 24 Appellant • Appellant’s Contact: H. Leming (540-659-5155) lemingandhealy1@msn.com Secretary to the Board of Zoning Appeals • Thomas Jenkins (804-318-8898) jenkinsth@chesterfield.gov Staff • Planning Department Case Manager: Amy Somervell (804-748-1970) somervella@chesterfield.gov • Environmental Engineering: Douglas Miles (804-768-7797) milesd@chesterfield.gov • Fire & Emergency Medical Services: Christopher Harding (804-971-0399) hardingc@chesterfield.gov • Transportation - County Department of Transportation: Steve Adams (804-751-4461) adamsst@chesterfield.gov • Transportation – Virginia Department of Transportation: Dustin Dunnagan (804-674-2384) dustin.dunnagan@vdot.virginia.gov • Utilities: Jamie Bland (804-751-4439) blandj@chesterfield.gov • Virginia Department of Health: Richard Michniak (804-748-1695) Richard.Michniak@vdh.virginia.gov Case Contacts Page 45 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 1 of 22 26AP2096 – Coastal Contractors LLC Magisterial District – Midlothian Applicant's Contact – Christian Wayman (757-715-1208) BZA Public Hearing – June 3, 2026 Time Remaining 90 Days Case Manager Amy Somervell (804-748-1970) Request Appeal Appealing the February 27, 2026 denial of a variance request to place a residential driveway in and adjacent to a State road that is encumbered with FEMA Floodplain. Staff Recommendation Denial The Property 8031 Lake Shore Drive Site Size 0.45 Acre Figure 1: Aerial of Request Area – Click Image for Link to GIS Figure 2: Street View Staff recommends that the Board of Zoning Appeals deny this appeal and affirm the Director of Environmental Engineering’s denial of the Administrative Variance. Recommendation Page 46 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 2 of 22 Recommendation .................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Current Zoning Map ................................................................................................................................................................ 6 Exhibit A – Denial Letter .......................................................................................................................................................... 7 Exhibit B – Variance Request .................................................................................................................................................. 8 Case Contacts ........................................................................................................................................................................ 22 Table of Contents Page 47 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 3 of 22 Examination of Request Coastal Contractors LLC (“the appellant”) is appealing the February 27, 2026 denial by the Director of Environmental Engineering (attached as Exhibit A) of a variance request to place a residential driveway in and adjacent to a State road that is encumbered with Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) floodplain. The subject property is located within the Suburban Community (SC) zoning district. I. Background Information As required by Virginia and Federal law, the County Code includes provisions that regulate the development of land located near or in floodplain areas. See County Code § 19.2-27. In Chesterfield County, these provisions are referred to as the floodplain management regulations and are in the County’s zoning ordinance. The regulations are intended to regulate uses, activities and development which will cause unacceptable increases in flood heights, velocities and frequencies, as well as restricting or prohibiting such development from locating within areas subject to flooding. Id. These goals are achieved by applying various standards to areas that are identified as special flood hazard areas or floodplains as set forth in maps approved by FEMA. Id. The property at issue is located along the northern border of Chesterfield County. Adjacent to the property to the north lies Lake Shore Drive, which is located almost completely within a FEMA floodplain created by Powhite Creek and Rock Creek Park Lake. The appellant wishes to construct a single-family dwelling on the property and access the property from a proposed driveway that would connect to Lake Shore Drive. The floodplain regulations require that “[a]ll new construction and substantial improvements to existing structure shall have the access driveways elevated to at least the base flood elevation.” See County Code § 19.2-27.D.o. In addition, the regulations provide that “[t]here shall be no filling of any floodplain unless approved by the Director of Environmental Engineering and an approved land disturbance permit, building permit, improvement sketch, subdivision or site plan is on file with the Department of Environmental Engineering.” See County Code § 19.2-27.D.q.1 Because the appellant cannot meet these requirements, it sought an exception (“variance”) to the flood plain requirements from the Director of Environmental Engineering (see variance request dated February 18, 2026, attached as Exhibit B). Pursuant to the requirements of the floodplain ordinance, the Director denied the appellant’s variance request. The appellant then appealed the denial to the Board of Zoning Appeals. II. Appellant’s Stated Grounds of Appeal The appellant acknowledges that a variance from the Director of Environmental Engineering is necessary to construct the driveway because, among other things, Lake Shore Drive is encumbered by a FEMA floodplain. See February 18, 2026 variance request (Exhibit B). In support of the appeal, the appellant stated in its appeal papers that it was appealing the “[d]enial of request for variance to place a residential driveway in and adjacent to a state road that is encumbered with FEMA floodplain” and that the grounds for the appeal were to obtain “[a]ccess to buildable lot for new construction of single-family home.” 1 The parcels to either side of the subject parcel have a single -family dwelling , but these dwellings were constructed during the 1950s, prior to the County’s adoption of the FEMA floodplain ordinance. Page 48 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 4 of 22 III. Analysis of Appeal Subject to stringent qualifying requirements, a property owner may seek a variance from the Director of Environmental Engineering to certain of the floodplain regulations. Under the ordinance, the burden of proof rests on the applicant to justify the variance and, without such proof, the request must be denied. In addition the applicant must “demonstrate good and sufficient cause that failure to grant the variance would result in an exceptional hardship; that granting the variance will not result in increased flood heights, additional threats to public safety or extraordinary public expense, create nuisances, cause fraud on or victimization of the public or conflict with existing local laws or ordinances; and that the variance is the minimum necessary, considering the flood hazard or risk of dam break inundation, to afford relief.” See County Code § 19.2-27.E. In addition to the foregoing, the Director of Environmental Engineering must consider certain factors when reviewing a variance request, including the following: a. The danger to life and property due to increased flood heights or velocities caused by encroachments. No variance shall be granted for any proposed use that will cause any increase in flood levels during the base flood…. k. The expected heights, velocity, duration, rate of rise and sediment transport of the floodwaters expected at the site…. See County Code § 19.2-27.F.2 2 The entire factor list includes the following: a. The danger to life and property due to increased flood heights or velocities caused by encroachments. No variance shall be granted for any proposed use that will cause any increase in flood levels during the base flood. b. The danger of materials being swept onto other lands or downstream and causing injury. c. The proposed water supply and sanitation systems, and the ability of these systems to prevent disease, contamination and unsanitary conditions. d. The susceptibility of the proposed facility and its contents to flood damage and the effect of such damage on the individual owners. e. The importance of the services provided by the proposed facility to the community. f. The requirements of the facility for a waterfront location. g. The availability of alternate locations not subject to flooding for the proposed use. h. The compatibility of the proposed use with existing and anticipated future development. i. The relationship of the proposed use to the comprehensive plan and floodplain management program for the area. j. The safety of access to the property in time of flood by ordinary and emergency vehicles. k. The expected heights, velocity, duration, rate of rise and sediment transport of the floodwaters expected at the site. l. The loss of beneficial natural stormwater management characteristics. m. The historic nature of a structure. Variances to allow for repair or rehabilitation of historic structures may be granted upon a determination that the proposed repair or rehabilitation will not preclude the structure's continued designation as a historic structure, and the variance is the minimum necessary to preserve the historic character and design of the structure. Page 49 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 5 of 22 With respect to the present appeal, the Director of Environmental Engineering denied the appellant’s variance request because, among other things, the Director concluded that the because Lake Shore Drive is completely encumbered by FEMA floodplains and the proposed driveway would require substantial fill to achieve the required elevation requirements, that these conditions (floodplain-encumbered access to the property, elevation requirements of a driveway, and the placement of fill in a floodplain) precluded granting a variance. See February 27, 2026 denial, attached as Exhibit A. Therefore, the appellant had not demonstrated the existence of an exceptional hardship or that the variance (if granted) would not result in increased flood heights or additional risks to public safety. Each of these reasons, as well as the fact that the fill is likely to cause additional flooding to adjacent residential properties, are sufficient to justify the denial and, taken collectively, definitively preclude the Director from approving the variance. IV. Conclusion Upon an appeal to this Board, a decision by an administrative officer in the administration or enforcement of the zoning ordinance (here, the Director of Environmental Engineering) “shall be presumed to be correct” and “the appellant has the burden of proof to rebut such presumption of correctness by a preponderance of the evidence.” See Va. Code § 15.2-2309(1). The affirmative vote of at least three members of the Board is necessary to reverse the decision or to decide in favor of the appellant. See Va. Code § 15.2-2312. For the reasons stated above, staff recommends that the Board of Zoning Appeals affirm the Director of Environmental Engineering’s denial of the appellant’s appeal of the Director’s denial of the appellant’s variance request relating to the floodplain regulations of the County’s zoning ordinance. Page 50 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 6 of 22 Current Zoning Map Page 51 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 7 of 22 Exhibit A – Denial Letter Page 52 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 8 of 22 Exhibit B – Variance Request Page 53 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 9 of 22 Page 54 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 10 of 22 Page 55 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 11 of 22 Page 56 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 12 of 22 Page 57 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 13 of 22 Page 58 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 14 of 22 Page 59 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 15 of 22 Page 60 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 16 of 22 Page 61 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 17 of 22 Page 62 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 18 of 22 Page 63 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 19 of 22 Page 64 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 20 of 22 Page 65 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 21 of 22 Page 66 of 67 Coastal Contractors LLC 26AP2096 Page 22 of 22 Applicant • Applicant’s Contact: Christian Wayman (757-715-1208) Secretary to the Board of Zoning Appeals • Thomas Jenkins (804-318-8898) jenkinsth@chesterfield.gov Staff • Planning Department Case Manager: Amy Somervell (804-748-1970) somervella@chesterfield.gov • Environmental Engineering: Douglas Miles (804-768-7797) milesd@chesterfield.gov • Fire & Emergency Medical Services: Christopher Harding (804-971-0399) hardingc@chesterfield.gov • Transportation - County Department of Transportation: Steve Adams (804-751-4461) adamsst@chesterfield.gov • Transportation – Virginia Department of Transportation: Dustin Dunnagan (804-674-2384) dustin.dunnagan@vdot.virginia.gov • Utilities: Jamie Bland (804-751-4439) blandj@chesterfield.gov • Virginia Department of Health: Richard Michniak (804-748-1695) Richard.Michniak@vdh.virginia.gov Case Contacts Page 67 of 67

Source: Chesterfield County website. First collected Oct 5, 2026.